ISSUE 42 - JUNE 2020 COPIES

  U.S. expels two of Cuba's U.N. diplomats, citing 'influence operations'

Matt Spetalnick

 REUTERS/Alexandre Meneghini

WASHINGTON (Reuters) - The Trump administration on Thursday ordered the expulsion from the United States of two members of Cuba’s delegation to the United Nations and restricted travel of the remaining mission members to Manhattan, drawing strong condemnation from Havana.

In an announcement just days before world leaders gather for the annual U.N. General Assembly, the U.S. State Department accused the two Cuban diplomats of trying to “conduct influence operations” harmful to U.S. national security but did not elaborate on the accusations or release their names.
It was the latest sign of deteriorating U.S. relations with communist-ruled Cuba, focusing especially on Havana’s support for Venezuela’s socialist President Nicolas Maduro, since U.S. President Donald Trump took office in January 2017.
“The Department of State today notified the Cuban Ministry of Foreign Affairs that the United States requires the imminent departure of two members of Cuba’s Permanent Mission to the United Nations for abusing their privileges of residence,” State Department spokeswoman Morgan Ortagus said in statement.
“This is due to their attempts to conduct influence operations against the United States,” she said.
Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez rejected the U.S. actions as “unjustified,” saying on Twitter: “The imputation that they might have carried out actions incompatible with their diplomatic status is a vulgar slander.”
“The expulsion ... has the aim of provoking a diplomatic spiral that would lead to the closure of bilateral embassies, further tightening of the (U.S.) blockade and creation of tensions between both countries,” he said.
Ortagus said the movements of other members of the Cuban delegation would “essentially” be limited to the island of Manhattan.
“We take any and all attempts against the national security of the United States seriously, and will continue to investigate any additional personnel who may be manipulating their privileges of residence.”
Under the 1947 U.N. “headquarters agreement,” the United States is generally required to allow access to the United Nations for foreign diplomats. But Washington says it can deny visas for “security, terrorism, and foreign policy” reasons, though this provision is only invoked on a limited basis.
Over the decades, Washington and Havana, old Cold War foes, have engaged in tit-for-tat expulsions of diplomats.
The Trump administration expelled 15 Cuban diplomats in September 2017 after sharply drawing down U.S. embassy staff in Havana over a mysterious affliction that Washington said had affected American personnel there.
The Republican president has imposed new economic sanctions on Cuba and restricted travel to the island, steadily rolling back parts of the historic opening under his Democratic predecessor, Barack Obama.
Washington has made clear that a key objective of its pressure campaign is to force Cuba to abandon Maduro, something Havana has said it will never do. Trump, however, has stopped short of breaking off diplomatic relations with Cuba restored by Obama in 2015 after more than five decades of hostility.

Reporting by Matt Spetalnick; additional reporting by Lisa Lambert in Washington, Michelle Nichols in New York and Sarah Marsh in Havana; editing by Grant McCool

 Diplomatic showdown at the UN as Cuba interrupts US meeting 

By Elizabeth Joseph and Richard Roth,

Cuban diplomats interrupt UN event 02:16

(CNN)This wasn't the "Missiles of October," the famed nuclear showdown between Cuba and the United States in 1962, but tensions between the two countries were impossible to ignore at the United Nations Tuesday afternoon.

A US event meant to highlight the plight of Cuba's political prisoners was drowned out by the noise of Cuban diplomats banging on tables and voices screaming, "Cuba yes, blockade no" across a large conference room, a reference to the US economic embargo against the island nation.

Cuban diplomats were using both hands to slap the rectangular table while others were yelling in Spanish, and although US Ambassador Kelley Currie repeatedly asked for security, officers stood watching the protest without intervening. Why? Because the protesters were accredited UN diplomats from Cuba, and yelling diplomats cannot be physically restrained based on UN security protocols.

The United States may be considered the most powerful member -- financially and diplomatically -- at the United Nations, but despite its status, security would not step into the fray.

The near 90-minute meeting was met with the sound of dissent by Cuban diplomats, with panelists trying their best not to acknowledge the uproar.

"I was ready to end the proceedings, but I'm damned if I'm going to do it for you. So I can sit here all day and let you shout yourselves silly," Ambassador Michael Kozak told the protesters. Kozak, of the US State Department's Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, moderated a panel after Currie's remarks.

"I have never in my life seen diplomats behave in the way the Cuban delegation did today," Currie, the US representative on the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations, told reporters after leaving the conference room, calling protesters actions "shocking and disturbing."

"It makes you wonder that if the diplomats of this government behave this way, how do the police behave?"

The "thuggish behavior" displayed by the diplomats has no place at the United Nations, Currie said, adding that the island nation and its diplomatic representatives should be ashamed of themselves.

The estimated 130 political prisoners held by the Cuban government are "an explicit sign of the repressive nature of the regime and represent a blatant affront to the fundamental freedoms that the United States and many other democratic governments support," the State Department said in a statement describing the event.

"Holding the Cuban regime responsible for its human rights violations and supporting the Cuban people's aspirations to live in freedom are key components of President Trump's National Security Presidential Memorandum of 2017."

Cuba forcefully objected to this meeting being called by the United States, appealing in vain in recent days to the United Nations, and writing a letter to the UN secretary-general.

The "Jailed for What?" event was an attempt by the United States to hoodwink the international community into ignoring its own human rights violations at home and abroad, a statement released by the Cuban Mission to the United Nations said.

The United States has a "pattern of systematic violations of all human rights," it said, citing torture of Guantanamo detainees, the murder of African-Americans at the hands of police officers, and imprisonment of immigrants.

The secretary-general of the Organization of American States, a former political prisoner, and the sister of a current political prisoner in Cuba comprised an expert panel in the meeting. But of all the words exchanged, the ambassador may be the only person who may want to retract her opening comments.

"Thank you for coming," Currie said, welcoming everyone to the event.

CNN's Patrick Oppmann contributed to this report from Havana, Cuba.

 

Gunman With Assault Rifle Shoots Up Cuban Embassy In Washington. No One Hurt.

By Tim Padgett • Apr 30, 2020

• 
  
  

  Washington, D.C., police inspect large bullet holes fired Thursday morning into the facade of the Cuban Embassy.

  Andrew Harnik / AP

These aren’t the best of times for Cuba. The COVID-19 crisis has deepened the communist island’s crippling economic shortages. And now, a gunman shot up the outside of Cuba’s embassy in Washington early Thursday morning.

At about 2 a.m., Washington, D.C., police say an SUV pulled up at the Cuban embassy and a man jumped out with an assault rifle. Neighbors were awakened by a hail of gunfire that tore large bullet holes across the embassy’s façade and into a statue of Cuban hero José Martí.

No one was injured. Police quickly arrested the alleged shooter: Alexander Alazo, a 42-year-old man from Aubrey, Texas. He was charged with possessing an unregistered firearm (which had a high-capacity magazine) and assault with intent to kill.
What police and Secret Service agents — who investigate crimes against diplomatic missions — say they still don’t have is a motive. (The Associated Press reported Thursday afternoon a preliminary police report suspects the attack was a hate crime.) Alazo seems to have little if any social media footprint.
The official Cuban newspaper Granma said Alazo was not on the communist government’s radar screen of anti-Cuba militants in the U.S. In tweets, Cuban President Miguel Díaz-Canel and Foreign Minister Bruno Rodríguez said only they were awaiting an investigation by U.S. authorities and urged them to protect embassies there.

https://www.wlrn.org

Cuba. Systematic Repression of Dissent

	United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services
	1 December 1998
	[PS/CUB/99.001]
	United States Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services, Cuba. Systematic Repression of Dissent, 1 December 1998, [PS/CUB/99.001], available at: https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6a60c0.html [accessed 26 November 2019]
	The July 27, 1990 Regulations, "Aliens and Nationality: Asylum and Withholding of Deportation Procedures," mandated the creation of a new corps of Asylum Officers to provide an initial, nonadversarial adjudication of asylum claims. Asylum Officers use asylum law, interviews with asylum applicants, and relevant information on country conditions to determine the merits of individual claims for asylum. The Resource Information Center was created to assist Asylum Officers domestically, and Immigration Officers determining refugee status overseas, by collecting and disseminating credible and objective information on human rights conditions. As specified in the Regulations (8 CFR 208.12), such information may be obtained from the Department of Justice, the Department of State, and "other credible sources, such as international organizations, private voluntary organizations, or academic institutions." Resource Information Center Papers are one of the means by which information reflecting a wide range of credible sources is summarized for easy access by Asylum and Immigration Officers. The views expressed in Resource Information Center papers do not necessarily represent official U.S. Government opinion, nor do they reflect U.S. foreign policy concerns. This paper was written on the basis of publicly available information, analyses, and comment. All sources are cited. This paper cannot be, and does not purport to be, either exhaustive with regard to the country surveyed, or conclusive as to the merits of any claim to refugee status or asylum. Updates to this paper may be made from time to time. NOTE: This paper has been particularly written to address the information needs and issues of concern to U.S. Asylum Officers and other Immigration Officers. As such, it may not be exhaustive in its coverage of human rights issues within the country. To facilitate timely access, certain information may be repeated in several sections of this paper.
	This is not a UNHCR publication. UNHCR is not responsible for, nor does it necessarily endorse, its content. Any views expressed are solely those of the author or publisher and do not necessarily reflect those of UNHCR, the United Nations or its Member States.

I.          INTRODUCTION

As described in chapters II-VII of this report, Cuba is a one-party Communist state, in which every Cuban is subject to a totalitarian system of political and social control. That system is institutionalized and given legal framework by the 1976 Constitution and the Penal Code, which together outlaw virtually any form of political or civic activity outside the purview of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC). Anyone deemed by the regime to be in opposition to it is regarded as a "counterrevolutionary" and an "enemy," and is therefore at risk of punishment. The judicial system is constitutionally subordinated to the executive and legislative branches and under the control of the PCC. That leaves Cubans with no recourse before the unlimited powers of the state, which has "zero tolerance for the growth of civil society"^[1][1] and systematically violates the rights to freedom of expression, association, assembly, privacy and due process of law.
The only mitigating factors are international opinion, and the leverage provided by the Cuban government's need since the demise of the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc to secure Western investment to keep Cuba's ailing economy from collapsing. In the 1990s Cuban dissidents have sought to take advantage of the regime's vulnerability in this regard. As described in Chapters IX, XI and XIV, and as can be seen in the lists of members of the Concilio Cubano, Cuban Council, in Appendices I and III, dissident groups have proliferated in this decade despite repeated crackdowns against them. What began in the second half of the 1970s as a handful of human rights groups has grown into a diverse array which now includes independent journalists, youth and women's organizations, trade unionists, former political prisoners, lawyers' groups, medical associations, artists, environmentalists and farmers.
More than 130 dissident organizations affiliated themselves with the Concilio Cubano, which is described in Chapter XI, while others remained independent even though they may have shared its non-violent, democratic principles. More recently, many dissident groups have joined two new umbrella groups that have emerged in the wake of the 1996 crackdown against the Concilio Cubano: the Grupo de Trabajo de la Disidencia Interna, Internal Dissidence Work Group, and the Alianza Nacional Cubana, Cuban National Alliance, both of which are described in Chapter XIV, and were targeted in the 1997 summer crackdown.
In response to international pressure, the Cuban government has occasionally made human rights gestures-for example, the freeing of political prisoners or a slight easing of repression. However, the laws that legalize and provide impunity for human rights violations and the suppression of peaceful dissent have never been altered, except to strengthen them. The only exception was the constitutional reform in 1991 which lessened some of the restrictions on religious expression, a tactical maneuver by the regime which is assessed in Chapter XVI, Section D.
The statement by prominent Cuban dissident and human rights monitor Elizardo Sanchez Santa Cruz during a slight thaw in spring 1995 has always held true: "Repression always had its ups and downs, and the current situation can change tomorrow because we have no guarantee of human rights here."^[2][2] Indeed, the U.S. Department of State reported the following year:
The government's human rights record worsened in 1996 with the large-scale crackdown against the prodemocracy umbrella group "Concilio Cubano," the shootdown of two U.S. civilian airplanes in international airspace, increased reports of deaths due to the excessive use of force by police, further restrictions on the distribution of foreign publications, increased use of exile and internal exile to control the activities of independent journalists and human rights advocates, antagonism to any foreign diplomatic criticism of human rights practices, restrictions on foreign contacts with human rights activists, the denial of visas to prominent U.S. journalists, and the expulsions of visiting foreign journalists.^[3][3]^[4][i]
Also with regard to 1996, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Cuba concluded in his most recent report, "To be a dissident in Cuba is as difficult today as it has been at any time in recent years."^[5][4]
Those readers who are looking for a reference to a specific group or organization should consult the Index and Appendices I and II. It should be emphasized, however, that if the group in question is not mentioned in this report, it does not mean that group does not or has not at some time existed. When searching for references to a particular group, it should be kept in mind that some parts of a group's name may be dropped in common parlance or in media accounts. For example, the Movimiento Cubano de Jóvenes por la Democracia, Cuban Movement of Youth for Democracy, is often referred to simply as Jóvenes por la Democracia. Also, spellings of people's names are not necessarily rendered exactly, due in large part to the difficulties Cuban dissidents and independent journalists experience in transmitting information between themselves and with the world outside Cuba.

II.         THE STRUCTURE OF THE STATE

Cuba is a one-party Communist state. Communist structures were institutionalized under the Constitution approved after more than a decade of preparation by the first congress of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC) in December 1975. The Constitution was formally implemented in February 1976. At the fourth PCC congress in October 1991, the single-party state was reaffirmed and the Constitution was amended to reinforce Communist rule. Article 5 of the Constitution states:
The Communist Party of Cuba, based on Marxism-Leninism and the thought of José Martí, is the organized vanguard of the Cuban nation and the highest directing force of the society and the State, which organizes and orients the common efforts toward the high aims of building socialism and advancing toward the communist society.
José Martí was the hero of the fight for Cuban independence from Spain in the late 1800s, and his mantle is claimed, too, by many organizations that oppose the government, both in Cuba and abroad.
The Cuban Constitution provides for collegiate state and governmental organs modeled after those of the old Soviet Union as prescribed in the 1936 Soviet Constitution. But unlike the charters of the former Soviet Union and its Eastern Bloc allies, the Cuban Constitution concentrates enormous power in a single individual-Fidel Castro.
The Constitution provides for a National Assembly of People's Power whose members emerge from an electoral process controlled by the PCC. Theoretically, the National Assembly designates a Council of State which appoints a Council of Ministers in consultation with its president who serves as head of state and chief of government. In reality, there is no separation of powers between the executive and the legislative body-Fidel Castro is responsible for virtually every appointment and the National Assembly meets for only a few days twice a year to ratify his decisions. In 1996 the National Assembly convened only once. Moreover, Article 91 of the Constitution grants Castro, as head of state and government, the unlimited authority to "assume leadership of any ministry or central agency of the administration." Fidel Castro, as first secretary of the PCC, president of the Council of Ministers, chairman of the Council of State, and commander-in-chief of the Revolutionary Armed Forces (FAR), is a "hands-on caudillo"^[6][5] who controls every lever of power in Cuba.^[7][6]
The 1991 PCC congress marked a new high in the personality cult of Fidel Castro, as it granted him even greater power within the PCC, the nation's dominant institution. The congress dissolved the PCC Secretariat and its Central Committee departments, further centralizing policy-making authority in the PCC Political Bureau presided over by Castro, along with his younger brother, Raúl, who is PCC second secretary.^[8][7]
At the fifth PCC congress held on October 8-10, 1997, the trend continued. The number of members of the Central Committee was reduced from 225 to 150, further enhancing Fidel Castro's power. Eight people were removed from the Political Bureau and seven added, which dropped the membership to 24 from 25. Diplomats in Havana said that the authority of all the newcomers "derives directly from Fidel." In his opening-day speech to the congress, the now 71-year-old Fidel Castro stated, "Anything but retreat, anything but surrender…This nation, this party will never surrender their unity." He also formally endorsed his brother Raúl, 66, as his successor.^[9][8] In turn, Raúl Castro explained to the congress that the downsizing of the Central Committee was designed to make the body immune to "ideological viruses." He added, "What happened to the socialist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union is not going to happen here."^[10][9]
The Cuban armed forces, with Fidel Castro as commander-in-chief and Raúl Castro as second-in-command, are fully politicized, with the PCC acting as overseer. Since 1975, PCC organization has reached from top to bottom within the military. Political instruction for every member of the military is mandatory, systematic, and is carried out almost daily for new draftees and non-officers. The National Commission of the Party in the Armed Forces, headed by Raúl Castro, selects the political instructors. Members of the military who do not join the PCC or its youth branch, the Union of Communist Youth, are almost never promoted above the rank of non-commissioned officer (the PCC controls admission to officer school) and may be otherwise ostracized. Because of the discipline-based military command structure, refusal by any soldier to participate in PCC instruction and activities is considered insubordination and grounds for punishment, as is the expression of political opinion or any other behavior deemed not to be in accord with PCC training and ideology.^[11][10]
The Cuban judiciary is constitutionally subordinated to the executive and legislative branches. Article 121 of the Constitution states:
The courts constitute a system of state organs subordinate hierarchically to the National Assembly of People's Power and the Council of State.
Article 121 further grants the Council of State the authority to exercise the legislative initiative and regulatory power to make decisions and issue rules binding on all the courts, and on the basis of this, to give binding instructions in order to establish a uniform judicial practice in the interpretation and enforcement of the law.
Moreover, Articles 125 and 126 of the Constitution provide for a system of oversight that requires judges to provide regular accounts of their work to the PCC-controlled political bodies that appoint them and have the power to remove them at will.

III.        OPPOSITION OUTLAWED BY THE CONSTITUTION

Amendments to the Constitution made by the PCC at its 1991 congress reaffirmed the illegality of any political or civic activity outside the structures of the state. Although the charter, in Article 54, still appears to grant certain rights regarding freedom of association and assembly, these rights are subordinated to the construction and preservation of Communist rule, as stated in Article 62:
None of the freedoms recognized for citizens may be exercised against the provisions of the Constitution and the laws, nor against the existence and ends of the socialist state, nor against the decision of the Cuban people to build socialism and communism. Infractions of this principle are punishable.
Freedom of expression is similarly circumscribed by Article 53, which states:
Freedom of speech and the press are recognized for citizens consistent with the purposes of socialist society. The material conditions for their exercise are present by the fact that the press, radio, television, the cinema and other mass media are state-owned or socially owned and can never be privately owned, which ensures their use exclusively in the service of the working people and in the interest of society.
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States (IACHR-OAS), in the chapter on Cuba in its most recent annual report, onsiders that the Cuban Constitution clearly establishes the legal bases for censorship, since the state is the only one that can determine whether oral or written expression, the right to association and assembly, or the other rights set forth in the Constitution are contrary to the prevailing political system.^[12][11]
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights further states:
There are no legal means for openly challenging the policies of the Government or Party, or competing as a group, movement, or political party organization for the right to govern, to replace the Communist Party and its leaders by peaceful means, and to develop new and different policies…it is impossible to make open and organized criticism of the policies of the Government and the Party that might hold top leaders accountable or make them susceptible to being removed from office.^[13][12]
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights concludes that the regime in Cuba is "a totalitarian political system,"^[14][13] as the Cuban Constitution eliminates any possibility of defense for the individual before the power of the state, and confers constitutional protection on the arbitrary exercise of power against the people of Cuba.^[15][14]
The only softening evident at the fourth PCC congress in 1991 concerned relations between the state and the Catholic Church. After seizing power in 1959, the Castro government nationalized church property and closed Catholic schools. However, since the Cuban economic crisis that began with the collapse of the Eastern Bloc and the Soviet Union (1989-1991), the government has eased restrictions on worship. At the fourth PCC congress the Constitution was amended to allow practicing Christians to be members of the PCC, and the state, previously atheist, was declared to be "secular."^[16][15]
In 1997, Fidel Castro agreed to a visit to Cuba by Pope John Paul II on January 21-25, 1998, an attempt by the Cuban government to gain greater international recognition even as it steps up repression against dissidents. Since the fourth PCC congress, the Catholic church has attempted, with some success, to test the limits of the government's desire to project a more tolerant image abroad. A more detailed discussion of the current dynamic between the government and the Catholic Church, and the situation of worshipers in general, is discussed in Chapter XVI, Section D, of this report.

IV.        THE PENAL CODE

The restrictive constitutional framework is supplemented by the Cuban Penal Code which, as summarized by the executive director of Human Rights Watch/Americas,
provides a solid legal foundation for the repression of political dissidence.^[17][16]
Although many of the crimes defined by the Penal Code do not necessarily target the exercise of basic political and civil rights, "they are so ambiguously and broadly defined that they may be discriminatorily applied to prevent Cubans from exercising these rights."^[18][17]
Among the most serious crimes under the Penal Code as it pertains to suppressing political rights are rebeldía, or "rebellion," which is defined as acting with the intention to depose the Cuban government; sabotaje, "sabotage"; and terrorismo, "terrorism." Conviction usually results in lengthy prison sentences. Until 1993-1994 these charges were frequently brought against individuals for their peaceful advocacy of democracy and respect for human rights.
For example, independent journalist Yndamiro Restano Díaz, an avowed pacifist, was convicted of "rebellion" in 1992 for leading a democratic socialist organization, El Movimiento Armonía, The Harmony Movement, which advocated changing the government through peaceful means. Restano was sentenced to ten years in prison, even though the prosecution's witnesses affirmed at his trial that Restano was a pacifist who never advocated violence.^[19][18] Restano was subsequently released on June 1, 1995, following the visit to Cuba of a human rights delegation led by Danielle Mitterand, head of the French charitable organization, France-Liberté, and wife of the former French prime minister, Francois Mitterand. The government said his release was unconditional, but after granting him permission later in 1995 to travel to Europe as part of his journalistic work, it prevented his return to Cuba.^[20][19]
Since 1993-1994, however, as Fidel Castro has attempted to improve his government's human rights image as part of an effort to attract foreign investment and build international support against the U.S. economic embargo of Cuba, the Cuban state has resorted more to charging dissidents with crimes punishable by shorter prison sentences and with offenses that are less overtly political.^[21][20] The articles of the Penal Code now used more frequently to suppress dissent include:^[22][21]
• Article 144, which defines the crime ofdesacato, or "disrespect." Itstates that anyone who threatens, slanders, defames, insults, harms or inanyway outrages or offends, verbally or in writing, the dignity or honor of anauthority, public official, or their agents or auxiliaries, in the exercise oftheir functions or because of them can be imprisoned for between three monthsand one year or fined or both. If the act of disrespect is directed at the headof state or other senior officials the penalty is a prison term from one tothree years.
•Articles 208 and 209, which define the crime ofasociación ilícita, or "illicitassociation." These articles state that anyone belonging to an unregisteredassociation can be fined or imprisoned for between one and three months. Thepromoters or leaders of such an association can be fined or imprisoned forbetween three months and a year. Anyone who participates in illegal meetings ordemonstrations can be fined or imprisoned for between one and three months. Theorganizers of illegal meetings or demonstrations can be fined or imprisoned forbetween three months and a year.
•Article 103, which defines the crime ofpropaganda enemiga, or "enemypropaganda." It states that anyone who incites against the social order,international solidarity or the socialist state by means of verbal, written orany other kind of propaganda, or who makes, distributes or possesses suchpropaganda, can be imprisoned from between one to eight years. Anyone whospreads false news or malicious predictions likely to cause alarm or discontentamong the population, or public disorder, can be imprisoned from between oneand four years. If the mass media are used, the sentence can be from seven tofifteen years in prison.
•Article 207, which defines the crime ofasociación para delinquir, or"associating with others to commit crimes." It states that if three or morepersons join together in a group to commit crimes, they can be imprisoned forbetween one and three years, simply for meeting together. If the only objectiveof the group is to provoke disorder or interrupt family or public parties,spectacles or other community events or to commit other anti-social acts, thepenalty is a fine or a prison sentence of between three months and one year.
•Article 115, which defines the crime ofdifusión de falsas informaciones contrala paz internacional, or "dissemination of false information againstinternational peace." It states that anyone who spreads false news with aim ofdisturbing international peace or putting in danger the prestige or credit ofthe Cuban State or its good relations with another state can be imprisoned forbetween one and four years.
•Article 143, which defines the crime ofresistencia, or "resistance." Onoccasion, the crime is referred to asdesobediencia,or "disobedience." It states that anyone who resists an official in theexercise of his duties can be imprisoned for between three months and a year orfined. If the official is trying to apprehend a criminal or someone who hasescaped from prison, the penalty is a prison term from two to five years.
•Articles 72-90, which define the crime ofpeligrosidad, or "dangerousness." Thesearticles come under the heading, "The Dangerous Status and Security Measures,"a section of the Penal Code under which someone can be sentenced for up to fouryears in prison on the grounds that the authorities believe the individual hasa "special proclivity" to commit crimes, even though he or she might not haveactually committed a crime. These articles broadly define "dangerous" people asthose who act in a manner that contradicts "socialist morality" or engage in"anti-social behavior." Moreover, Article 75 provides for an "official warning"to people the authorities deem to be in danger of becoming "dangerous," i.e.,those who are not yet "dangerous" but who are regarded as having criminaltendencies because of their "ties or relations with people who are potentiallydangerous to society, other people, and to the social, economic and politicalorder of the socialist State…"
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (IACHR)concludes that because of "their lack of precision and their subjectivenature," the legal definitions of "dangerousness" and such terms as "socialistlegality" and "standards of socialist coexistence," constitute a source ofjuridical insecurity which creates conditions permitting the Cuban authoritiesto take arbitrary action.^[23][22]
In other words, the Penal Code articles which define"dangerousness" constitute a catch-all mechanism which gives the government thelegal justification for taking any citizen it wants out of circulation. AsHuman Rights Watch/Americas stated in October 1995:
Cubans who engage in "anti-social behavior" or violate"socialist morality" may be held in preventive detention under the"dangerousness" provisions of the criminal code for as long as four years, evenwithout being convicted of a crime.^[24][23]
According to Pax Christi Netherlands and AmnestyInternational, there are clear indications that the crime of "dangerousness" isused as a cover to imprison people for political reasons on the grounds thatthey are common delinquents.^[25][24]
The Penal Code also defines the crime ofsalida illegal del país, "illegalexit from country." Under Penal CodeArticles 216 and 217, those caughttrying to leave the country without the permission of the government can befined or imprisoned for up to three years if they have not used violence and upto eight years if force or intimidation is used. In cases where passengervessels or airplanes are hijacked, the charge is usually one ofpiratería, "piracy." Under Penal CodeArticle 117, piracy carries a penalty of up to 20 years imprisonment, or apossible sentence of death if there is loss of life or risk to the lives ofothers.^[26][25]
In the past three decades, thousands of Cubans have beenimprisoned for trying to leave the island without permission. In 1994, illegalexit prisoners were thought to constitute the largest category of politicalprisoners in Cuba. In 1990 alone, there were 335 inmates convicted of illegalexit serving time in a single prison in Havana, theCombinado del Este.^[27][26]
Under the 1995 U.S.-Cuba immigration agreement, the Cubangovernment promised to "ensure that no action is taken against those migrantsreturned to Cuba as a consequence of their attempt to emigrate illegally."^[28][27]However, the Cuban government still has neither eliminated nor amended PenalCode Articles 216 and 217 to reflect this commitment. Although recently thereappears to be a trend toward lighter penalties – e.g., fines and/or housearrest – particularly in cases of first-time offenders, Articles 216 and 217are still used to punish people for trying to leave the country withoutpermission. That underscores the fact that the threat of punishment continuesto hang over the heads of those who are returned to Cuba following attempts toleave without authorization. The current status of the U.S.-Cuba immigrationagreement and the condition of Cubans who have been repatriated to Cuba arediscussed in Chapter XVI, Section C, of this report.

V.THEJUDICIAL SYSTEM

As explained in Chapter II on the "Structure of the State,"the Cuban judiciary is constitutionally subordinated to the executive andlegislative branches, and under the control of the PCC. Articles 125 and 126 ofthe Constitution provide for a system of oversight that requires judges toprovide regular accounts of their work to the PCC-controlled political bodiesthat appoint them and have the power to remove them at will. Following itsinvestigation in Cuba from July 15 to August 4, 1995, the delegation from PaxChristi Netherlands concluded:
There is no rule of law. Instead the juridical systemserves as an instrument of political control…Political prisoners are notrecognized as such. Those jailed for political reasons are officially labeled‘counterrevolutionaries.'^[29][28]
In the most recent assessment of the Inter-AmericanCommission on Human Rights:
…in Cuba there is still de facto and de juresubordination of the administration of justice to the political authorities.^[30][29]
In its most recent report on Cuba, Human RightsWatch/America determined that Cuban trials
…fall short of international due process requirements.Journalists and other observers are often barred from attending [trials],violating the right to a public trial. Defense witnesses are often barred fromtestifying in them, violating the right to defense. In the end, defendants arealmost always convicted and their convictions are almost always upheld onappeal.^[31][30]
The legal profession itself, as with every other professionin Cuba, is under the control of the state. Decree Law No. 81, instituted in1984, requires that in order to practice, attorneys must belong to theOrganización Nacional de Bufetes Colectivos(ONBC), National Organization of Collective Law Offices, which is controlled bythe PCC through the Ministry of Justice. According to this law, to attainmembership in the ONBC an attorney must "have moral characteristics inaccordance with the principles of our society," which in practice has impededthe entry of those who dissent from the political system in place.^[32][31]
Elections for ONBC directors are controlled by the PCC, andONBC directors use systematic intimidation against those holding opinionscounter to the political line of the organization. In 1996, the Inter-AmericanCommission on Human Rights
…received many complaints that describe arbitrarydetentions, summonses to appear before police authorities and prosecutors,expulsions from law offices, and even prison sentences for lawyers who soughtto exercise their profession independently.^[33][32]
The Inter-American Commission also received informationabout irregularities during trials of individuals charged with crimes of apolitical nature. The Commission noted that in these cases, hearing rooms arefilled with police and State Security agents who impede access to journalistsand the public; defendants are not given sufficient time to examine case filesbefore trial; and defendants are often denied access to defense attorneysuntil, in many cases, the moment the trial begins. The Commission notes furtherthat while there are no legal grounds to prevent defense witnesses, defensewitnesses are rare because of "the fear of reprisals by the State." Finally,the Commission notes the Cuban state policy
…of intimidating defense attorneys for personsdetained on political grounds, who run the risk of being accused, in reprisal,for the mere fact of having such clients.^[34][33]
Similarly, Amnesty International noted in an April 1996report on
…Cuba that, in cases of a political nature, the roleof the defense lawyer is severely limited…In recent years the few defenselawyers who have been more outspoken have found themselves penalized inprofessional terms and sometimes dismissed or threatened with physicalviolence.^[35][34]
In its August 1997 report on Cuba, Amnesty Internationalstated:
Very few defense lawyers, all of whom are employed bythe state, are willing to argue strongly in defence of their client for fear ofreprisals against themselves. Prosecution witness are also sometimes subjectedto undue pressures to testify against the accused. Those accused of crimesagainst state security (which include "enemy propaganda") are tried inprovincial courts and are normally not permitted access to lawyers while inpre-trial detention. Such detention can last several weeks or months. Duringthat period they may be subjected to psychological pressures , includingthreats against relatives, to sign incriminating statements…Cases involvingmore minor offences, such as "disrespect" or "dangerousness," are tried inmunicipal courts. According to the Cuban Penal Code, the participation of adefence lawyer is "not indispensable" in municipal court cases although, if thedefendant wishes, he or she may appoint one. However, in practice, thedefendant frequently has no opportunity to consult a lawyer, especially when,as often happens, the relatives are not informed of the arrest or the trialtakes place within a day or so of the arrest.^[36][35]

VI.THE PERVASIVE PRESENCE OF THE STATE

The goal of the Castro regime has been to "fuse state andsociety."^[37][36]The two principal, overlapping instruments are the PCC, which "rules over everylevel of Cuban life,"^[38][37]andthe Ministry of Interior (MININT). The MININT contains within it a vast,nationwide surveillance and repressive apparatus to keep the population inline. The principal departments in the MININT for exercising political andsocial control are theDepartamento deSeguridad del Estado(DSE), Department of State Security, commonly referredto simply as "State Security," and theDepartamento Técnico de Investigaciones(DTI), Department of TechnicalInvestigations. The headquarters of State Security is housed in a formerseminary in the Havana section of Villa Marista and is often referred to simplyas "Villa Marista." Through the use of electronic surveillance, undercoveragents and a widespread network of informants who are often coerced orblackmailed, MININT has the capability and the mandate to spy on or forciblyintrude in the lives of any citizen for any reason, anytime, anywhere.According to the U.S. Department of State:
The State has assumed the right to interfere in thelives of citizens, even those who do not actively oppose the Government and itspractices.^[39][38]
Human Rights Watch/Americas has described the situation thisway:
The violation of the right of privacy is systematicand pervasive. Tight political control in Cuba is maintained through extensivemonitoring of Cubans' daily lives.^[40][39]
MININT, like the PCC, is deeply imbedded in the structuresof the military,^[41][40]and also controls the uniformed Revolutionary National Police (PNR).
MININT's surveillance and control of the population areenhanced by numerous PCC-controlled mass organizations, including theComités de Defensa de la Revolución(CDRs), Committees for the Defense of the Revolution; theCentral de Trabajadores de Cuba(CTC), Cuban Confederation ofLabor; theUnión de Jóvenes Comunistas(UJC), Union of Communist Youth; theFederaciónde Mujeres Cubanas(FMC), Federation of Cuban Women; theFederación de Estudiantes Universitarios(FEU), Federation of University Students; theFederación de Estudiantes de Escuelas Medias(FEEM), Federation ofSecondary School Students; theAsociaciónNacional de Agricultores Pequeños(ANAP), Association of Small Farmers; andeven thePioneros, Pioneers, aScout-like organization for pre-adolescent youth. The FEEM and the FEU arefrequently mobilized intoBrigadas Estudiantilesde Trabajo(BETs), Student Work Brigades, for collective work inagriculture and in construction brigades.
The CDRs are a nationwide network of neighborhood blockassociations which act as appendages of the state security apparatus, operatingas its eyes and ears on a daily basis. The CDRs were founded in 1960 as adefense against violent counterrevolution and developed into a ubiquitousmechanism of social and political control. The CDR system, like all massorganizations in Cuba, is organized like a pyramid. There is a nationaldirectorate headed by a national coordinator. At the next level are thefourteen CDR provincial committees, and beneath those are regional, municipaland zone committees. The zone CDRs oversee the individual block committees.^[42][41]
CDR members spy on their neighbors and, in turn, urge themto spy on others and fill out "Opinion Collection Forms" about what they heartheir neighbors and colleagues saying during the course of daily life,particularly their political opinions. The completed forms are then passed onby the CDRs to the police and MININT. The CDRs also rely on networks ofchivatos, "stool pigeons," to gatherinformation on people's behavior.^[43][42]TheCDRs operate in conjunction and overlap with the CTC, the UJC, the FMC, and theFEU, which perform the same functions in the workplace and in the schools. Thefailure to report criminal activity, including political "crimes," is itselfconsidered a crime punishable under Cuban law.^[44][43]Inassessing the penetration of the state into daily life, one young man said tothe delegation from Pax Christi Netherlands, "I can't even trust my friends."^[45][44]
Another organization whose purposes include social andpolitical control is the Territorial Troop Militia (MTT). The MTT wasestablished in 1980 under the direction of the PCC and in 1992 had an estimated1.5 million people under paramilitary discipline.^[46][45]The stated purpose of the MTT was to defend against foreign invasion, but theMTT is foremost a political instrument for mobilizing a discontented populace,intensifying political indoctrination and reinforcing a garrison statementality.^[47][46]
In sum, there is no official organization that is not gearedto combat and root out dissent and disaffection with the political system.State Security, the array of PCC-controlled mass organizations and the MTTcomprise an integrated system of organized surveillance and informing on amassive scale.
Cuba's severe economic problems since the collapse of theSoviet Union and the Eastern Bloc appear to have undercut the effectiveness ofthe CDRs to some extent, particularly in terms of their ability to mobilizegreat numbers of people for PCC gatherings and activities, another of theirprescribed functions. However, during a ten-day trip to Cuba in the spring of 1995by this writer, most ordinary Cubans in Havana and the provincial cities ofCienfuegos, Trinidad, Santa Clara and Matanzas reported that they remainedintensely wary of CDR surveillance, even while conversing in their own homes.^[48][47]The delegation from Pax Christi Netherlands, which visited Cuba from July 15 toAugust 4, 1995, concluded:
Fear is the basic instrument of political control. Theinformation at the State Security's disposal can be used to threaten andintimidate anybody, including those who oppose the regime, to force them to goalong with the established ideology…There is no place to escape the tentaclesof the State. The distrust is unbearable.^[49][48]
Pax Christi Netherlands believes, based on both official anddissident sources in Cuba, that there are currently about 80,000 CDRs.^[50][49]That means that with a population of a little more than 11 million, Cuba hasapproximately one CDR for every 140 people.

VII.OPTIONS FOR CUBANS VIS-À-VIS THE STATE

Cubans are expected to voice loyalty to Fidel Castro and theCommunist state. Doing so makes a person anintegrado,someone integrated into the system. As described by Pax Christi Netherlands:
From the moment a child enters school his or herpolitical and social insertion is more important than individual ability:whether their parents belong to the Party, attend meetings of the Committeesfor the Defense of the Revolution, or have learned the words of Fidel and Che[Guevara] by heart. When children reach adolescence they may well continue tostudy…They can attend universities but they cannot ask anything that is not inkeeping with the prevailing Marxist materialist ideology. They leave theseuniversities prepared to continue giving the answers expected of them by thestate.^[51][50]
Being integrated is key to getting ahead, or even justgetting by, because the state controls every facet of an individual's life. Itdecides, based on political attitude and performance, what one studies inschool, where one works, whether one is promoted, permission to travel, andwhether one will have access to inexpensive consumer goods through one'sworkplace. An individual who is not integrated is considered by the governmentto be "disaffected" and potentially a "counterrevolutionary," the term appliedto any individual whom the government believes has crossed the line fromdisaffection to dissent.^[52][51]
Moreover, there is little middle ground. The state viewspolitical neutrality as a form of disaffection. In describing the organizedinforming by the CDRs and State Security, Argentine journalist and authorJacobo Timerman likens it to
…a collective state of mind in which the Cuban is,simply, a member or friend, a brother or son, of the Revolution and itsComandante [Fidel Castro]-or else, an enemy of all.^[53][52]
Cubans who do not support the government therefore are facedwith a choice. They can feign loyalty to the government by voicing support andparticipating in state-sponsored organizations and activities, includinginforming, or they can risk the consequences of being deemed suspicious or disaffectedby the state if they do not. For example, a dozen or more questions regardingsomeone's "integration" are routine procedure when applying for employment.^[54][53]
Jacobo Timerman, in assessing the content of Fidel Castro'sspeeches, says that Castro seems to think the regime has created "a new kind ofrevolutionary conscience." Timerman concludes, however,
When you go from city to city, from group to group,from person to person, it becomes clear that [Fidel Castro's] rhetoric hasproduced a vacuum in the conscience of the Cuban people, substituting astifling collective paranoia. The rest-acceptance, vacillation, informing-is atthe service of repression.^[55][54]
Given Cuba's ongoing economic crisis, even staunchsupporters of the government have reason to be wary. The government no longerhas the resources to reward those it considers to be "good revolutionaries."Today, an estimated 40 percent of the workforce is unemployed or underemployed,and the salaries of those who have full-time jobs are not enough to cover basicneeds.^[56][55]As of June 1997, Cuba's average monthly wage was 203 pesos; at the streetexchange rate of 20 pesos, that came to approximately $10 per month.^[57][56]Dollars were legalized by the Cuban government in 1993. Since the averagemonthly wage is insufficient to support a family, Cubans who do not receivedollar remittances from friends or family abroad often break the law in orderto survive, either by going into the black market or stealing goods andservices from the state.^[58][57]Mostrecent estimates are that 20 percent or less of the population receives dollarremittances from abroad.^[59][58]
The government knows of these daily crimes and Cubans areaware that the government knows. The state often looks the other way in orderto keep discontent from mounting. In recent years it also has tolerated morecomplaining, so long as it is about specific deficiencies, such as poor publictransportation or lack of medicines in clinics, and does not cross the notalways easily discernible line into criticism of the system generally. Butbecause of the totalitarian nature of the government, Cubans know from longexperience that the authorities can crack down at any time. In the words ofAndres Oppenheimer, a Pulitzer Prize-winning journalist who has reported fromCuba for nearly two decades, it is as if Cubans are "on a permanent probationstatus."^[60][59]
Cubans compelled to break the law to survive bracedthemselves in 1997 when the government instituted a sweeping set of laws thatprovide for up to 20 years in prison for failure to stop waste and theft ofstate property, both common ways of diverting state property into the blackmarket which has burgeoned in the 1990s.^[61][60]
New laws also have targeted the 200,000 or so Cubans whoaccepted the government's invitation in 1993 to try self-employment: forexample, by starting in-home restaurants known aspaladares, or by taking up one of the approximately 140 licensedtrades such as shoe repair and hair-cutting. The tax and regulatory steps takenin 1997 appear designed to put an end to the experiment in limited freeenterprise. By August 1997, an estimated one-tenth of the fledgling enterpriseshad shut down voluntarily or been closed by state inspectors.^[62][61]
In a speech in April 1997, Fidel Castro painted with apolitical brush those who fail to abide by the new laws, declaring thefollowing groups to be "allies of imperialism,": those in private enterprisewho did not pay the new taxes and follow the new regulations, and homeownerswho rented rooms to foreign tourists. He accused these groups of "lack ofsocial discipline," and of "receiving encouragement from the enemies of theRevolution in order to sow discontent and disorder." He then called on the CDRsto be vigilant against such "crimes," because "in the Defense Committeeseveryone knows what everyone is doing." Following the speech, all CDRs held"orientation" meetings on the need to root out those committing these new typesof crimes.^[63][62]

VIII.THE DISSIDENT MOVEMENT 1976-1989

In the wake of a number of attempts at armed internalresistance in the early 1960s, the Castro government arrested thousands ofsuspected "counterrevolutionaries" in a sustained crackdown that virtuallyeliminated any organized opposition, peaceful or otherwise. In 1965 there were,by Castro's own estimate, 20,000 political prisoners in Cuba.^[64][63]By 1975 this number had been reduced to about 4,500 through a "rehabilitation"program which offered early release to those willing to participate in laborand political indoctrination programs. In 1979 the government released about3,600 more prisoners following a dialogue with Cuban-Americans.^[65][64]
Between 1965 and 1975 peaceful dissent was generally limitedto acts by individuals, who despite their non-violent behavior werenevertheless labeled by the government as "counterrevolutionaries" andimprisoned. The first peaceful internal opposition organization was theComité Cubano Pro Derechos Humanos(CCPDH), Cuban Committee for Human Rights, which was formed in 1976 in Havana.A number of its members had distinguished themselves during the Castro-ledstruggle that brought down the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista in 1959 andhad subsequently endured imprisonment for holding dissident views. The CCPDHadvocated the liberation of all political prisoners, respect for human rightsand the establishment of a democratic rule of law in Cuba. It vowed to conductitself in the peaceful traditions of Andrei Sakharov, Martin Luther King, Jr.and Mahatma Gandhi.
The CCPDH was systematically persecuted by the government,its members arrested, sentenced to long prison terms and in some cases driveninto exile. Human rights monitoring was and remains illegal under Cuban law,^[66][65]and possession of a copy of the Universal Declaration on Human Rights ispunishable by imprisonment under a charge of "enemy propaganda."^[67][66]The CCPDH's principal founder, Ricardo Bofill, endured three prison terms,totaling ten years, before going into exile in the United States in 1988. In1986, the CCPDH was still the only independent human rights group in Cuba. Itclaimed to have about 200 members in the country, but 12 of its top people werein prison.^[68][67]Since 1988, the CCPDH has been led by Gustavo Arcos Bergnes, who foughtalongside Fidel Castro in the famous guerrilla attack on the Moncada barracksin 1953. Arcos, now 71-years-old, has been a political prisoner for extendedperiods under both the Batista and Castro governments. As of September 1997, hestill lived in a tiny apartment in the Vedado section of Havana, where hecontinued to take testimony and assemble information on Cuban politicalprisoners and human rights violations.
In 1985, the Cuban government, in the face of mountinginternational criticism of its human rights record, eased somewhat itsrepression against dissidents. In mid-1987. the government agreed to schedule aSeptember 1988 visit from the United Nations Human Rights Commission. Thatprompted the formation of a second independent human rights group in October1987, theComisión Cubana de DerechosHumanos y Reconciliación Nacional(CCDHRN), Cuban Commission for HumanRights and National Reconciliation. Its principal founder was Elizardo SánchezSanta Cruz, a former philosophy professor at the University of Havana, fromwhich he was expelled in 1967 for criticizing the "cult of personality" aroundFidel Castro.
The CCDHRN, like the CCPDH, collected information on humanrights abuses and distributed it to foreign embassies and internationalorganizations. Both groups advocated political dialogue with the government asa means to achieving a more democratic Cuba.
In 1987, CCPDH and CCDHRN members were for the first timeallowed by the Cuban government to be interviewed by foreign journalists andhold indoor meetings. Also, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC)was finally permitted to visit Cuba's prisons, and a number of politicalprisoners were released.
However, the Cuban government quickly shut this narrowopening after the visit of the delegation from the United Nations Human RightsCommission in September 1988. A number of human rights activists who had testedthe apparent thaw by organizing tiny, quasi-political groups were arrested.During the visit of Mikhail Gorbachev in April 1989, about two dozen peoplewere arrested for planning a demonstration to seek the Soviet leader's supportforglasnost, free expression, inCuba. By the end of the summer of 1989, over three dozen rights activists anddissidents had been jailed. By 1990, the Cuban government had revoked theICRC's permission to visit Cuba's prisons.^[69][68]Ofthe 87 individuals interviewed by the United Nations Human Rights Commission inSeptember 1988, a year later 22 were in prison,^[70][69]including Elizardo Sánchez Santa Cruz. In early 1992, Human RightsWatch/Americas reported that more than 200 Cuban human rights monitors andactivists had been arrested since 1989, that 42 were serving jail terms and 11others were awaiting trial.^[71][70]
By 1996, Elizardo Sánchez was out of jail, having spent atotal of more than nine years as a political prisoner. As of September 1997,Sánchez, 54-years-old, continued to direct the CCDHRN from his home in Havana,taking testimony and assembling information on human rights violations which hesends abroad.^[72][71]

IX.THE DISSIDENT MOVEMENT 1990-1994

Despite the Cuban government's crackdown against dissent in1989-1990 following the slight thaw in 1985-1988, the dissident movementcontinued to grow. It was inspired by the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, thecollapse in 1991 of the Soviet Union, and the 1991 vote of the United Nationsto assign for the first time a Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Cuba. By1991 more than a dozen new groups had emerged to test the regime's strength andtolerance.
In 1991, six small organizations with links to theconservative Cuban-American National Foundation in Miami formed theCoalición Democrática Cubana, CubanDemocratic Coalition. In the first week of September of that year, about adozen individuals representing the Coalition staged a protest demonstration infront of the headquarters of State Security in the Havana section of VillaMarista. The protesters were violently dispersed and Coalition leader DanielAzpillaga Lombard was arrested.^[73][72]
That same week, leaders of eight other dissident groups metin the home of CCDHRN leader Elizardo Sánchez Santa Cruz to form thecenter-leftConcertación DemocráticaCubana(CDC), Cuban Democratic Concertation. A few weeks later, at the timeof the fourth PCC congress and not long after Mikhail Gorbachev had announcedan end to military aid to Cuba, the Concertation held a press conference in Sánchez'shome for more than fifty foreign journalists. It issued a proposal calling fora general amnesty for political prisoners, government recognition of politicaland human rights organizations, and free national elections.^[74][73]
The Cuban government found the Concertation more threateningthan the conservative Cuban Democratic Coalition because it vowed to preservethe revolution's social gains and was far more popular among the Cubanpopulation. Virtually all of the Concertation members had at one time supportedthe revolution and a number of them now declared themselves social democrats.
The crackdown against the Concertation began with the arrestin November 1991 of María Elena Cruz Varela, one of the island's best knowndissidents and leader of theCriterioAlternativo, Alternative Criterion, a group of dissident intellectuals thathad joined the Concertation. A mob organized by State Security stormed herhome, dragged her down the stairs and forced her to eat an AlternativeCriterion leaflet. She was subsequently arrested, convicted of spreading "enemypropaganda," and sentenced to two years in jail.^[75][74]Following her prison term, Cruz Varela went into exile in the United States.
In the ensuing months many other Concertation leaders werearrested and jailed. The incarceration of Yndamiro Restano Díaz, independentjournalist and head of theMovimientoArmonía, Harmony Movement, is described in Chapter IV on the Penal Code.Other Concertation members arrested included José Luis Pujol and JorgeQuintana, leaders of theProyectoApertura de la Isla(PAIS) , Opening of the Island Project; María CelinaRodríguez, leader ofLibertad y Fe,Liberty and Faith, an organization focusing on religious rights; and LuisAlberto Pita Santos, Lázaro Loreto,and Ramón Rodríguez, leaders of theAsociación Defensora de los DerechosPolíticos(ADEPO), Association in Defense of Political Rights, a group ofmostly young dissidents.^[76][75]
The crackdown extended to the CCPDH, which had not joinedthe Concertation but supported its goals of a peaceful transition to democracythrough negotiations with the government and free elections. Sebastián ArcosBergnes, a principal CCPDH figure and brother of CCPDH leader Gustavo ArcosBergnes, was arrested in January 1992, convicted the following October ofspreading "enemy propaganda," and sentenced to four years and eight months inprison. In prison he was denied proper medical treatment for rectal cancer andsuffered greatly.^[77][76]Hewas released on May 31, 1995, following the visit to Cuba of a human rightsdelegation led by Danielle Mitterand, head of the French charitableorganization,France-Liberté, andwife of the former French president, Francois Mitterand. In September 1995,Sebastián Arcos went into exile in the United States, having spent a total ofeleven years in prison under both the Batista and Castro regimes.
In total, during the period 1991-1993, dozens of prominentdissidents associated with the Concertation and the CCPDH were convicted andgiven substantial prison sentences or placed underprisión domiciliara, house arrest, for an array of offenses,particularly "enemy propaganda," but also including "rebellion," "illicitassociation" and "disrespect."^[78][77]
Though the Concertation and the CCPDH were severelyweakened, new dissident groups continued to emerge, not only in Havana, but inother urban centers and provinces throughout the island. They included not onlyhuman rights and pro-democracy groups, but also organizations of independenttrade unionists and journalists. By early 1992, more than fifty dissidentgroups of one sort or another existed, most having been formed after 1989.^[79][78]
TheComisión Nacionalde Sindicatos Independientes(CONSI), National Commission of IndependentUnions, an umbrella organization for five independent Cuban trade unions, wasformed in February 1993.^[80][79]Thefive member unions were:
•Unión General de Trabajadores de Cuba(UGTC) - General Union of Cuban Workers.
•Unión Sindical de Trabajadores Cubanos(USTC) - Syndicated Union of Cuban Workers.
•Unión de Trabajadores de Ciudad Habana(UTCH) - Union of Workers of the City of Havana.
•Unión de Trabajadores de Provincia Habana(UTPH) - Union of Workers of the Province of Havana.
•Unión de Trabajadores de Comercios(UTC)- Union of Commercial Workers.
These unions were formed mainly by unemployed workers whohad lost their jobs because of human rights or independent trade unionactivities.^[81][80]From the start, CONSI affiliates and their members faced frequent harassment,including beatings and short-term detentions and penetration by undercovergovernment agents.^[82][81]Under such pressure, which was heightened by internal differences regarding theU.S. economic embargo, CONSI eventually came apart. Still, its affiliatesremained in existence or evolved into new union organizations. The currentsituation of independent trade unions is described in Chapter XVI, Section A,Part 3, of this report.
The first organization of independent journalists, theAsociación de Periodistas Independientes deCuba(APIC2), Association of Independent Cuban Journalists, was created byYndamiro Restano Díaz in 1988-1989. At the time of his arrest and incarcerationin 1991 (described in Chapter IV), Restano was preparing an issue of hisbulletin,Opinión. FollowingRestano's imprisonment, journalist Néstor Baguer became director of APIC2 andrenamed itAgencia de PrensaIndependiente de Cuba, Independent Press Agency of Cuba. By mid-1995, therewere at least three independent journalists organizations: APIC;Patria, Fatherland, founded by RoxanaValdivia Castilla in the central province of Ciego de Avila; andHabana Press, Havana Press, launched byRafael Solano. Solano and many of the other journalists involved had worked forthe state media and been fired for "ideological incompatibility."^[83][82]The journalists working for the new agencies immediately became targets ofharassment, intimidation and short-term detentions by police and StateSecurity.^[84][83]

X.NEWINSTRUMENTS OF CONTROL - RAPID RESPONSE BRIGADES AND THE UNIFIED SYSTEM OFVIGILANCE AND PROTECTION (SUVP)

In response to the emergence of new dissident organizations,bolder dissident actions, and the deepening economic crisis, the Cubangovernment in 1991 developed new instruments of control. In fall 1990, FidelCastro had announced that Cuba was entering a "special period in peacetime," aeuphemism for a drastic austerity program involving severe cutbacks in energyconsumption and more stringent rationing of food and consumer items.^[85][84]The government, aware of mounting discontent over severe economic hardship, wasintent on preventing the type of popular mobilizations which had led to thefall of regimes in Eastern Europe.
In early 1991, the government prepared for potential unrestand stepped-up dissident activity by creating theBrigadas de Respuesta Rápida, Rapid Response Brigades, under thedirection of the MININT. The task of the brigades, according to the government,was to defend the country, the Revolution and socialism in all circumstances,by confronting and liquidating any sign of counterrevolution or crime.^[86][85]
The brigades are made up of regime supporters recruited fromCDRs, other mass organizations and workplaces, and organized by State Security.Their principle mission is to carry outactosde repudio, acts of repudiation, which entail violent mob actions againstdissidents or suspected dissidents, their homes, and any public demonstrationof dissent. The mobs can involve up to hundreds of people who wield chains,bats and lengths of pipe. They shout slogans and threats, throw rocks and othercrude missiles, deface homes with graffiti and otherwise damage property. Themobs are frequently invasive, breaking down doors and windows to carry outphysical attacks against the occupants. The assault against dissident MaríaElena Cruz Varela in November 1991, described in Chapter IX on "The DissidentMovement 1990-1994," was conducted by one of these brigades.
Two months after the assault on Cruz Varela, CCDHRN leaderElizardo Sánchez Santa Cruz was besieged for fifteen hours by a Rapid ResponseBrigade of between three and five hundred people. The mob destroyed his garage,where he had his office, and his files. It tried to break down the back door tohis house, but could not penetrate the steel bars he had erected. It shatteredthe windows and threw pots of paint and bottles of ink against the walls. Itcalled for Sánchez to come out and face his accusers. The mob was directed bypolice, who called for Sánchez to come out so they could protect him. Sánchezwas able to record on tape part of the incident, during which the policeofficer in charge was heard instructing the mob to beat Sánchez with theirfists and feet if he were to come out.^[87][86]
Following is a more recent action by a Rapid ResponseBrigade, as reported by Human Rights Watch/Americas. It was carried out onAugust 10, 1995, at the Havana home of Victoria Ruíz Labrit, president of theComité Cubano de Opositores PacíficosIndependientes, Cuban Committee of Peaceful and Independent Opposition. Amob of 60 to 80 people armed with pipes and chains surrounded her home in orderto prevent a meeting of dissidents. Then, two officials, one from the NationalAssembly of People's Power, the governments legislative body, and the otherfrom the PCC-controlled Federation of Cuban Women (FMC), came to her door. Theystated they had been informed that a "counterrevolutionary" meeting wasscheduled to take place in her home, and threatened to beat Ruíz and members ofher family and to smash up their house if the meeting were held.^[88][87]
One immediate goal of the Rapid Response Brigades was toensure against disruption of the fourth PCC congress in October 1991. In themonths before and after the congress, nearly every prominent dissident groupwas the target of brigade actions. More generally, the regime formed thebrigades to stifle public protest and mounting dissident activity before itcould reach the point where the military would be needed to put downopposition. The Cuban government was fully aware of the military's refusal tofire on antigovernment demonstrators in some Eastern European countries, andthe brutal repression by troops in others, each of which had contributed to theunraveling of Communist regimes. Moreover, the government could portray thebrigades, domestically and abroad, as a demonstration of the "people" defendingthe revolution, even as it was evident that brigade actions were coordinated byState Security.^[89][88]
Actions by the Rapid Response Brigades, a form ofpsychological terror, are designed to intimidate dissidents or anyone elseharboring views different from those of the state. They can culminate inarrest, as in the case of María Elena Cruz Varela, or not, as in the case ofthe assault a few months later against Elizardo Sánchez Santa Cruz. The aim isto keep targets, potential targets, their families and friends, and anyone elsewitnessing or hearing about these highly public repressive measures, in aperpetual state of anxiety.
During the period 1991-1993, a majority of those targeted bythe Rapid Response Brigades eventually were imprisoned or subjected toshort-term detention. The government clearly intended to keep anything like themass demonstrations which had occurred in Eastern Europe from happening inCuba. In fact, one high level Cuban official told Cuba specialist Gillian Gunnthat the government preferred "to arrest dissidents now rather than have toshoot them later."^[90][89]
That dovetails with Fidel Castro's long desire todistinguish his rule from the former Batista regime in Cuba and right-wingmilitary regimes in Latin America and elsewhere. Although Cubans have not hadto face death squads, instruments like the Rapid Response Brigades, as part ofan overall system of surveillance and repression, can have a similarly chillingeffect. As an unidentified CCDHRN representative said to a delegation to Cubafrom Pax Christi Netherlands in 1995:
While during the Batista period people who protestedagainst the regime were assassinated, now they are psychologically terrorizedand brainwashed. This is more difficult to gauge because the damage inflictedcannot be measured and it does not leave scars.^[91][90]
The second new instrument of control was theSistema Único de Vigilancia y Protección(SUVP), the Unified System of Vigilance and Protection. Implemented in Decemberof 1991, the SUVP is coordinated by State Security through the CDRs and thenational police and adds another level of surveillance to the existing CDRstructures and the CDR vigilance committees.^[92][91]Alsoin 1991, to improve the performance and efficiency of the CDRs themselves,Fidel Castro appointed Brig. Gen. Sixto Batista as national chief of the CDRs,the first time this mass organization had been headed by a military officer.^[93][92]
The SUVP originally focused on rooting out the crime ofpeligrosidad, "dangerousness," which isexplained in detail in Chapter IV of this report on "The Penal Code." Thecreation of the SUVP was announced, in fact, soon after the crime ofdangerousness had been established and added to the Penal Code. The purpose ofthe SUVP, as stated by the government, was to expose people who are "dangerous"to society due to "apparent deviations in their conduct." This can result inthe national police opening a "dangerous status" file on them, which can leadto arrest and imprisonment for up to four years.^[94][93]
Since 1994, however, the scope of the SUVP has widened.Beginning in that year, the government lessened the frequency and severity ofacts of repudiation by the Rapid Response Brigades against dissidents,following stepped-up international criticism of these types of assaults.^[95][94]Still, such brigade actions continued to take place intermittently, signalingdissidents and the population in general that the brigades remained part of thegovernment's arsenal and that their actions could be stepped up at any time.
Meanwhile, the government began to make greater use ofSUVP-organized groups to target dissidents, using less violent means, at leastat the start. Rather thanactos derepudio, acts of repudiation, involving wholesale attacks on the target'shome, SUVP groups can either invite the target to amitin de repudio, repudiation meeting, or insist upon entering thehome to hold such a meeting if the target declines. The groups then verballyassault the target, threaten jail terms, and on occasion ransack the premisesand physically rough up the target. Repudiation meetings soon became commoninstruments against independent journalists, whose numbers had been growingsince 1994. The use of SUVP repudiation meetings increased in 1996, and againin 1997, when they became increasingly more violent and in a number ofinstances approached the level of intimidation characteristic of Rapid ResponseBrigades. In the first five months of 1997 there were more than a dozen SUVPrepudiation meetings against independent journalists alone.^[96][95]

XI.THE DISSIDENT MOVEMENT 1995-1996 -CONCILIO CUBANO

In 1995, Cuban dissidents sought to take advantage of theslight relaxation of repressive measures by the Cuban government. Dissidentefforts led to the formation of theConcilioCubano, an unprecedented umbrella organization which would eventually unitemore than 130 groups from throughout the island before the government tookmeasures to neutralize it in early 1996.
Over the past decade and a half, repression in Cuba hasoccurred in waves. Severe repression in the early 1980s gave way to a slightthaw in 1985-88, as the Cuban government seemed to respond to mountinginternational criticism of Cuba's human rights record. The thaw was followed bya crackdown in 1989, and the introduction of the Rapid Response Brigades andthe SUVP in 1991, as described in the preceding chapter of this report. Thecrackdown seemed to reach a fever pitch on July 13, 1994, when a state-ownedtugboat hijacked from Havana harbor by 72 civilians was deliberately rammed andsunk by a Cuban vessel, killing 41 people.^[97][96]
The sinking of the13de Marzoprompted a new round of international reproach, at a time when theCuban government could least afford it. Cuba's economic crisis had continued toworsen in 1993-1994, and the government was desperately seeking foreigninvestment to avoid what Fidel Castro had warned two years earlier was the"Zero Option," in effect, the devolution into a pre-industrialized society.^[98][97]At the same time, intensifying poverty was fomenting social tension andcontributing to a steady increase in the number of Cubans attempting to leavethe country illegally. Each year since 1990 had seen more than 2,000 Cubanbalseros, rafters, reach the UnitedStates, with a record number of over 3,500 arriving in 1993.^[99][98]
In August 1994, thousands rioted in Havana when police triedto stop a group of Cubans from launching a raft. The following day, FidelCastro announced the government would no longer stop people from trying toleave the island. In part, this was a safety-valve measure reminiscent of the1980 Mariel exodus of 120,000 Cubans, when Castro had also opened the gates inan effort to get rid of the most disaffected Cubans.^[100][99]Thus began the flight of over 35,000 people, most of whom were picked up by theU.S. Coast Guard and sent to camps at U.S. military bases in Panama andGuantánamo at the eastern end of Cuba. The episode led to the 1994 and 1995U.S.-Cuba immigration agreements, which called for, among other things, Cuba tostop the flow of rafters and the U.S. to allow entry to up to20,000 Cubanseach year in a variety of immigration categories. The current status of theseagreements and the condition of Cubans who have been repatriated under them,are discussed in Chapter XVI, Section C, of the this report.
The August 1994 riots were a public display of populardiscontent unprecedented since the beginning of the revolution. The governmentresponded with a renewed crackdown against dissident groups, to keep them fromtaking advantage of a level of popular disaffection the government itselfseemed to have underestimated. The crackdown, combined with the riots and thesinking of the13 de Marzothatpreceded it, severely tarnished Cuba's image abroad and Fidel Castro soonmaneuvered to improve it.
In November 1994, the Castro government allowed UN HighCommissioner for Human Rights José Ayala Lasso to visit Cuba, even as itcontinued to bar the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) and Amb.Carl-Johan Groth, the UN Special Rapporteur for Human Rights in Cuba, from theisland. In April 1995, a delegation led by Danielle Mitterand, head of theFrench charitable organizationFrance-Libertéand wife of former French president Francois Mitterand, was permitted to cometo Cuba. From October 1994 to July 1995, a number of high-profile politicalprisoners were released. In the continuation of a disturbing new trend,however, many of the prisoners were released on the condition that they leaveCuba, a form of "forced exile" which is described further in Chapter XII ofthis report. Also, in May 1995, the Cuban government ratified the InternationalConvention Against Torture, and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment orPunishment.
This diplomatic offensive by the Cuban government wasclearly designed to gain international respectability, end its isolation, andcombat the U.S. economic embargo and the then-pending Helms-Burton legislationto strengthen the embargo. The goals were to secure foreign investment, gainaccess to foreign credits, and achieve a cooperation agreement with theEuropean Union.
In early 1995, Cuban dissidents and independent journalistsmoved to make the most of the government's diplomatic offensive and its slighteasing of repression. New groups and associations were formed and initiativesundertaken to unify around fundamental principles. On February 2, 1995, twelvepeople acting on behalf of thirteen organizations issued a document thatrequested "amnesty for all political prisoners [and] the legalization, inaccordance with the Law of Associations, of opposition groups, human rightsgroups, and other groups representing diverse currents of opinion." Thethirteen organizations and the individuals who signed for them were^[101][100]:
•Agramontista Corriente, Agramontist Current - René Gómez Manzano.
•Comisión Cubana de Derechos Humanos y Reconciliación Nacional-Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation - ElizardoSánchez Santa Cruz.
•Comité de Madres Pro Amnistía "Leonor Pérez"- Leonor Pérez Pro Amnesty Mothers' Committee - Alicia Ramos.
•Confederación Nacional por DerechosPolíticos- National Confederation for Political Rights - Lázaro LoretoPerea.
•Consejo Nacional por Derechos Civiles-National Council for Civil Rights - Jorge Omar Pimienta.
•Coordinadora de Presos Políticos y Ex-Presos- Coordinator of Political Prisoners and Ex-Prisoners - Aída Valdés Santana.
•Coordinadora de Trabajadores Cubanos-Cuban Workers Coordinator - Aída Valdés Santana.
•Corriente Socialista Democrática-Democratic Socialist Current - Vladimiro Roca Antúnez.
•Frente Martiano Cívica de Mujeres-Martiano Civic Women's Front - Mérida Pérez Fuentes.
•Frente Unido Sindical- United LaborFront - Evaristo Patricio.
•Fundación Cubana por Derechos Humanos-Cuban Foundation for Human Rights- Gisela Estévez.
•Los Cuetos del Movimiento 24 de Febrero- Los Cuetos of the February 24^thMovement - Mario Remedio.
•Movimiento Demócrata Cristiano Cubano-Cuban Christian Democrat Movement - María Valdés Rosado.
The Law of Associations cited in the document signed bythese thirteen groups is Law 54 of December 27, 1985. The law was decreed atthe beginning of the slight thaw in repression that occurred in 1985-1988. Thelaw, which does not apply to PCC-controlled organizations or religious groups,establishes procedures by which certain kinds of associations can beestablished, provided their activities do not "damage the social interest." Thelaw remains on the books today and many dissident organizations have appliedfor formal recognition from the government since the law was implemented.Applications are reviewed and decided upon by the Ministry of Justice. Ifrecognized, the association is subject to periodic inspections and must supplythe state with information about its work. Only one dissident organization hasever received a reply, and that was a denial, nearly ten years after theapplication had been submitted.^[102][101]
As dissident groups moved toward greater cooperation, asimilar process was occurring among independent journalists. On September 19,1995, Yndamiro Restano Díaz, who had been released from prison on June 1,founded theBuró de PeriodistasIndependientes de Cuba(BPIC), Bureau of Independent Journalists of Cuba,to coordinate the three already existing agencies: 1) theAgencia de Prensa Independiente de Cuba(APIC), Independent PressAgency of Cuba, which Restano himself had established two years before hisimprisonment in 1991 and was now headed by Néstor Baguer; 2)Patria, Fatherland, founded by RoxanaValdivia in the central province of Ciego de Avila; and 3)Habana Press, Havana Press, launched by Rafael Solano. Solano andmany of the other journalists involved had worked for the state media and beenfired for "ideological incompatibility." Valdivia had foundedPatriaafter serving four months of a one-yearprison term on the charge of spreading "enemy propaganda." By the end of 1995,the BPIC encompassed at least 20 journalists working in Havana and nine offourteen provinces.^[103][102]
Independent journalists were already taking advantage of thesignificant upgrade in telecommunications between Cuba and the United States inlate 1994. They are prohibited from publishing newspapers or magazines, so theysend their articles abroad for publication and for re-transmission back to Cubaby radio or the Internet. Articles are sent either by fax or dictated over thephone. With State Security constantly confiscating fax machines anddisconnecting telephone lines, the independent journalists are alwaysscrambling to connect with their contacts outside Cuba. Volunteers in Floridaand Europe built a Florida-based web site,CubaNet(http://www.cubanet.org), for the journalists, and e-mail articles to more than700 subscribers, including many in Cuba. Access to the Internet is prohibitedby the Cuban government, except for official institutions. But those withaccess occasionally share it with friends and family.^[104][103]
TheConcilio Cubanowas founded on October 10, 1995, when some 40 dissident groups united around aset of principles and goals which were outlined in four points in a statementreleased on that date:
The determination to work for a totally peacefultransition toward a democratic society under the rule of law, devoid of anyvindictiveness, and including equally all Cubans.
Obtaining unconditional amnesty for all political prisoners.
Launching a series of legal transformations which willprovide the necessary framework, within the law, to secure absolute respect forall universally recognized human rights, as well as equal participation by allCubans in a process of opening which will lead to economic independence.
The belief that in order to harmonize the peacefultransition we are advocating, with the principle of Cuba as the fatherland andthe home of each and every Cuban, it is essential to provide the conditions thatwill guarantee the participation of all Cubans, with no exclusions whatsoever.^[105][104]
Within two months, approximately 60 additional groups hadjoined theConcilio Cubano. By thattime the umbrella organization included human rights groups, political oppositiongroups, independent press agencies and journalist groups, independent lawyersorganizations and other professional groups, independent trade unions, youthgroups, women's organizations, groups of former political prisoners, andenvironmental groups. Many of these groups put aside ideological differencesand differing opinions regarding the U.S. economic embargo of Cuba to becomepart of the umbrella group. By the end of November 1995, the Miami-basedGrupo de Apoyo a Concilio Cubano(GACC),Concilio CubanoSupport Group, whichhad been formed a few weeks earlier, issued a list of 101 groups belonging totheConcilio Cubano, and the name ofthe representative signing for each group. That list appears in this report inAppendix I.
When theConcilioCubanowrote Fidel Castro in mid-December to formally request permissionfor a public assembly to be held in Havana on February 24-27, 1996,representatives of more than 130 groups signed the letter. By one estimate themembership base of all the groups combined was around 5,000 people.^[106][105]However, because of the conditions in Cuba it is extremely difficult for eventhe groups themselves to know the true number of members and supporters.
TheConcilio Cubanodid not wait for a reply from the government and moved ahead with organizingthe event and strengthening its structure. A ten-member youth commission wasformed, calledLos Pinos Nuevos, NewPines. A seven-member support group of prominent dissidents was established,theGrupo de Apoyo, Support Group,which included: Elizardo Sánchez Santa Cruz; Gustavo Arcos Bergnes; andVladimiro Roca Antúnez, head of theCorrienteSocialista Democrática, Democratic Socialist Current, and son of longtimePCC stalwart Blas Roca. All three had been principal players in the formationof this dissident confederation. TheConcilioCubanoalso set up eleven working groups to cover a number of areas,including: human rights, trade union issues, economics, finance, familyaffairs, ethics and international relations.^[107][106]
In December 1995, thirteenConcilio Cubanocommissions were established around the country. Byearly February the commissions had elected two representatives each to the26-memberConsejo Nacional Coordinador,National Coordinating Council, which then elected a five-memberSecretariado Nacional, NationalSecretariat. Dr. Leonel Morejón Almagro, a 31-year-old lawyer and head of theecological organizationNaturPaz,NaturePeace, was elected as the national delegate of the Secretariat. The fourdeputy delegates elected were: Mercedes Parada Antúnez, president of theAlianza Democrática Popular(ADEPO2),People's Democratic Alliance, and member of the executive committee of theMovimiento de Madres Cubanas por laSolidaridad, Movement of Cuban Mothers for Solidarity; Héctor Palacio Ruiz,president of thePartido SolidaridadDemocrático(PSD), Democratic Solidarity Party; Lázaro González Valdés,president of thePartido Pro DerechosHumanos en Cuba(PPDHC), Party for Human Rights in Cuba; and ReinaldoCosano Alén, president of theCoaliciónDemocrática Cubana(CDC2), Cuban Democratic Coalition.^[108][107]The organizational structure of theConcilioCubanoas it existed in early February 1996 is outlined in Appendix II.
During its first four months of existence,Concilio Cubanoleaders and membersfaced constant harassment by State Security-including short-term detentions,interrogations and threats of imprisonment on all manner of charges, eventerrorism and drug trafficking-as well as intimidation by the SUVP and RapidResponse Brigades.^[109][108]OnFebruary 15, 1996, nine days before the plannedConcilio Cubanomeeting in Havana, the Cuban government initiatedone of the broadest police sweeps ever against dissidents. Within four days,more than a dozen topConcilio Cubanoleaders were arrested. Among them were four of the five members of theConcilio Cubanonational secretariat,including Dr. Morejón Almagro, the national delegate and lead organizer of theassembly. On February 16, an official of the Ministry of Interior went to thehome of Gustavo Arcos Bergnes and notified him that the public meeting of theConcilio Cubanowas prohibited. Bymid-March, about 200 of the organization's members, including many independentjournalists, had been either arrested or detained for short periods andsubjected to threats of imprisonment and physical violence. Homes and officeswere ransacked and organizational documents and equipment seized. Throughoutthe crackdown, telephone lines belonging to manyConcilio Cubanomembers were cut off.^[110][109]
The government targeted for the harshest penalties two youngleaders who had emerged during the formation of theConcilio Cubano: the 31-year old Dr. Leonel Morejón Almagro and the35-year-old Lázaro González Valdés. Aside from their duties on the NationalSecretariat, both were members of theConcilioCubanoyouth commission,Pinos Nuevos,New Pines. In a three-hour trial on February 22, González Valdés was foundguilty of "disrespect" and "disobedience" and sentenced to fourteen months inprison. His defense lawyer was only able to speak to him minutes before thetrial began and the court building was surrounded by police and a RapidResponse Brigade armed with metal bars and sticks. The next day, Dr. Morejónwas tried and convicted of "resistance." He was sentenced to six months inprison. When he appealed, he was given an additional nine-month prison sentenceon a charge of "disrespect."^[111][110]
The crackdown against theConcilio Cubanocontinued through the spring and on into July andAugust of 1996, when dozens of dissidents were detained for short periods andwarned not to organize commemorations on July 13, the anniversary of thesinking of the13 de Marzotugboat in1994 in which some 40 people died. For example, Aída Rosa Jiménez of theMovimiento de Madres Cubanas por laSolidaridad, Cuban Mothers' Solidarity Movement, was threatened withimprisonment if she went to church on July 13, and Isabel del Pino Sotolongo,president ofSeguidores de Cristo Rey,Followers of Christ the King, was threatened with several charges after being detainedfor displaying photographs of the victims of the tugboat sinking anddistributing leaflets containing quotes from the Bible.^[112][111]
Aside from Dr. Leonel Morejón Almagro and Lázaro GonzálezValdés, a number of otherConcilio Cubanoleaders were tried and imprisoned. They included: Juan Francisco Monzón Oviedo,an alternate member of theConcilioCubanoNational Coordinating Council and president of thePartido Demócrata Cristiano(PDC),Christian Democratic Party; and Roberto López Montañez, a leader of theMovimiento Opositor Pacífico "Panchito GómezToro,"Panchito Gómez Toro Peaceful Opposition Movement, and theAlianza Democrática Popular(ADEPO2),Popular Democratic Alliance. Following a summary trial on March 21, 1996,Monzón Oviedo was sentenced to six months in prison for "illicit association."López Montañez was tried on July 16, 1996, and sentenced to one year in prisonfor "disrespect" and three additional months for "falsifying documents."^[113][112]
By mid-1996 theConcilioCubanohad been severely weakened. Its activities had been mostly drivenunderground and it was struggling to maintain a semblance of nationalorganization. In August 1996, theConcilioCubanoissued a new list of its organizations, now reduced to about 80member groups. The list was distributed abroad by the Miami-based GACC andappears in Appendix III of this report.
The Cuban government labeled theConcilio Cubanoas a "counterrevolutionary" organization createdand controlled by the U.S. During the first month of the crackdown, for example,an official of the Cuban Foreign Ministry, Carlos Fernández de Cossio, statedto the foreign media, "We know this Concilio is a fabrication. It is aninvention of the United States."^[114][113]TheCuban government's characterization of the groups of theConcilio Cubanoas agents of the United States, however, ignoresthe fact that many of the member organizations are strongly and publiclyopposed to U.S. policy toward Cuba, particularly the economic embargo. Labelingthem as right-wing "counterrevolutionaries" also overlooks the reality thatmany ofthem are committed socialists.

XII.NEW TACTICS OF REPRESSION 1994-1997

The 1996 crackdown against theConcilio Cubanoexemplified the new tactics of repression thegovernment had been using against dissident organizations and independentjournalists since 1994. Previously, the pattern had been to imprison leadersand members of such groups for several years or longer on overtly politicalcharges like "rebellion" and spreading "enemy propaganda." However, with Cuba'seconomic crisis continuing to worsen in 1993-1994, the government wasdesperately seeking foreign investment. It therefore needed to give theimpression to the international community that there was an improvement in thehuman rights situation in Cuba.^[115][114]
The new tactics adopted to give this impression include: 1)charging peaceful government opponents with less overtly political offenses andsentencing them to shorter prison terms, 2) forcing dissidents and independentjournalists to go into exile by constantly intimidating them through short-termdetentions and threatening them with prolonged imprisonment if they do notleave the country, 3) freeing political prisoners on the condition that theyleave the country permanently, and 4) sentencing dissidents and independentjournalists todestierro,"banishment," a prohibition against residing in certain places, orlimitación de libertad, "restriction ofliberty," a prohibition against leaving a certain locality or residence for anyreason.^[116][115]
Charging dissidents with less overtly political offensesallows the Cuban government to portray them as common criminals or socialmisfits, rather than as political prisoners who would command greater attentionabroad. That is why the number of dissidents imprisoned for their peacefulpolitical activities but convicted on other kinds of charges, usually of aspurious nature, as in the case ofConcilioCubanoactivists, has been on the increase since 1994.^[117][116]One example among many is the case of Reynaldo Soto Hernández, a poet andjournalist for the independent news agencyCubaPress,who also worked with theComité CubanoPro Derechos Humanos, Cuban Committee for Human Rights, headed by GustavoArcos Bergnes. When Soto Hernández was arrested in September 1994, it wasclearly in connection with his journalistic and human rights activities.Nonetheless, he was sentenced to three years in prison on the vague, catch-allcharge of "dangerousness." He was let out of prison on September 6, 1997,although the exact terms of his release were not known at that time.^[118][117]
Similarly, the Cuban government seeks to limit criticismabout the number of political prisoners it is holding by instead employingconstant intimidation and short-term detentions. That, coupled with the threatof imprisonment if the targeted individual does not leave the country, and thefreeing of existing political prisoners on the condition they leave thecountry, benefits the government in two ways. First, it removes potential andactual leaders of dissident movements from the country. Fidel Castro seems tohave calculated, given the surge in peaceful opposition in recent years, thatdissident leaders are more of a threat to his government inside rather thanoutside Cuba. Second, forced exile not only diminishes the embarrassment ofholding known political prisoners. In the case of existing political prisonersit allows the Cuban government to appear cooperative in the eyes of foreigngovernments which have intervened on behalf of prominent dissidents who havebeen jailed.
According to Amnesty International, at least nine prominentdissidents and independent journalists were forced into exile in 1996,including: Mercedes Parada Antuñez, one of the four deputy national delegatesof theConcilio Cubano; RafaelSolano, director ofHabana Press,Havana Press; and Roxana Valdivia Castilla, director and founder of pressagencyPatria, Fatherland.^[119][118]According to dissident groups in Cuba, at least 60 opposition activists andindependent journalists went into exile between February and November 1996.^[120][119]
In turn,destierroandlimitación de libertadare usedby the Cuban government as instruments to stifle dissent without having toresort to imprisonment.Destierro,banishment or internal exile, is defined in Article 42 of the Penal Code. Thismeasure can be imposed for up to ten years on anyone whose continued presencein a place is considered to be "socially dangerous." The measure is frequentlyused against dissidents and independent journalists to remove them from Havanato isolated areas of the country where their ability to function or communicatewith colleagues, foreign embassies or the foreign media is greatly reduced.^[121][120]
Limitación de libertad,"restricted liberty," is defined in Article 34 of the Penal Code. This measurecan be imposed for up to three years, during which time the person concernedmay not change residence without permission, is not permitted to receivepromotion or a salary increase where they work, must appear before the court toexplain their conduct if summoned, and must maintain "an honest attitude towardwork, in strict accordance with the law and with respect for the norms ofsocialist life."^[122][121]Article 34 also provides that the penalty of "restrictedliberty" shall becarried out under the supervision and vigilance of the CDRs and other massorganizations of the sentenced person's place of residence.^[123][122]

XIII.PRISON CONDITIONS

Despite the use of new repressive tactics that do notnecessarily culminate in imprisonment, the Cuban government continues tomaintain a high number of political prisoners. In July 1996, human rightsmonitoring groups in Cuba presented the United Nations Special Rapporteur onHuman Rights in Cuba with a list of 1,173 persons serving sentences forpolitical offenses.^[124][123]Elizardo Sánchez Santa Cruz, head of theComisiónCubana de Derechos Humanos y Reconciliación Nacional(CCDHRN), CubanCommission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation, one of the oldest andmost respected rights groups in Cuba, recently estimated that there werebetween 3,000 and 5,000 persons currently imprisoned for political reasons,although many may have been charged with non-political crimes.^[125][124]
By the criteria of Amnesty International, as of 1996 therewere some 600 "prisoners of conscience," the term the organization uses forthose imprisoned for reasons related to their attempts to peacefully exercisetheir rights to freedom of expression, association and assembly.^[126][125]But even Amnesty International's lower figure is enough to impress Cubans thatno matter what image the Cuban government is trying to project abroad, no oneis exempt from the threat of imprisonment for exercising internationallyrecognized political and civil rights.
The threat of imprisonment weighs heavily on the mind of anyCuban who would consider expressing or peacefully acting upon beliefs counterto the state. According to the most recent report on Cuba by the Inter-AmericanCommission on Human Rights of the Organization of American States (IACHR-OAS),there are 294 prisons and correctional work camps located throughout Cuba, withan estimated 100,000 to 200,000 prisoners of all categories, who endure"deliberately severe and degrading treatment."^[127][126]According to the most recent report by the United Nations Special Rapporteur onHuman Rights in Cuba, conditions in Cuba's prisons are characterized by:overcrowding, terrible sanitary conditions, inadequate and substandard food,limited medical care, beatings, restrictions on family visits, the problems ofhaving common criminals share living quarters with political prisoners and thejailing of many political prisoners far from their home towns, which makescontact with their families extremely difficult.^[128][127]
In 1997 Amnesty International noted "frequent reports" ofbeatings in prisons, "sometimes with blunt instruments such as lengths ofhosepipe." It noted further that there were frequent indications that food andmedical attention were withheld as a form of punishment. Prisoners whoprotested about their treatment or refused to obey prison rules were kept in punishmentcells, sometimes with no light or furniture, for weeks or months at a time,often on reduced rations and without access to medical attention.^[129][128]
According to Pax Christi Netherlands:
The inhuman conditions in Cuban jails (psychologicaland physical torture combined with totally inadequate food and medicine supply)regularly result in fatalities.^[130][129]
The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights reported in1997, with regard to sentenced prisoners as well as those held in short-termdetention, that beatings, far from constituting isolated incidents, are usedhabitually and systematically by Cuban state agents as a means of punishment orintimidation."^[131][130]
The Commission also reported that political prisoners aresingled out for particularly harsh treatment, citing testimony by politicalprisoners in La Manga prison, Granma province, provided by a human rightsmonitoring group in Cuba, excerpts of which follow:
They place us with highly dangerous criminals, personswho have personality disorders, even psychiatric disorders. In many cases StateSecurity…uses them to commit outrages on our dignity. Many are used by StateSecurity as informants; they are promised benefits in exchange for providinginformation on what we say, and they are authorized to beat us if we speakpoorly of the President of the Republic. Furthermore, the prison authoritieshave created a system in which certain prisoners are charged with overseeingthe discipline of others in exchange for certain privileges. They are violent,unscrupulous and highly dangerous persons who impose excessive rigor. Theslightest breach of discipline committed by a prisoner is met with outrages,denigrating words and even savage beatings…We are taken to severeinterrogations based on false information given by the common prisoners, inaddition to which we are threatened with death.^[132][131]
Singling out political prisoners for especially harshtreatment conforms to a consistent pattern. In 1995, Human RightsWatch/Americas reported:
Conditions are often worse for political prisoners,who may be singled out for abuse. To begin with, political prisoners are kepttogether with common criminals-often criminals convicted of violent offenses orthose with psychological problems-exposing them to a serious risk of harm. Theyalso report harassment from prison authorities for their political beliefs, andcontinued efforts to "reeducate" them. Many political prisoners are allowedfamily visits only once every two months…A number of political prisoners havereportedly suffered from severe medical problems that were not properlytreated.^[133][132]

XIV.THE DISSIDENT MOVEMENT 1997

During the crackdown of 1996,Concilio Cubanoleaders vowed to continue organizing toward apublic assembly. By fall of that year, however, the umbrella organization wasin disarray, with several of its top people in jail or forced into exile.Manuel Cuesta Morua of theCorrienteSocialista Democrática, Social Democratic Current, said in November, "We'restill regrouping." But he and otherConcilioCubanorepresentatives said the Cuban government continued to confiscatecomputers and fax machines, cut telephone lines, seize documents and preventdissidents from attending meetings.^[134][133]
The last official membership list of theConcilio Cubanowas issued in August1996, and the number of members had been reduced to about 80 groups. The listwas distributed abroad and appears in Appendix III of this report. By thattime, however, there were divisions among the top figures in the organizationover, among other things, whether to nameConcilioCubanorepresentatives outside of Cuba.
A number of those who opposed that idea formed in August1996 theGrupo de Trabajo de laDisidencia Interna para el Análisis de la Situación Socio-Económica Cubana,Internal Dissidence Work Group for the Analysis of the Cuban Socio-EconomicSituation, to reassess the political landscape for future dissident actions.The four founding members of the group, all previously members of theConcilio CubanoSupport Group, or Groupof Seven (see Appendix II), were: Vladimiro Roca Antúnez, a member of theexecutive committee of thePartido SocialDemócrata Cubana(PSDC), Cuban Social Democratic Party; Félix BonneCarcasés of theCorriente Cívica Cubana,Cuban Civic Current; Dr. René Gómez Manzano, a founder of theCorriente Agramontista, AgramontistCurrent, Cuba's principal independent lawyers' group; and Marta Beatriz RoqueCabello, director of theInstituto Cubanode Economistas Independientes, Cuban Institute of Independent Economists.During the remainder of 1996 and into early 1997, the Internal Dissidence WorkGroup kept a relatively low profile as it continued its work.
At the end of 1996, Cuban dissidents were encouraged by thedecision of the 15-member European Union (EU) to adopt a policy toward Cubathat would "encourage a process of transition to pluralist democracy andrespect for human rights." The policy linked the prospect of an EU-Cubacooperation pact, much desired by the Cuban government, to Cuba's response tothe EU's call to release political prisoners and stop harassment of dissidents.Cuban dissidents hoped the new EU policy would give them greater prominence andlegitimacy in international circles and undercut the Cuban government'sallegation that dissidents were pawns of the United States.^[135][134]
Dissidents were also encouraged when Canada's foreignminister, Lloyd Axworthy, visited Cuba on January 21, 1997, and obtained anagreement from the Cuban government that discussion of human rights would bepart of bilateral relations between Canada and Cuba. Despite the agreement, theCuban government exhibited its continuing contempt for the issue of humanrights by detaining for interrogation on the very same day the Canadian foreignminister was in Cuba: Marta Beatriz Roque Cabello of the Internal DissidenceWorking Group; and Tania Quintero and Juan Antonio Sánchez, reporters for theindependent news agencyCubaPress.^[136][135]
On April 15, 1997, the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) announcedthat it would hold its fifth party congress in the fall. The date was subsequentlyset for October 8-10, 1997. In response to that announcement, and to a StateSecurity sweep against dissidents and independent trade unionists on May 1,1997,^[137][136]the Internal Dissidence Work Group held a press conference for the foreignmedia in the Havana home of Vladimiro Roca on May 5, 1997.
The participants at the press conference were: Roca and thethree other founders of the group, Marta Beatriz Roque Cabello, René GómezManzano and Félix Bonne Carcasés; Odilia Collazo Valdés, head of the Working Group'seight-memberComité de Apoyo, SupportCommittee, and representative of thePartidoPro Derechos Humanos en Cuba(PPDHC), Party for Human Rights in Cuba; JesúsYanez Pelletier, member of the executive committee of theComité Cubano Pro Derechos Humanos(CCPDH), Cuban Committee forHuman Rights, headed by Gustavo Arcos Bergnes; and Arnaldo Ramos Lauzirique andRafael García Suárez of theConfederaciónde Trabajadores Democráticos de Cuba, Cuban Confederation of DemocraticWorkers. Twenty-one foreign journalists, representing media outlets from tencountries, attended.^[138][137]
The eight organizations which formed the Work Group SupportCommittee were:^[139][138]
Alianza PatrióticaCubana- Cuban Patriotic Alliance.
Confederación deTrabajadores Democráticos de Cuba- Confederation of Democratic Workers ofCuba.
Jóvenes Defensores delos Derechos Humanos- Youth Defenders of Human Rights.
Movimiento 13 de Julio- July 13^thMovement.
Partido Pro DerechosHumanos en Cuba- Party for Human Rights in Cuba.
Sociedad InternacionalPro Libertad del Sector Médico de Cuba- International Society for Libertyof the Medical Sector of Cuba.
Unión de JóvenesDemocráticos de Cuba de la provincia de Piñar del Río- Union of DemocraticYouths of Cuba from the province of Piñar del Río.
Unión DemocráticaCubana- Cuban Democratic Union.
By early July 1997, as reported by Miami-based newspapercolumnist Ileana Fuentes, a number of other organizations had signed on to theSupport Committee of the Working Group, including:^[140][139]
Alerta VerdeGrupo Ecológico- Green Alert EcologicalGroup.
Alianza JuvenilMartiana- Martí Youth Alliance.
Foro de EstudiosHistóricos- Historical Studies Forum.
Madres por la Libertad- Mothers for Liberty.
Movimiento AgendaNacionalista- Nationalist Agenda Movement.
Movimiento Cubano deJóvenes por la Democracia- Cuban Movement of Youths for Democracy.
Movimiento LiberalDemocrático- Democratic Liberal Movement.
Movimiento Pacifistapor la Democracia- Pacifist Movement for Democracy.
Movimiento UniónNacional Cubano- Cuban National Union Movement.
Partido LiberalDemocrático de Cuba- Democratic Liberal Party of Cuba.
Partido UniónDemocrática Cubana- Cuban Democratic Union Party.
Unión Humanitaria deCristianos Sociales- Humanitarian Union of Social Christians.
At the May 5, 1997 press conference, the Work Group issued asix-point platform in support of a transition to democracy in Cuba and proposedthe convening of an international forum with the participation of the EuropeanUnion to discuss the issue. Further, it called for negotiations between theCuban government and the internal and external opposition to address "a grave,general, economic, political, social and moral crisis the country is facing."It also called for Cubans to boycott the PCC-controlled elections for theNational Assembly expected sometime after the fifth PCC congress in October.^[141][140]
On May 23, 1997, the PCC released a party platform inpreparation for the October 8-10 PCC congress. The document's title, "The Partyof Unity, Democracy and Human Rights that We Defend," seemed designed toappease international criticism, but the document itself staunchly, and in grimlanguage, defended the one-party Communist system. The platform hailed the PCCideology based on "Marx, Engels and Lenin," excoriated Cubans' "fascination andfrivolous cult for Yankee symbols and models," and called on PCC members torespond "firmly" to "counterrevolutionaries" and "criminals" seeking toundermine the regime. On the subject of human rights, the platform stated therewere no human rights violations in Cuba, that "there has not been a singlepolitical crime, one person tortured, one person disappeared since 1959."^[142][141]
On June 7, 1997, the Work Group met in Havana with MichaelRanneberger, the U.S. State Department coordinator on Cuba, and asked theUnited States to act as an observer of the National Assembly elections.Vladimiro Roca reiterated the group's call for Cubans to boycott the elections,saying, "[a]bstentionism is the only way to turn this voting into an election, toshow the government we do not agree with the system it has imposed."^[143][142]
On June 27, 1997, the Work Group issued a paper entitled,"The Homeland Belongs to Us All," in response to the PCC party platform. In thepaper the group stated that the PCC platform "does not offer the possibility ofestablishing a true constitutional state, nor an independent and impartiallegal system that would protect the liberties and rights of the individual andthe practice of political pluralism." Following a detailed diagnosis of Cuba'songoing economic crisis, the group repeated its earlier call for negotiationsbetween all Cubans on the island and abroad, saying, "[i]t is better to discusssolutions now than to plunge our homeland into mourning tomorrow."^[144][143]The Work Group and its Support Committee claimed to represent between 500 and1,000 dissidents.^[145][144]
Five days earlier, on June 22, 1997, another group of formerConcilio Cubanomembers formed theAlianza Nacional Cubana, Cuban NationalAlliance. Principal organizers includedConcilioCubanonational delegate Dr. Leonel Morejón Almagro, who had been releasedfrom prison on May 9, 1997, and his wife, Zoíris Aguilar Calleja, president oftheAlianza Democrática Popular(ADEPO2),Popular Democratic Alliance. The independent news agencyHabana Press, Havana Press, reported that the Cuban NationalAlliance, at the time of its founding, consisted of the following memberorganizations:^[146][145]
Alianza DemocráticaPopular- Popular Democratic Alliance.
Coalición DemocráticaCubana- Cuban Democratic Coalition.
Comité por Paz,Progreso y Libertad- Committee for Peace, Progress and Liberty.
Movimiento de Madrespor la Solidaridad- Movement of Mothers for Solidarity.
NaturPaz-NaturePeace.
Organización FemeninaIndependiente- Independent Women's Organization.
Organización JuvenilMartiana por la Democracia -Martí Youth Organization for Democracy.
Partido AcciónNacionalista- National Action Party.
Partido LiberalDemocrático- Liberal Democratic Party.
Unión de Trabajadoresde Cuba- Union of Workers of Cuba.
The Cuban National Alliance called for renewed efforts toreconstitute theConcilio Cubanobased on its original principles, and called on the Cuban government to allowtheConcilio Cubanoto hold themeeting which had been prohibited in February 1996. The Alliance also calledupon the Cuban government to hold a plebiscite in which Cubans would vote toamend the constitution in favor of "freedom of expression, freedom ofassociation, pluralism, and the election of rulers through direct, free andsecret ballots within the framework of representative democracy."^[147][146]
Meanwhile, it was reported that theConcilio Cubanocommission for the province of Havana, CommissionNo. 7, met in the city of Artemisa on June 29, 1997. It called for arevitalization of the umbrella group's national structure. The followingorganizations were represented:^[148][147]
Asociación de Campesinos Independientes- Independent Peasants Association.
Asociación de Maestrosy Profesores- Association of Teachers and Professors.
Asociación Nacional deTrabajadores por Cuenta Propia- National Association of Self-EmployedWorkers.
Centro No Gubernamental de Derechos Humanos yCultura de Paz "José de la Luz y Caballero"- Non-Governmental Human Rights, Culture andPeace Center "José de la Luz y Caballero."
Consejo UnitariosCubanos, Delegación Artemiseña- Council of Cuban Unitarians, ArtemisaDelegation.
Fundación Regional deOpositores de Artemisa- Regional Opposition Foundation of Artemisa.
Partido DemócrataCristiano, Delegación Artemiseña- Christian Democrat Party, ArtemisaDelegation.
Unión DemócrataCristiana- Christian Democratic Union.

THE 1997 CRACKDOWN
Although the Cuban government had not disrupted the May 5,1997 press conference of the Internal Dissidence Work Group, repression againstdissidents generally had been on the increase since the beginning of the year,and would culminate in a crackdown against the Work Group itself in July.
Héctor Palacio Ruíz, one of the fourConcilio Cubanovice national delegates and president of thePartido Solidaridad Democrático(PSD),Democratic Solidarity Party, was arrested on January 9, 1997, after sayingduring an interview with German television, "Either Fidel Castro is crazy andwants to submit this country to a holocaust, or he is simply trying to prolonghis stay in power."^[149][148]Palacio Ruíz was held for nine months, convicted in a two-hour trial onSeptember 4, 1997, on the charge ofdesacato,"disrespect," and sentenced to 18 months in prison. According to AmnestyInternational, friends and journalists were not allowed to attend the trial andthe witnesses his lawyer had requested were not permitted to testify.^[150][149]
On May 1, 1997, at least a dozen dissidents were arrested.Most were interrogated by State Security, threatened with imprisonment if theydid not cease their "illegal" activities, and released. Ana María AgramonteCrespo of theMovimiento AcciónNacionalista, Nationalist Action Movement, however, who had been draggedout of her home by police on May 1, was tried and convicted on May 20 on acharge of "disrespect" and sentenced to 18 months in the Havana Women's Prison,known asManto Negro, Black Mantle.^[151][150]As of June 26, 1997, Alberto Perera Martínez of theComité por Paz, Progreso y Libertad, Committee for Peace, Progressand Liberty, was still being held at the Villa Marista State Securityheadquarters in Havana.^[152][151]
Also detained on May 1, 1997, was Reinaldo Alfaro García oftheAsociación de Lucha Frente a laInjusticia(ALFIN), Association for Struggle Against Injustice. AlfaroGarcía is also a member of the executive of thePartido Solidaridad Democrático(PSD), Democratic Solidarity Party.He was released and re-arrested on May 8. On July 13, he was transferred to theCombinado del Esteprison where, asof August 20, he was still awaiting trial on charges of "enemy propaganda" and"spreading false news against international peace." His arrest reportedly camethe day after he had delivered a letter, together with several mothers ofpolitical prisoners, to the President of the National Assembly, asking for anamnesty.^[153][152]
During the first six months of 1997, according to Cubanhuman rights activists, "dozens and dozens" of dissidents and independentjournalists had been subject to short-term detention by police and StateSecurity, and harassment and intimidation by SUVP groups and Rapid ResponseBrigades. Some were threatened with imprisonment if they did not stop theiractivities, while others, usually more prominent figures, were threatened withimprisonment if they did not leave the country. Elizardo Sánchez Santa Cruztold CNN in June 1997, "Last year the human rights situation was worse than in1995, and this year unfortunately the situation is already worse than lastyear."^[154][153]Amnesty International supported the assessment of the Cuban rights monitors,stating in mid-1997 that since 1996, members of Concilio Cubano and journalistsworking for independent organizations have been subjected to persistentharassment and frequent short-term detention. They have also been threatenedwith long-term imprisonment and occasionally physical violence if they do notcease their activities or leave the country.^[155][154]
The targeting of the Internal Dissidence Work Group and itsSupport Committee began in the first days of July 1997. On July 2, OdiliaCollazo Valdés, head of the Work Group Support Committee was detained andreleased by State Security, and two colleagues of Work Group co-founder MartaBeatriz Roque had their homes searched by State Security agents who confiscateda computer. Collazo Valdés, who is also president of theMadres por la Democracia, Mothers for Democracy, was among some 40members of groups belonging to the Support Committee who were detained aroundthat date, interrogated, and released.^[156][155]Thenight of July 2, unidentified individuals threw rocks and shattered windows atthe home of Vladimiro Roca, and on July 3, Roca's wife was temporarily detainedfor interrogation by State Security officials.^[157][156]
On July 16, all four founding members of the Work Group werearrested and taken to the Villa Marista State Security headquarters in Havana:Vladimiro Roca Antuñuz, Marta Beatriz Roque, Dr. René Gómez Manzano, and FélixBonne Carcasés. Each of their homes was searched and items ranging from books,computers, printers and cameras, to pencils, pens, envelopes andEnglish-language training manuals were confiscated.^[158][157]Cuban Foreign Ministry official Miguel Alfonso said the four were arrested "forcharges related to counterrevolutionary activities."^[159][158]On July 17, Odilia Collazo Valdés was re-arrested and this time taken to StateSecurity headquarters, where she was held for three days and released.^[160][159]The four Work Group members were declared "prisoners of conscience" by AmnestyInternational.^[161][160]
A week after the arrests of the four Work Group members, theCuban government hinted that it would attempt to link the four to the series ofsmall, unclaimed bomb explosions at Cuban tourist hotels since April.^[162][161]In response to inquiries by the Dutch and Canadian embassies regarding thearrests, the Cuban government sent a diplomatic note which stated, "[t]he Cubanauthorities have sufficient proof of the involvement of these citizens withleaders of terrorist groups in the territory of the United States." The notealso said the four were being held for "subverting the legal and constitutionalorder of the Republic of Cuba," and because they had lied about the economy andhad threatened foreign investors, the latter allegation apparently in referenceto a letter the Work Group had sent to European firms in Cuba in February,asking them to respect worker rights.^[163][162]
As of mid-September 1997, the four Work Group membersremained in detention at State Security Headquarters in Havana, without anyformal charges having been brought against them. Odilia Collazo was arrestedagain on August 7, threatened with imprisonment and released. On August 23, sheand her husband were injured in a traffic accident, in which they say a Havanacity bus deliberately veered into the path of their automobile.^[164][163]
Cuban rights monitors said that during the four weeks thatbegan with the targeting of the Work Group, 85 dissidents and independentjournalists were arrested, most for short-term detentions during which theywere threatened with long-term imprisonment. It was the second largest securitysweep this decade after the crackdown against theConcilio Cubanoin 1996. Many of those detained were threatenedwith 20-year prison sentences on charges of "terrorism" and "sabotage." The NewYork-based Committee to Protect Journalists counted nine independentjournalists detained between June 23 and the first week in August. Most weresubsequently released after being threatened with imprisonment, but LorenzoPaez Núñez was tried and convicted of "disrespect" against the national policeand sentenced to 18 months in prison. Paez Núñez is the head ofLibertad2, Freedom, an independent newsagency based in the province of Havana which is affiliated with the BPIC, acorrespondent for the more recently formedAgenciaNueva Prensa(ANP), New Press Agency, and president of theCentro No Gubernamental para los DerechosHumanos "José de la Luz y Caballero,"José de la Luz y CaballeroNon-Governmental Center for Human Rights.^[165][164]According to Amnesty International, from April to August 20, 1997, there were150 detentions of members of dissident organizations and independentjournalists, "who have been attempting to peacefully challenge officialpositions in many different spheres, including politics and human rights."Amnesty stated that because of the severe limitations on the reporting of humanrights violations, "the real figure may well be higher." Amnesty reported thatof those detained during this period, eight people were brought to trial andsentenced to prison and 28 others were believed to be facing trial. While somewere charged with offenses of an overtly political nature, others were chargedwith offenses which were "believed to have been fabricated or unfairly broughtagainst them as punishment for their political views." Amnesty further reportedthat many other activists were threatened with imprisonment if they did notforego their activities or leave the country. Amnesty noted that in some cases,the activists were subjected to physical attacks by persons believed to beworking for State Security, anonymous telephone threats, loss of employment orthreats against members of their families. Others were subjected toactos de repudio, acts of repudiation,had their telephone lines cut, or were ordered by police not to leave theirhomes for a certain period of time. Finally, Amnesty reported the confiscationfrom activists of office equipment such as typewriters, computers and faxmachines, as well as books and documents, including reports of alleged humanrights violations and copies of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.^[166][165]
The crackdown continued through August and on intoSeptember. On August 19, Zoíris Aguilar Calleja, wife of Dr. Leonel MorejónAlmagro and a co-founder with him of the Cuban National Alliance, was arrestedalong with Maritza Lugo Fernández of thePartidoDemocrático "30 de Noviembre" Frank País, Democratic Party "30^thof November" Frank País. Aguilar Calleja was released on September 1. OnSeptember 7, 1997, Lugo Fernández was sentenced to two years in prison on acharge of "bribery," after the government accused her of paying 100 pesos to aprison official to smuggle a tape recorder to a political prisoner, AyardeHerrera, held in a Havana jail. Lugo Fernández is the wife of Rafael IbarraLópez, president of the Democratic Party "30^thof November" FrankPaís, who is currently serving a twenty-year sentence for "sabotage." A numberof other dissidents associated with the National Alliance were also detained,threatened with imprisonment and released.^[167][166]
The 1997 crackdown extended beyond Havana, targetingdissident organizations that have been able to maintain branches in otherprovinces, as well as groups that are regionally based and often not as wellknown by foreign journalists based in Havana. Repression against local groupsin the provinces can be more difficult to track because of difficulties incommunication and travel, and because the foreign press corps tends to focusmore on events in Havana. Nonetheless, Cuba's independent news agencies havemanaged to place correspondents in a majority of the fourteen provinces outsideHavana and some agencies themselves are based outside the capital. That hasresulted in the last few years in a better flow of information from other partsof the island. The following incidents are just a few examples of regionalreports based on the dispatches of Cuban independent journalists. Although thereporting of Cuba's independent journalists is at times uneven-not surprising,given the arduous conditions under which they must operate-most make greatefforts to be accurate. The UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Cubastated in his most recent report that Cuba's independent news agencies"maintain high professional standards,"^[168][167]andin 1996 they were awarded the Grand Prize for Press Freedom by the Inter-AmericanPress Association, which is made up of editors and publishers of news media inLatin America, the Caribbean and the United States.
On May 3, 1997, as reported by theBuró de Periodistas Independientes de Cuba(BPIC), Bureau ofIndependent Journalists of Cuba, Zoilo Rafael Gavilla Valdés was interrogatedby State Security in the western city of Piñar del Rio. Gavilla Valdés hadfought with anti-government guerrillas in the central Escambray region in the1960s, served a prison term and was later released. State Security questionedhim about involvement with an organization calledVeteranos Independientes, Independent Veterans, a group of formeranti-government fighters still living in Cuba. Gavilla Valdés deniedinvolvement with that group, but admitted belonging to a former prisoners club,Ex Club Cautivo, Club of Ex-Captives.State Security threatened him with imprisonment if he did not cease hisactivities with the club.^[169][168]The Ex Club Cautivowas formed inJanuary 1996 in the town of San Carlos in the province of Piñar del Río. As ofJanuary 1997, the president was Luis Alberto Rodríguez, who stated at that timethat in 1996 many of the clubs members had been detained by State Security andthreatened with imprisonment.^[170][169]
On April 4, 1997, as reported by theAgencia de Prensa Independiente de Cuba(APIC), Independent PressAgency of Cuba, the group calledMovimientoJuvenil Ortodoxo del Año 2000, Movement of Orthodox Youth of the Year 2000,witnessed police sweeps of young people in front of the Hotel Santiago in theeastern city of Santiago de Cuba. APIC also reported that on April 9, 1997, inSantiago de Cuba, María Victoria Altunaga Benítez, a member of theMovimiento Democracia y Paz Oriente,Democracy and Peace Movement of the East, and a member as well of theClub de Ex-Presos Políticos Gerardo González,Club of Ex-Political Prisoners Gerardo González, was detained for five hours byState Security and threatened with physical assault and imprisonment. Also onApril 9, 1997, as reported by the APIC, Orestes Rodríguez Orruitiner, presidentof theComité de Amigos del Club deEx-Presos Políticos, Committee of Friends of the Club of Ex-PoliticalPrisoners, was summoned to the State Security office in Santiago de Cuba, wherehe was threatened with imprisonment if he did not cease his involvement in"little counterrevolutionary groups."^[171][170]Independent news agencyHabana Press,Havana Press, subsequently reported that Rodríguez Orruitiner, who is alsovice-president of theMovimiento ProDerechos HumanosSeguidores de Chibás,Movement for Human Rights Followers of Chibás, in Santiago de Cuba, wasarrested on June 20, 1997, and held for 72 hours by State Security in Santiagode Cuba.^[172][171]
The crackdown against dissidents continued in October 1997,with a wave of arrests in the city of Santa Clara in north-central Villa ClaraProvince that began on October 9 according to Amnesty International. Amnestyreported that 12 individuals associated with thePartido Pro Derechos Humanos en Cuba(PPDHC), Party for HumanRights in Cuba, were arrested for carrying out a hunger strike to protest theprevious arrest of Daula Carpio Mata, the PPDHC provincial delegate for VillaClara. Carpio Mata had been placed in the Guamajal Women's Prison to awaittrial on charges of intimidating a prison doctor. A two-year prison sentencewas being sought. On October 16, 1997, Ricardo González Alfonso, aCubaPresscorrespondent covering theincidents in Santa Clara, was arrested at his home in Havana and threatenedwith long-term imprisonment.^[173][172]Thearrest of González Alfonso was carried out by State Security agents under thecommand of an official who identified himself as "Aramis," according toCubaPressdirector Raúl RiveroCastañeda, who was present at the time. Cuba's independent news agencies reportthat "Aramis" frequently is in charge of State Security operations againstindependent journalists.^[174][173]
In October 1997, the APIC reported on detentions,interrogations and other forms of intimidation against dissident groups ineastern Cuba. Groups targeted included theComitéPro Derechos Humanos Oriental, Eastern Committee for Human Rights, based inthe city of Bayamo, José Angel Correa, Luis Felipe Rodríguez and Ana Luisa LeónArana, officers; theUnión Cristiana deCuba, Christian Union of Cuba, based in the city of Bayamo, Ricardo Aramis,President; and theMovimiento de DerechosHumanos, Movement of Human Rights, based in Guacanayabo, Luz Delia Aguilar,Vice-President.^[175][174]

XVI.ASSESSMENT OF GROUPS

As described in chapters II-VII of this report, Cuba is aone-party Communist state, in which every Cuban is subject to a totalitariansystem of political and social control. That system is institutionalized andgiven legal framework by the 1976 Constitution and the Penal Code, whichtogether outlaw virtually any form of political or civic activity outside thepurview of the Communist Party of Cuba (PCC). Anyone deemed by the regime to bein opposition to it is considered a "counterrevolutionary" and an "enemy," andis therefore at risk of punishment. The judicial system, constitutionallysubordinated to the executive and legislative branches and under the control ofthe PCC, leaves Cubans with no recourse before the unlimited powers of thestate.
Cubans know there is a line, not always easily discernible,which cannot be crossed without incurring some type of repressive reaction fromthe state. Whether or not they are identified with an "illegal" organization,individuals who harbor critical opinions about the nature of rule in Cuba riskpunishment merely by expressing their views, either publicly or privately. Theregime at times allows a certain level of complaining, usually during periodsof economic crisis-for example, complaints about deficient publictransportation, electricity blackouts, or the quality of produce at state-runfood outlets. However, criticism of the political system itself or itsleadership is not tolerated.
Moreover, an individual who expresses such criticism knowsnot only that he or she is subject to punishment, but that relatives and friendscan also come under suspicion or be similarly threatened by the state as a wayto intimidate the actual dissenter. The same goes for relatives or friends ofpeople who actually do belong to groups considered "illegal" by the state. Forexample, it was reported in July 1997 that during a series of State Securityinterrogations of four members of thePartido Democrático "30 de Noviembre" Frank Paísin Manzanillo, Granmaprovince, Virginia Estrada, the 68-year-old mother of one of the party memberswas herself ordered to the State Security office for questioning. The son, LuisMario Parés Estrada, stated, "[s]he's not a political activist and they knowit. They've ordered her in to scare her and to discourage me from continuingwith this struggle for human rights."^[176][175]Inthe assessment of Pax Christi Netherlands:
State Security keeps a careful watch on activists,threatening them and their families: "We will fire your brother," "We'll sendyou to the other end of the country," "Something is going to happen to yourfamily," "We are going to arrest you." To intimidate activists, they aretelephoned every two hours during the night, members of their families are heldfor questioning, their homes are prey to vandalism and slogans are painted ontheir walls.^[177][176]
In another example, Julio Restano Suárez, the 75-year-oldfather of Yndamiro Restano, the founder of the independentBuró de Periodistas Independientes de Cuba(BPIC), the Bureau ofIndependent Journalists of Cuba, was interrogated for ten hours at the VillaMarista State Security headquarters in Havana on May 2, 1996. He was warned notto allow further BPIC meetings at his home, where the BPIC office was based.^[178][177]
Penalties for criticism of the political system or itsleaders can range from job loss to imprisonment, but the initial stage ofpunishment can begin with intimidating visits or other warnings from StateSecurity, the national police, or members of PCC-controlled mass organizationssuch as theComités de Defensa de laRevolución(CDRs), Committees for the Defense of the Revolution.
Targeted individuals also may receive written citations orwarnings from State Security or the police regarding their conduct orstatements they have made. For example, Antonio Morales Torres, a member of theBloque Democrático "José Martí," JoséMartí Democratic Bloc, in Nueva Gerona, the principal city on theIsla de Juventud(formerlyIsla de Pinos), Isle of Youth, relatedtoCubaPressin July 1997 that StateSecurity had filed three warnings against him for "dangerousness" and that hehad been told by officials that he could be formally charged with that crime atany time.^[179][178]
It should be emphasized, too, that while this reportincludes the names of dissident groups which are known, it is quite possiblethat there are groups or cells which operate clandestinely in order to avoidthe punishment to which all groups known to the state are subjected. Forinstance, while in Cuba in 1995, this writer came to know in a south-centralcoastal city a small group of people, mostly teachers, who met at night in apublic park. They gathered with the pretext of listening to taped jazz music,but used the meetings to compile instances of corruption and abuse in theschools, a dossier, they said, to be applied against local PCC officials in theevent of a hoped-for political transition in Cuba. One teacher had alreadyreceived a written citation from the local State Security office for certainstatements made during a faculty meeting. But all would be subject to fargreater penalties if the actual nature of their group were known. It is not outof the realm of possibility that similar dissident groupings might form and tryto operate clandestinely within official institutions, but because StateSecurity is so pervasive, it is questionable how long such groupings would beable to exist without detection.
Another point to be emphasized is that since at least1993-1994, the Cuban government has blurred the line between political andcommon crimes, part of an effort to improve its image internationally, asdescribed in Section IV. This is particularly the case in the government's useof the penal statutes against "dangerousness." The Inter-American Commission onHuman Rights (IACHR) has concluded that because of "their lack of precision andtheir subjective nature," the legal definitions of "dangerousness" constitute asource of juridical insecurity which creates conditions permitting the Cubanauthorities to take arbitrary action.^[180][179]
In other words, the Penal Code articles which define"dangerousness" constitute a catch-all mechanism which gives the government thelegal justification for taking any citizen it wants out of circulation. AsHuman Rights Watch/Americas has stated:
Cubans who engage in "anti-social behavior" or violate"socialist morality" may be held in preventive detention under the"dangerousness" provisions of the criminal code for as long as four years, evenwithout being convicted of a crime.^[181][180]
According to Pax Christi Netherlands and Human RightsWatch/Americas, there are clear indications that the crime of "dangerousness"is used as a cover to imprison people for political reasons on the grounds thatthey are common delinquents.^[182][181]
Finally, the reader who is looking for a reference to aspecific group or individual should not limit the search solely to this chapterof the report on groups at risk. The purpose of this chapter is to highlightspecific categories of groups of risk. Not all known groups are mentioned inthis section and the reader is advised to see also the Index and the Appendicesto this report.

A.DissidentOrganizations

As described in Chapters IX, XI and XIV of this report, andas can be seen in the lists ofConcilioCubanomembers in Appendices I and III, dissident groups have proliferatedin the 1990s despite repeated crackdowns against them. What began in the secondhalf of the 1970s as a handful of human rights groups has grown into a diversearray that now includes independent youth and women's organizations, tradeunionists, former political prisoners, lawyers' groups, medical associations,artists, environmentalists and farmers. Many affiliated themselves with theConcilio Cubano, which is described indetail in Chapter XI, while others remained independent even though they mighthave shared its principles. Many dissident groups have joined two new umbrellagroups that have emerged in the wake of the 1996 crackdown against theConcilio Cubano: theGrupo de Trabajo de la Disidencia Interna, Internal DissidenceWork Group, and theAlianza NacionalCubana, Cuban National Alliance, both of which are described in detail inChapter XIV, and were targeted in the 1997 crackdown.
All of these groups and umbrella organizations disavowviolence and many have tried to gain legal status through the Law ofAssociations, Law 54 of December 27, 1985. The law was decreed at the beginningof the slight thaw in repression that occurred in 1985-1988. The law, whichdoes not apply to PCC-controlled organizations or religious groups, establishesprocedures by which certain kinds of associations can be established.Applications are reviewed and decided upon by the Ministry of Justice, and canbe turned down for procedural reasons or because insufficient information isprovided as well as "if its activities could damage the social interest" or if anotherassociation with similar aims or name already exists. If recognized, theassociation is subject to periodic inspections and must supply the state withinformation about its work. Only one dissident organization, the ecologicalgroupsNaturPaz, NaturePeace, headedbyConcilio Cubanonational delegateLeonel Morejón Almagro, has ever received a reply, and that was a denial,nearly ten years after the application had been submitted.^[183][182]

1.YouthOrganizations

Since the 1996 crackdown against theConcilio Cubano, younger dissidents have been particularly activeand have been targeted by the government for harsh penalties. For example,there are the cases of two young leaders who had emerged during the formationof theConcilio Cubanoitself: the31-year old Dr. Leonel Morejón Almagro, a lawyer, and the 35-year-old LázaroGonzález Valdés. Aside from their duties on the National Secretariat, both weremembers of theConcilio Cubanoyouthcommission,Pinos Nuevos, New Pines,and González Valdés was president of thePartidoPro Derechos Humanos en Cuba(PPDHC), Party for Human Rights in Cuba. In athree-hour trial on February 22, 1996, González Valdés was found guilty of"disrespect" and "disobedience" and sentenced to fourteen months in prison. Hisdefense lawyer was only able to speak to him minutes before the trail began andthe court building was surrounded by police and a Rapid Response Brigade armedwith metal bars and sticks. The next day, Dr. Morejón was tried and convictedof "resistance." He was sentenced to six months in prison. When he appealed, hewas given an additional nine-month prison sentence for "disrespect."^[184][183]
Another member of New Pines, Luis Felipe Lores Nadal, wasfirst imprisoned in 1993 on a charge of "dangerousness," and released in March1995. He was arrested again on February 24, 1996, and held for eight days. Uponhis release he was told to discontinue his activities, leave the country, orface imprisonment again.^[185][184]
On June 6, 1996, in Havana, 32-year-old Néstor RodríguezLobaina and 27-year-old Radames García de la Vega, president and vice-presidentof theMovimiento Cubano de Jóvenes porla Democracia, Cuban Movement of Youth for Democracy, were arrested,charged with "disrespect" and "resistance" and sentenced respectively to twelveand six months' "restricted liberty" and "banishment," or internal exile. Thearrest was in connection to a project they had initiated,Universidades Sin Fronteras, Universities Without Borders, todemand that universities be made autonomous of the government, an old LatinAmerican tradition. After being beaten while in police detention, RodríguezLobaina and García de la Vega were removed to their respective homes inBaracoa, Guantánamo province, and Palma de Soriano, in the province of Santiagode Cuba.^[186][185]
In January 1997, Rodríguez Lobaina, García de la Vega, and29-year-old Heriberto Leyva Rodríguez, also a vice-president of theMovimiento Cubano deJóvenes por la Democracia, signed anopen letter to Fidel Castro calling for academic freedom in Cuba's universitiesand an end to professors and students being fired or thrown out of schoolbecause of their political beliefs, what they referred to as "ideologicalapartheid." The letter also protested their previous arrests, death threats,beatings, trials without due process and internal exile. Rodríguez Lobaina wasagain arrested on April 8, 1997, and two days later sentenced to 18 months inprison in theCombinado de Guantánamoprison for "disrespect" and "resistance." García de la Vega was arrested onApril 30, 1997, charged with "disrespect," and tried and sentenced on July 23,1997, to 18 months at Santiago de Cuba prison. Days after the trial, LeyvaRodríguez was fined 1,000 pesos, the equivalent of nearly five months' wages,for "disrespect of the Court" and "violating the solemnity of a trial," afterhe uttered statements in support of García de la Vega.^[187][186]On April 8, 1997, Néstor Rodríguez Lobaina's mother and his father, RamónRodríguez, were taken to a police station and forced to sign anacta de advertencia, an "officialwarning," and told they if they continued to defend their son they would bearrested.^[188][187]
On July 31, 1997, as Cuba was about to host the 14^thWorld Festival of Youth and Students (the last one was held in North Korea in1989), Leyva Rodríguez reported that sixMovimientoCubano deJóvenes por la Democraciamembers in Guantánamo province were visited in their homes by State Securityagents. The activists were warned not to show themselves in public whendelegates of the youth festival visited the province. Some of the activistswere also members of theComisión deDerechos Humanos Félix Varela, Félix Varela Human RightsCommission, whichis affiliated withthe Movimiento Cubanode Jóvenes por la Democracia. Despite the warnings, the activists attemptedto contact delegates to ask for help in gaining the release from prison ofNéstor Rodríguez Lobaina. On August 2, 1997, activist Juan Carlos Herrera wasarrested and held for two days by State Security. He was fined for "disorderlyconduct" and threatened with imprisonment on a charge of "enemy propaganda" forhaving in his possession a copy of the United Nations Universal Declaration onHuman Rights.^[189][188]
Another dissident youth organization,Juvenil Ortodoxo del 2000, Orthodox Youth of the Year 2000, wasactive in 1997 particularly in the eastern city of Santiago de Cuba, reportingon, among other things, conditions at the Boniato Prison.^[190][189]
There have also been reports of a group formed by people intheir twenties called the "Elpidio Valdés Commandos." The group is named aftera Castro-era cartoon character, a fictitious colonel in Cuba's war ofindependence from Spain. Reportedly based in the small town of Placetas, 150miles east of Havana, group members are said to go out at night to paintslogans and spread leaflets critical of Fidel Castro. In October 1997, it wasreported that five members of the group had been arrested in 1996. Three weresubsequently put under house arrest, while Emis Martí and his cousin, NoelRamos, formerly a resident of West Palm Beach, Florida, remained in prison.Martí and Ramos went on a hunger strike in October 1997 to demand a trial.^[191][190]

2.Women'sOrganizations

There are a number of independent women's organizations inCuba, some Havana-based with branches in various provinces, others regionallybased. Many have affiliated themselves with theConcilio Cubano, among them: theFrente Cívico de Mujeres Martianas, Villa Clara,Civic Front ofMartí Women of Villa Clara Province; theMovimientode Madres Cubanas Por la Solidaridad, Movement of Cuban Mothers forSolidarity; and theFrente FemeninoHumanitario,Humanitarian Feminist Front.
A newer group, theOrganizaciónFeminista Independiente(OFI), Independent Feminist Organization, put out astatement which was published on theCubaNetweb site in August 1997. The statement, signed by OFI president Cecilia ZamoraCabrera, criticized the "machismo" of Cuba's "totalitarian leader," and calledon Cuban women to fight for "equal rights" in a Cuba "where the people's voicesare not reduced to silence." The OFI is linked to thePartido de Acción Nacional, National Action Party, as Ingrid TorresAlvarez is a vice-president of both organizations.^[192][191]
TheForo Feminista,Feminist Forum, is a Santiago de Cuba-based,Concilio Cubano-affiliated organization that has been particularlyactive since the end of 1996. It is headed by 50-year-old Deysi (or Daisy)Carcasés Valle, who is often referred to contemptuously by governmentauthorities as la rubia flaca, "the skinny blonde." In December 1996, theForo Feministalaunched open protestswhich included reciting the United Nations Universal Declaration of HumanRights in a church park. Founded in 1994, the group claims 50 active members,and says that many have been targeted for arrest, short-term detentions,threats of imprisonment and violent assaults by Rapid Response Brigades. As anexample of how dissident organizations can overlap, Carcasés and anotherdissident leader, Rafaela Lasalle, operate an independent news agency inSantiago de Cuba,Agencia de Prensa LibreOriental(APLO), Eastern Free Press Agency, and file dispatches directly toRadio Martí in Miami or through Havana-based independent news agencies fordistribution abroad. Both Carcasés and Lasalle, who is the director of APLO(often referred to simply asPrensaOriente), report that they are frequently harassed and threatened by StateSecurity and the police. Carcasés was briefly detained on August 15, 1997, andthreatened with long-term imprisonment if she did not cease her activities.^[193][192]

3.TradeUnionists

TheComisión Nacionalde Sindicatos Independientes(CONSI), National Commission of IndependentUnions, an umbrella organization comprised of five independent Cuban unions,was formed in February 1993.^[194][193]Thefive member unions were:
•Unión General de Trabajadores de Cuba(UGTC) - General Union of Cuban Workers.
•Unión Sindical de Trabajadores Cubanos(USTC) - Syndicated Union of Cuban Workers.
•Unión de Trabajadores de Ciudad Habana(UTCH) - Union of Workers of the City of Havana.
•Unión de Trabajadores de Provincia Habana(UTPH) - Union of Workers of the Province of Havana.
•Unión de Trabajadores de Comercios(UTC)- Union of Commercial Workers.
These unions were formed in large part by unemployed workerswho had lost their jobs because of independent human rights or trade unionactivities.^[195][194]From the start, CONSI affiliates and their members faced frequent harassment,including beatings and short-term detentions and penetration by undercovergovernment agents.^[196][195]Under such pressure, which was heightened by internal differences regarding theU.S. economic embargo, CONSI eventually came apart. Still, its affiliatesremained in existence or evolved into new union organizations, including theConsejo Unitario de Trabajadores Cubanos(CUTC), United Cuban Workers Council, a member of theConcilio Cubano. CUTC president Pedro Pablo Alvarez, also thepresident of the USTC, was arrested, threatened, and released during the 1996crackdown against theConcilio Cubano.^[197][196]
In May 1996, Néstor Baguer, head ofthe Agencia de Prensa Independiente de Cuba(APIC), IndependentPress Agency of Cuba, reported on the activities of six independent tradeunions:
•Central Sindical Cristiana(CSC),Christian Workers Central.
•Confederación de Trabajadores Democráticosde Cuba(CTDC), Cuban Confederation of Democratic Workers.
•Sindicato Independiente Baraguá(SIB),Independent Union of Baraguá.
•Unión Laborista de Cuba(ULC), LaborUnion of Cuba.
•Unión Sindical de Trabajadores de Cuba(USTC), Syndicated Union of Cuban Workers.
•Unión Sindical Independiente de Cuba(USIC), Independent Syndicated Union of Cuba.
Baguer reported that all but one of the six unions wasnational, while the SIB was a union of independent farm workers based inBaraguá in eastern Cuba. He wrote that each union had as many as one hundredmembers.^[198][197]
Baguer did not mention theUnión General de Trabajadores de Cuba(UGTC), an original member ofCONSI. But the UGTC continued to exist as it leaders, as well as leaders of theUSTC, met in Havana in February 1996 with a delegation from the InternationalConfederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). At that time, the USTC favoredmaintaining the U.S. economic embargo on Cuba, while the UGTC leaned towardlifting the embargo and promoting change within the official, PCC-controlledunion, theCentral de Trabajadores deCuba(CTC), Cuban Workers' Central. Both the UGTC and the USTC reportedharassment and intimidation by police and State Security, loss of jobs, andbeing labeled by the government as "stooges of the Americans" and"counterrevolutionaries."^[199][198]
On February 2, 1997, theConfederación de Trabajadores Democráticos de Cuba(CTDC), announced theformation of theCongreso de TrabajadoresIndependientes, Independent Workers Congress, and appealed to all independenttrade unions and organizations to join. Further reports indicated that otherunions did join, but their names were not mentioned. In April 1997, theCongress issued a platform calling for, among other things, an end to"discrimination based on political opinion" and the "promotion of worker rightsand labor justice." The Congress also vowed its support for theGrupo de Trabajo de la Disidencia Interna,Internal Dissidence Work Group. Those who signed the platform were José OrlandoGonzález Bridón, president of the CTDC; Ofelia Nardo Cruz; Gustavo Toirac; andRafael García Suárez, organizing secretary of the CTDC.^[200][199]
At the end of April 1997, a workers rights organization, theCoordinadora de Trabajadores Cubanos(COC), Cuban Workers' Coordinator, issued a declaration calling for "politicaldemocracy, social justice, and international solidarity." The COC is linked totheOficina de Información de DerechosHumanos, Human Rights Information Office, as Aida Valdés Santana is adirector of both organizations.^[201][200]
During the crackdown of summer 1997, numerous independenttrade unionists were targeted. For example, CUTC organizer Gilberto FigueredoAlvarez was among a number of activists detained by State Security in Havana onJune 20, 1997. Before being released he was told he was being given "a firstand last warning," and that no independent unions would be tolerated "becausethey are all CIA agents." Three other CUTC activists were confined to theirhomes for two days, and the home of yet another was assaulted by a RapidResponse Brigade.^[202][201]OnAugust 21, 1997, Vicente Escobar Barreiro, director of theInstituto de Estudios de Sindicalismo Cubano, Institute for theStudy of Cuban Trade Unionism, which is linked to the CUTC, was called in forquestioning for the second time by an SUVP unit in Havana. He was warned thathe would be arrested if he did not cease his union activities.^[203][202]On July 22, 1997, Luis Mario Pared Estrada, organizational secretary of theCUTC in the eastern province of Granma, was arrested by State Security. On July25, he was sentenced to a year in prison on a charge of "dangerousness," andwas placed in the Las Mangas prison near the city of Bayamo. CUTC nationalorganizer Lázaro Cuesta Collazo reported that Pared Estrada is also a member ofthePartido Democrático "30 de Noviembre"Frank País,Democratic Party "30^thof November" Frank Pais.^[204][203]
In the first week of July 1997, CTDC president José OrlandoGonzález Bridón and CTDC organizing secretary Rafael García Suárez werearrested by police in Havana. Independent journalists reported that GarcíaSuárez was threatened and released on July 8, 1997, but that González Bridónwas still being detained at that time.^[205][204]OnOctober 3, 1997, it was reported that Florentino Ledesma and Jorge Martínez,the organizational secretary and secretary general of theCentral Democrática de Trabajadores de Cuba (Histórica),DemocraticCentral of Workers of Cuba, were detained for a day on the eve of a plannedpress conference in Havana. They were threatened with long-term imprisonment ifthey did not cease their independent labor activities. This worker organizationmay be an offshoot or faction of theConfederaciónde Trabajadores Democráticos de Cuba(CTDC), Cuban Confederation ofDemocratic Workers.^[206][205]

4.PoliticalPrisoners Organizations

There are a number of organizations of former politicalprisoners and groups which provide support to current and former politicalprisoners. Among those that were affiliated with theConcilio Cubano, with the names of founders or leaders inparentheses, are:
•Atención a Presos Políticos- Attentionto Political Prisoners (Roberto Hernández Morales).
•Comité de Ayuda Humanitaria a PresosPolíticos de Santiago de Cuba- Santiago de Cuba Committee for HumanitarianAid to Political Prisoners (Jorge H. Alfonso Aguilar).
•Coordinadora de Presos Políticos-Political Prisoner Coordinator (Aida Valdés Santana).
•Comisión Humanitaria de Ayuda al PrisionerosPolíticos- Commission for Humanitarian Aid to Political Prisoners (AgustínJesús Arcos Amoya).
•Unión de Ex-Presos Políticos IgnacioAgramonte- Ignacio Agramonte Union of Ex-Political Prisoners (ReilerRamírez Muñíz).
•Unión de Ex-Presos Políticos, Camagüey-Marcelino Soto Caballero.
One ex-prisoner group that is not known to have been amember of theConcilio Cubanois theClub de Ex-Presos Políticos Gerardo González,Club of Ex-Political Prisoners Gerardo González, founded on September 12, 1996,in Santiago de Cuba. On April 9, 1997, in Santiago de Cuba, it was reportedthat María Victoria Altunaga Benítez, a member ofthe Movimiento Democracia y Paz Oriente, Democracy and PeaceMovement of the East, and of theClub deEx-Presos Políticos Gerardo González, was detained for five hours by StateSecurity and threatened with physical assault and imprisonment. It was alsoreported on April 9, 1997, that Orestes Rodríguez Orruitiner, president of theComité de Amigos del Club de Ex-PresosPolíticos, Committee of Friends of the Club of Ex-Political Prisoners,established as part of the Club in January 1997, was summoned to the StateSecurity office in Santiago de Cuba, where he was threatened with imprisonmentif he did not cease his involvement in "little counterrevolutionary groups."Rodríguez Orruitiner stated that days earlier a group of people, apparently aRapid Response Brigade or SUVP delegation, gathered in front of his house toshout "Sold out to Yankee imperialism!"^[207][206]OnJune 18, 1997,Habana Pressreportedthat three members of theMovimiento ProDerechos Humanos Seguidores de Chibás, Movement for Human Rights Followersof Chibás, were detained by State Security for protesting the imprisonment ofthe group's president, Fidel Soria Torres. Soria Torres, who is also avice-president of theClub de Ex-PresosPolíticos Gerardo González, was reportedly sentenced to two years in prisonon a charge of "dangerousness."^[208][207]

5.ProfessionalOrganizations

In recent years, numerous independent professionalorganizations have emerged. Many were founded by persons who lost their jobs orwere expelled from official organizations for political beliefs deemed counterto Communist ideology or the interests of the state.
The principal organization of independent lawyers is theCorriente Agramontista, AgramontistCurrent, which was founded in 1990 by, among others, Dr. René Gómez Manzano.The group has attempted to defend dissidents and openly criticized thepolitical control of the judicial system (described in Chapter V of thisreport). The group, an original member of theConcilio Cubano, says that it seeks to reform the judiciary fromwithin, but its formal request in February 1991 for official recognition by thegovernment has been ignored. Its members are frequently detained by StateSecurity and threatened. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights reportedthat during 1996 it had received many complaints of arbitrary detentions,summonses to appear before the police and State Security, expulsions from lawoffices, and prison sentences for lawyers who attempted to practice theirprofession independently.^[209][208]Dr.Gómez Manzano was arrested on July 16, 1997, along with the other threefounding members of theGrupo de Trabajode la Disidencia Interna, Internal Dissidence Work Group. As ofmid-September 1997, all four were still detained and under investigation for"counterrevolutionary" activities. On August 5, 1997, Gómez Manzano and anotherlawyer, Dr. Leonel Morejón Almagro, theConcilioCubanonational delegate, were awarded the International Human Rights Awardfrom the American Bar Association's Litigation Section.^[210][209]
The principal organization of independent medical doctors istheColegio Médico Independiente de Cuba,Independent Medical Association of Cuba, founded by Dr. Hilda Molina and Dr.Iraida de León in 1995. It is based in Havana but has affiliates in otherprovinces, for example theConsejo MédicoCubano Independiente, Independent Cuban Medical Council, in Piñar del Ríoprovince, founded by Dr. Jesús Ramón Marate Pozo.^[211][210]On July 12-13, 1997, in Havana, the vice-president of theColegio, Dr. Augusto Madrigal Izaguirre, was threatened by policein Havana with imprisonment if he did not cease his activities with theorganization. On July 30, 1997, he was arrested by State Security and againthreatened with imprisonment.^[212][211]
TheColegio MédicoIndependiente de Santiago de Cuba, Independent Medical Association ofSantiago de Cuba, is headed by Dr. Desi Mendoza Rivero, who was fired from hisjob after founding the organization. He was arrested by State Security on June25, 1997, after making statements and providing information to foreignreporters and independent Cuban journalists regarding the dengue fever epidemicwhich had struck Santiago de Cuba. He provided the only unofficial reportsabout the number of deaths and accused the government of covering up the trueextent of the epidemic. As of mid-September 1997, he was still under detentionand being investigated for "enemy propaganda." His wife, Caridad PiñonRodríguez, reported that groups of people had gathered in front of their hometo denounce her and her husband and that she had received threatening telephonecalls. In a related case, journalist Juan Carlos Céspedes of theAgencia de Prensa Libre Oriental(APLO),Eastern Free Press Agency, based in Santiago de Cuba, was detained by StateSecurity for six days, June 12-18, 1997, after reporting statements about theepidemic made by Dr. Mendoza Rivero.^[213][212]
Other independent professional organizations include: theColegio de Pedagogos Independientes de Cuba,Association of Independent Cuban Educators;Colegiode Ingenieros Independientes de Cuba, Association of Independent CubanEngineers; and theColegio de ArquitectosIndependientes de Cuba, Association of Independent Cuban Architects. OnJanuary 31, 1997, it was reported that these three associations, along with theColegio Médico Independiente de Cuba,had united to form theInstituto deIntegración Cubanoamericano, Institute of Cuban-American Integration,through which the members hoped to form ties with counterpart organizationsabroad.^[214][213]On July 30, 1997, Miriam García Chavez, dean of theColegio de Pedagogos Independientes de Cuba, was detained by StateSecurity in Havana and threatened with imprisonment if she did not cease heractivities with the organization.^[215][214]OnSeptember 11, 1997, García Chavez told theMiamiHeraldthat on September 5, three members of theColegio de Pedagogos Independientes de Cubahad been detainedduring a round-up of at least eight dissidents following the arrest of aSalvadoran national whom the Cuban government alleged was responsible for someof the recent bombings at Cuban tourist hotels.^[216][215]
On January 19, 1997, scientist and writer Rubier Rodríguezwas released from prison on the condition that he immediately leave thecountry, which he did, leaving for Madrid on that same day. He had beenarrested on February 13, 1992, and accused along with three other scientists atthe Academy of Sciences in Havana of belonging to an "illegal" group called theGeneración Revolucionaria Nueva, NewRevolutionary Generation. He was accused of trying to spread a computer viruscontaining political propaganda, convicted of "rebellion," and sentenced to tenyears in prison.^[217][216]

6.IndependentFarmers

There are at least two organizations of dissident orindependent Cuban farmers. The first to emerge was theCooperativa Transición, Transition Cooperative, based in Santiagode Cuba. In its mission statement issued on May 12, 1997,Transición, as it is commonly known, claimed to have 20 members (80counting family members), developing 54 hectares of land as a"non-governmental" cooperative. The statement was signed by theTransiciónpresident, Jorge BéjarBaltazar. The group said it supported the "National Salvation Program" of thePartido Cubano de Renovación Ortodoxa(PCRO), Cuban Party of Orthodox Renovation, which advocates, among otherthings, an end to state control of agriculture and freedom of association. ThePCRO claims to be a descendant of the party of the same name which existedbefore the revolution and is currently particularly active in Santiago de Cuba.^[218][217]
On July 27, 1997, PCRO president Diosmel Rodríguez Vega andPCRO Havana coordinator Rafael Santiago Montes were detained by State Securityin Havana for questioning. During the operation, their homes were searched andTransiciónvice-president Antonio AlonsoPérez, who was present, was ordered by State Security to return immediately toSantiago de Cuba.^[219][218]
On August 12, 1997, it was reported that theTransiciónpresident and vice-presidentwere expelled from the PCC-controlledAsociaciónNacional de Agricultores Pequeños(ANAP), National Association of SmallFarmers. The two were then summoned for questioning by State Security.^[220][219]On September 13, 1997,Transiciónpresident Béjar Baltazar stated that a horse had been killed and cattle robbedfrom the cooperative, but the authorities had refused to investigate.^[221][220]
The second independent farmers organization is theCooperativa Independiente Progreso 1,Independent Progress Cooperative 1, located in the southwest section of themunicipality of Niceto Pérez, in the eastern province of Guantánamo. Accordingto a report in early October 1997 by theAgenciade Prensa Libre Oriental(APLO), the cooperative is composed of 34 peoplein 11 families and it produces tobacco and various fruits on 91 hectares of land.The cooperative had recently sent a letter to the National Assembly to announceits formation as an entity independent of the PCC-controlledAsociación Nacional de Agricultores Pequeños(ANAP), National Association of Small Farmers. The letter stated that the ANAPdid not defend the interests of farmers. The cooperative listed ReinaldoHernández Pérez as president and Joel Pérez Hernández, an agronomist, asvice-president.^[222][221]

7.IndependentEnvironmentalists

Two of the known independent environmental groups areConcilio Cubanomembers. One is theMovimiento Ecologista y Pacifista Naturpaz,NaturePeace Ecological and PacifistMovement, founded by lawyer Leonel Morejón Almagro, who was later electedConcilio Cubanonational delegate andserved fifteen months in prison in 1996-97 on charges of "resistance" and"disrespect." The other is theGrupoEcológico Alerta Verde, Green Alert Ecological Group, based in Piñar delRío province, whose president is Raúl Pimentel. They are commonly referred toas, respectively,NaturpazandAlerta Verde.
Another group was formed in 1997, theAgencia Ambiental Entorno Cubano(A.A.M.E.C.), Cuban OpenEnvironmental Agency. It was founded in Camagüey by Eudel Cepero, a 35-year-olduniversity-trained conservationist who in 1996 was awarded a six-monthscholarship to study in the Netherlands by the Dutch government. When the Cubangovernment denied him permission to leave the country, he established theA.A.M.E.C. In its founding document, the organization defined itself as"independent and completely apolitical."^[223][222]
In November 1996,AlertaVerdeissued a small publication called "Alerta Verde," which held thegovernment responsible for deforestation and environmental damage in Pinar delRio. On July 5, 1997, Raúl Pimentel was arrested by State Security in thatprovince. On July 9,1997, the A.A.M.E.C. issued a declaration calling for theimmediate release of Pimental and requested the solidarity of environmentalgroups throughout the world on his behalf.^[224][223]

B.IndependentJournalists

The first organization of independent journalists, theAsociación de Periodistas Independientes deCuba(APIC2), Association of Independent Cuban Journalists, was created byYndamiro Restano Díaz in 1988-1989. At the time of his arrest and incarcerationin 1991 (described earlier in Chapter IV on the Penal Code), Restano waspreparing an issue of his bulletin,Opinión.After Restano's imprisonment, journalist Néstor Baguer became director of APIC2and renamed itAgencia de PrensaIndependiente de Cuba, Independent Press Agency of Cuba. By mid-1995, therewere at least three independent journalists organizations: APIC;Patria, Fatherland, founded by RoxanaValdivia Castilla in the central province of Ciego de Avila; andHabana Press, Havana Press, launched byRafael Solano. Solano and many of the other journalists involved had worked forthe state media and been fired usually for some form of "ideologicalincompatibility."^[225][224]Thejournalists working for the new agencies immediately became targets of frequentharassment, intimidation and short-term detentions.^[226][225]
As dissident groups moved toward greater cooperation in1995, a similar process was occurring among independent journalists. OnSeptember 19, 1995, Yndamiro Restano Díaz, whorecently had been released fromprison, founded theBuró de PeriodistasIndependientes de Cuba(BPIC), Bureau of Independent Journalists of Cuba,to coordinate the work of the APIC,Patria,andHabana Press. By the end of 1995,BPIC encompassed at least 20 journalists working in Havana and nine out offourteen provinces.^[227][226]
By that time, independent journalists were taking advantageof the significant upgrade in telecommunications between Cuba and the UnitedStates in late 1994. Cuba's independent journalists are prohibited frompublishing newspapers or magazines, so they send their articles abroad forpublication and for re-transmission back to Cuba by radio or the Internet.Articles are sent either by fax or dictated over the phone, and a number ofindependent journalists have contributed to U.S., Latin American, and Europeannewspapers. With State Security constantly confiscating office equipment anddisconnecting telephone lines-fax machines, typewriters, photocopiers,satellite dishes, modems, and access to the Internet are illegal unless authorizedby the government-the independent journalists are always scrambling to connectwith their contacts outside Cuba. Volunteers in Florida and Europe built a WestPalm Beach-based web site,CubaNet(http://www.cubanet.org), for the journalists, and now e-mail articles to morethan 700 subscribers, including many in Cuba. Access to the Internet isprohibited by the government, the only Internet provider in Cuba, except forofficial institutions. But those with access occasionally share it with friendsand family.^[228][227]
Cuba's independent news agencies have now managed to placecorrespondents in most of the provinces outside Havana and some agenciesthemselves are based outside the capital. That has expanded the flow ofuncensored information from throughout the island. In March 1997, one sourceestimated that there were some 60 independent journalists in Cuba. Except foroccasional fees from foreign newspapers, independent journalists receive nopayment for their work. They survive with the support of family, friends, andthe Paris-basedReporters Sans Frontières,Reporters Without Borders, which sends a little over $1,000 each month to bedivided among the independent news agencies.^[229][228]
Although the reporting by Cuba's independent journalists isoccasionally uneven-not surprising given the arduous conditions under whichthey must operate-most make every effort to be accurate. The UN SpecialRapporteur on Human Rights in Cuba stated in his most recent report that Cuba'sindependent news agencies "maintain high professional standards."^[230][229]In October 1996, the Inter-American Press Association awarded its Grand Prizefor Press Freedom to four independent Cuban press agencies and an associationof journalists and writers: the BPIC,HabanaPress,CubaPress,Patria, and theUnión de Periodistas e Escritores Cubanas Independientes(UPECI),Union of Independent Cuban Journalists and Writers. The UPECI was founded byjournalist María de Los Angeles González. She edited the inaugural issue of theUPECI publication,Transición, inFebruary 1996, for which she was arrested and placed under investigation for"rebellion" and "enemy propaganda."^[231][230]
As of September 1997, independent news agencies operating inCuba, with their main offices in Havana unless otherwise noted, included:
•Agencia de Prensa Independiente de Cuba(APIC), Independent Press Agency of Cuba.
•Agencia de Prensa Llanura, Prairie PressAgency. Based in the city of Matanzas, about fifty miles east of Havana.
•Agencia Nueva Prensa(ANP), New PressAgency.
•Agencia de Prensa Libre Oriental(APLO),Eastern Free Press Agency. Based in the eastern city of Santiago de Cuba. Oftenreferred to simply asPrensa Oriente.
•Buró de Periodistas Independientes de Cuba(BPIC), Bureau of Independent Journalists of Cuba.
•Centro-Norte Press(CNP). Based in thenorth-central province of Villa Clara.
•CubaPress, Cuba Press.
•Habana Press, Havana Press.
•Línea Sur Press, South Line Press. Basedin the south-central province of Cienfuegos. Has links with an independent newsagency in Puerto Rico,Línea Sur 3,and the Puerto Rico-basedPro PrensaLibre e Independiente para Cuba(PPLIC), Free and Independent Press forCuba, as well as with the BPIC.
•Patria, Fatherland. Based in the centralprovince of Ciego de Avila, with correspondents in the neighboring province ofCamagüey as well.
•Pinar Press. Based in the westernprovince of Pinar del Río.
In July 1997, there was a report by aHabana Presscorrespondent about another independent press agency,Caribe Press, operating in Santiago deCuba. The report said thatCaribe Presspresident Enrique Copello Véliz had been temporarily detained by State Securityin connection with the arrest of Dr. Desi Mendoza Rivero, who had beenproviding information to independent journalists on the dengue fever epidemicin Santiago de Cuba.^[232][231]
There are also a number of independent journalists who havefound ways to file stories directly toCubaNet.Among the more prominent are Manuel David Orrio and Monike de Mota, both ofwhom also file through APIC. They and others file stories also with theMiami-basedBuró de Información delMovimiento Cubano de Derechos Humanos, Information Bureau of the CubanMovement of Human Rights, headed by exiled former political prisoner ArielHidalgo, which distributes them to foreign media outlets and on the Internet.
In late summer 1997, a writer calling himself Pablo Cedeñobegan filing reports and editorial commentaries from Havana directly toCubaNetfor posting on its web site.Cedeño identified himself as part of something called theAgencia de Prensa Decoro, Decorum Press Agency.^[233][232]
From the outset, the government has regarded independentjournalists as "counterrevolutionaries" and "enemies," and they are frequentlyexcoriated in the state-controlled media. For example,Granma, the official newspaper of the Communist Party of Cuba(PCC), has referred to independent journalists as "the fifth column of Americanimperialism,"^[234][233]and accused them of "treason to the fatherland."^[235][234]
Independent journalists are targeted with the same forms ofrepression as independent human rights monitors and other dissidentgroups-frequent detentions, assaults by Rapid Response Brigades and the SUVP,systematic impoverishment, internal banishment, and prolonged prison terms andforced exile, as occurred during 1995-96 in the cases of: Yndamiro RestanoDíaz, the founder of the APIC and the BPIC; Rafael Solano, the founder ofHabana Press; and Roxana ValdiviaCastilla, the founder ofPatria.^[236][235]
The New York-based Committee to Protect Journalists hascharged that independent journalists are victimized by systematic governmentwire-tapping and denial of telephone services. Since 1996, reports of linesbeing interrupted or disconnected have steadily increased. When telephones areworking, the government frequently uses them to make hostile and threateningcalls to independent journalists. Government tapping is sometimes done openly,with State Security agents breaking into conversations. Members of the officialpress often participate with Rapid Response Brigades and the SUVP in "acts ofrepudiation" against independent journalists.^[237][236]
Between 1992 and August 1997, the Committee to ProtectJournalists recorded 80 attacks on independent Cuban journalists, includingarrests, "acts of repudiation," short-term detentions, beatings and 14 prisonsentences.^[238][237]During a four-day period beginning on February 9, 1997, Raúl Rivero Castañeda,the founder and director ofCubaPressand an acclaimed poet, and nine other journalists were subjected to "acts ofrepudiation."^[239][238]According to the Paris-basedReportersSans Frontières, Reporters Without Borders, in the first eight months of1997, 25 independent journalists were detained for interrogation and threatenedwith long prisons if they did not cease their activities or go into exile, andat least 12 more had been held in jail for two days or more.^[240][239]Between April and October 1997, the Inter-American Press Association recorded24 detentions of independent journalists, nine cases of imprisonment, seven"acts of repudiation," and three cases of "forced internal exile."^[241][240]
On August 12, 1997,CubaPressdirector Raúl Rivero Castañeda was arrested at his Havana home and taken to theVilla Marista State Security headquarters. He had been briefly detained inpolice stations and subjected to "acts of repudiation" numerous timespreviously. State Security agents searched his apartment and confiscated hisoffice equipment, personal papers, and theCubaPressfiles. Rivero was released on August 15, after being threatened with long-termimprisonment if he did not cease his journalistic activities or leave thecountry. Previously, on June 4, 1997, police had visited Rivero's elderlymother and pressured her to urge her son to leave the country or abandon hiswork.^[242][241]On August 14, 1997, Bernardo Arévalo Padrón, director ofLinea Sur Press, South Line Press, an independent news agency basedin the south-central province of Cienfuegos, was detained by State Security andreleased three day later to await trial on a charge ofdifamación, "defamation," reportedly on the grounds that he hadinsulted government officials, including Fidel Castro, in his articles.According to Amnesty International, which reported that at least 19 independentjournalists were detained between April and August 20, 1997, Arévalo Padrón wasforbidden to leave his home town of Aguada de Pasajeros and as of August 20,1997, no trial had taken place.^[243][242]
At the time of Raúl Rivero's release on August 15, 1997, itwas reported that Julio Martínez García, deputy director ofHabana Press, had left the country forSpain under threat of imprisonment.^[244][243]OnJuly 28, 1997, two other independent journalists had been forced into exile,threatened with imprisonment if they did not leave Cuba: Olance Nogueras Rofe,a BPIC correspondent in the south-central province of Cienfuegos; and LázaroLazo Alfonso, a BPIC director in Havana and chief ofLibertad2, Liberty, the BPIC-affiliated news agency in HavanaProvince. Prior to his departure, Nogueras Rofes had been detained by police orState Security nearly 20 times.^[245][244]Lorenzo Paez Núñez, a journalist for the BPIC and theAgencia Nueva Prensa(ANP), New Press Agency, ignored similarthreats and in early August was tried and convicted of "disrespect" against thenational police and sentenced to 18 months in prison.^[246][245]Héctor Peraza Linares, the co-director ofHabanaPresswas arrested on June 23, 1997, and taken to State Securityheadquarters in Pinar del Río province. Peraza Linares was released onSeptember 23, 1997, after having been held for 92 days without charge.Authorities did not return to him equipment-a computer, typewriter, andcamera-seized at the time of his arrest.^[247][246]
During the numerous "acts of repudiation" againstindependent journalists in 1997, Rapid Response Brigade members frequentlychanted passages from Article 8 of Law 80, theLey de Reafirmación de la Dignidad y Soberanía Cubana, Law ofReaffirmation of Cuban Dignity and Sovereignty. Implemented by the Cubangovernment on December 24, 1996, Law 80 is often referred to as the "antidote"law to the U.S. Helms-Burton Act. Cuban independent journalists call it the"muzzle law." One clause of Article 8 makes it a crime for Cubans to cooperatein any way with news organizations that publish or divulge U.S. governmentarguments in favor of Helms-Burton. Another clause makes it illegal to discloseany information that "favors the application" of Helms-Burton.^[248][247]
In June 1997, the Cuban government instituted newregulations for the approximately 110 accredited foreign journalists working inCuba. The regulations were clearly designed to intimidate the foreign presscorps. The regulations require that foreign journalists be "objective" in theirreporting, "paying rigorous attention to events in conformity with the ethicalprinciples that control the exercise of journalism." Failure to adhere couldresult in a journalist having his or her accreditation temporarily ordefinitively revoked, "according to the circumstances and the consequences ofthe fault committed." The regulations require that Cuban journalists who wishto work for foreign news organizations must first be contracted by a governmentemployment agency that will act as an intermediary with the news organizations.Cuban independent journalists believe the law is designed to discourage theforeign media from contacting them and reporting on their plight and thesituation of dissidents in general. Foreign journalists also expressed concernabout the evident attempt to circumscribe their activities.^[249][248]

C.RepatriatedPersons

Since 1995 a number of countries have reached agreementswith Cuba for the return of Cubans who have left the island withoutauthorization, usually by sea. As documented in this section, by Fall 1997 morethan a thousand Cubans had been repatriated. Most were sent back by the UnitedStates and the Bahamas, while smaller numbers were returned by the CaymanIslands, a British protectorate, and Jamaica.
The Cayman Islands and the United States signed separateaccords with Cuba in May 1995. The Bahamas reached an agreement with Cuba inJanuary 1996. Jamaica reached an accord with Cuba in May 1996.
Between 1994 and 1996 hundreds of Cubans were also returnedto the island by Sweden.^[250][249]Many came from the former Soviet Union and sought political asylum in Sweden.As will be discussed later in this section, there has been no agreement betweenCuba and Sweden and since 1996 Cuba no longer accepts Cubans whom Sweden wantsto repatriate.
On May 2, 1995 the U.S. and Cuba signed a bilateralimmigration accord in which Cuba agreed to accept the return of Cubans who hadfled the island and had been interdicted by the U.S. The U.S. stated thatmigrants who were determined to have a credible or well-founded fear ofpersecution in Cuba and who were not otherwise ineligible for protection wouldnot be returned. Under the accord, Cuba pledged to"ensure that no actionis taken against those migrants returned to Cuba as a consequence of theirattempt to emigrate illegally."^[251][250]Theaccord allowed for officials of the U.S. Interests Section in Havana to monitorthe well-being of those people repatriated by the U.S. As of September 17,1997, the U.S. had repatriated 764 Cubans under the 1995 agreement, accordingto the Cuban government.^[252][251]
The Bahamas and Cuba signed an accord on January 12, 1996.Cuba agreed to accept the repatriation of Cubans who had arrived illegally inthe Bahamas after August 4, 1994 at a rate of up to 30 per month. Cuba assuredthe Bahamas that no harm would come to migrants on their return, but there wasno provision in the Bahamas-Cuba accord for monitoring their well-being. TheBahamian government stated that all Cubans who arrived in the Bahamas illegallywould be screened by government officials and representatives of the UnitedNations High Commissioner for Refugees to determine whether they qualified aspolitical refugees under United Nations Conventions.^[253][252]By the beginning of September 1997, 356 Cubans were returned by the Bahamasunder the 1996 accord.^[254][253]
In early May 1995 the British government announced that ithad authorized the governor of the Cayman Islands to repatriate to Cuba"Cuban migrants who arrive in the Cayman Islands subject to the usualinternationally accepted screening and appeals procedure."Theannouncement followed an agreement between Cuba and the Cayman Islands for therepatriation of Cubans who arrived illegally in the Cayman Islands. Cubaassured the Cayman Islands that no harm would come to migrants on their return,but there was no provision in the Cayman-Cuba accord for monitoring theirwell-being. A year later, in May 1996, Jamaica reached a similar agreement withCuba.^[255][254]
Of the various repatriation agreements, only the U.S.-Cubaaccord provided for monitoring of the well-being of repatriated Cubans. In 1997U.S. officials said that Cuba had for the most part abided by its promise notto punish returnees. During an interview on July 15, 1997, an official of theU.S. State Department said:"In general, the Cubans are adhering to theagreement…there doesn't seem to be a concerted government effort to harassthese people."^[256][255]
Human Rights Watch/Americas, the Forced Migration Project ofthe New York-Based Open Society Institute, the Inter-American Commission onHuman Rights of the Organization of American States (IACHR-OAS), and AmbassadorCarl-Johan Groth, the United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights inCuba, however, offer a different assessment, saying that repatriated Cubans aresubjected to discrimination and other forms of retribution. Human RightsWatch/Americas reported in October 1995, five months after the accord went intoeffect, that several cases of reprisals had already been reported since therepatriations began. Ulises Cabale and his brother César Cabale said that sincetheir return on May 9, 1995, they had been harassed and watched by StateSecurity agents. Four other people made similar statements.^[257][256]
On May 18, 1995, 17-year-old José Acevedo Pérez, a Cubanrafter, was badly beaten by police six days after he had been repatriated.Acevedo was being arrested for a common crime, disorderly conduct, but said policejeered at him for trying to leave the country. Acevedo also reported that hehad experienced ongoing harassment for trying to flee.^[258][257]According to the U.S. Department of State, "the U.S. Interests Section inHavana raised the mistreatment of Acevedo with the Cuban Ministry of ForeignAffairs. In response, the government of Cuba reported that unauthorized forcehad been used by the police and a police official apologized for the incident."^[259][258]
Human Rights Watch/Americas also described the case of twopeople who reported frequent visits to their home by police, CDRs, and StateSecurity agents, and the case of a man whose son was expelled from schoolbecause the father's attempt to leave the country had led to him being labeleda "counterrevolutionary." It was also reported that a professor had been unableto return to his job because his attempt to flee had made him unsuitable fordirect contact with students.^[260][259]According to a U.S. State Department official, the U.S. raised the professor'scase with the Cuban government; after four months the professor was re-hired athis old salary, but in a non-classroom research position.^[261][260]
The Forced Migration Project division of the New York-basedOpen Society Institute sent a mission to Havana and Camagüey province from June25-29, 1995, to review the procedures required by the May accord. The missionconfirmed the reports by Human Rights Watch/America of reprisals in the casesof the Cabale brothers; Alvaro Zamora Hernández, the university professor; andJosé Acevedo Pérez, the youth beaten by police. The mission further reportedthat a physician, Dr. David Oliva, had been fired from his job in reprisal fortreating Acevedo Pérez. Ulises Cabale presented the mission with the letter hereceived informing him of his job termination. The letter states specificallythat he was fired because he had "tried to abandon the country," andconstituted "a dangerous example for the rest of the workers." The missionconcluded that, "[f]or the most part, returned rafters subsist as unemployedpolitical ‘untouchables,' waiting for a domestic political change or the chanceto leave."^[262][261]
According to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rightsof the Organization of American States (IACHR-OAS) and the United NationsSpecial Rapporteur, the situation of repatriates did not change after 1995. Inits annual reportissued in March 1997, the IACHR-OAS, relying on "an abundanceof information provided by non-governmental organizations in Cuba and abroad,"stated that it "has been informed that in practice the persons repatriated,though not placed on trial, continue to suffer all types of discrimination onpolitical grounds, especially when they seek employment."^[263][262]According to Milton Castillo, the lead investigator on the IACHR-OAS Cubareport, the Commission received "many complaints, directly from the island andfrom reliable NGOs outside Cuba, regarding firings and inability to find workamong the repatriates…We matched and double-sourced in order to confirm thereports."^[264][263]The United Nations Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Cuba, in his reportissued in January 1997, concluded that Cubans who attempt to leave the countryand are repatriated confront "de facto discrimination" by the Cuban government.^[265][264]
At a House of Representatives joint subcommittee hearing on27 June 1996, María R. Dominguez, Executive Director of the Human RightsInstitute at St. Thomas University in Miami, presented a statement concerningthe Cuban government's treatment of repatriated persons, based on testimonyfrom repatriated persons themselves and other sources in Cuba. One ofDominguez's sources was Dr. Desi Mendoza Rivero, whom she interviewed prior tohis arrest in June 1997, as described in Chapter XVI, Section A.5. of thisreport. Dr. Mendoza, a human rights activist, was a rafter who was returned toCuba from the U.S. base in Guantánamo in April 1995 after being assured by INSofficials that he would be able to apply for refugee status at the U.S.Interests Section in Havana (USINT).^[266][265]
Dr. Mendoza, president of theMovimiento Pacifista Pro Derechos Humanos, Peaceful Movement forHuman Rights, which became a member of theConcilioCubano, was detained and interrogated for four days by State Security uponhis arrival in Cuba. He was told by a State Security official that he had nobetter chance than any other Cuban to leave the island. After his release fromdetention, he applied for refugee status at the USINT. Nearly a year later, inFebruary 1996, his application had yet to be processed by the USINT and hisdocumentation was seized during the Cuban government's sweeping crackdownagainstConcilio Cubanomembers. Morethan a year after that, and just prior to his arrest in June 1997 for reportingon an outbreak of dengue fever, Dr. Mendoza's application for refugee status atthe USINT in Havana was denied.^[267][266]
Dr. Mendoza and his organization monitored the situation ofrepatriated Cubans during the period between his return to Cuba in 1995 and hisarrest in 1997. He told Dominguez that repatriated people were abused in severalways:
•Whileacknowledging the general employment crisis in Cuba, Dr. Mendoza said thatdiscrimination by the government made the situation more acute for repatriatedpeople. He said the government in fact wanted to keep repatriated peopleunemployed and force them to commit "delinquent" acts in order to discreditthem in the eyes of other Cubans and to jail them.^[268][267]
According to Dr. Mendoza, as reported in Dr. Dominguez'stestimony, other forms of abuse and actions taken by the Cuban governmentagainst repatriated people included:
•Persistentharassment, including being followed by police and having telephone callsmonitored.
•Threatsof physical violence against repatriated people and family members.
•Arbitrarysearch-and-seizure actions at their homes.
•Reprisalssuch as seizing or withholdingcarnets,personal identity cards, and other personal papers and documents essential forday-to-day survival in Cuba. For example, without acarneta person is considerednoconfiable, not trustworthy, and will not be given employment.
•Restrictionson travel within Cuba through control ofcarnets,making it extremely difficult to access the USINT in Havana.^[269][268]
Dominguez notes other cases in which the Cuban governmenttook action against repatriated people:
•ElierOrosa Ramírez. Orosa Ramírez was returned to Cuba from the U.S. base atGuantánamo in spring 1996. Days later he was arrested by State Security on aprevious charge of "illegal departure," convicted and sentenced to 10 months inprison. Despite pressure on the Cuban government by the USINT, he served thefull 10 months. After completing his sentence he escaped Cuba again, and waspicked up by the U.S. Coast Guard in Bahamian waters and taken to Nassau.Dominguez has since lost contact with him.
•MarioCordova. Repatriated from the U.S. base at Guantánamo in 1996, arrested andsent to the same prison as Orosa Ramírez. Cordova's family claims he was jailedon "trumped-up" charges so that the Cuban government would not be pressured byUSINT because of another breach of the 1995 U.S.-Cuba immigration agreement, inwhich Cuba pledged to ensure that no action is taken against those migrantsreturned to Cuba as a consequence of their attempt to emigrate illegally. Afterhis release from prison, Cordova escaped again from Cuba and was picked up bythe U.S. Coast Guard and taken to Nassau. He was interviewed there by theRegional Legal Counsel of the U.N. High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) andwas granted refugee status.
•EutimoGuzman Marrero. A human rights activist who attempted to leave Cuba anumber of times. He was returned from the U.S. base in Guantánamo along withOrosa Ramírez and Cordova in 1996. He told Dominguez that many repatriatedpeople were forced to live as homeless transients and outcasts. He escaped fromCuba again and made it back to the U.S. base in Guantánamo. That time he wasgranted refugee status.^[270][269]
Dominguez also reported discrimination by the Cubangovernment against family members of those granted political refugee status,principally women and children, including the loss of jobs and sometimes homesonce the government learned that their immediate family member has been grantedasylum by the United States.^[271][270]
An independent Cuban news agency reported that on August 7,1997, Dr. Walter Quesada Leguis, a 26-year-old physician, was arrested by StateSecurity in the province of Guantánamo and held for six days. It was reportedthat he was threatened with a long-term prison sentence if he did not cease hisactivities as a member of theMovimientoCubano de Jóvenes por la Democracia, Youth for Democracy Movement, a groupwhich has been targeted for especially severe punishment by the Cubangovernment, as described in Section A, Part 1, of this chapter. It was furtherreported that Dr. Quesada's associates believed he was personally targetedbecause he had fled the country in early 1997 by crossing into the U.S. base atGuantánamo, from where he was returned to Cuba by U.S. Immigration officials.Upon his return he was fired from his government job as a family doctor. OnMarch 5, 1997, Dr. Quesada was interrogated by State Security in GuantánamoProvince, and questioned specifically about his "illegal departure." It was notreported whether Dr. Quesada made known to U.S. Asylum Officers his affiliationwith the dissident youth organization.^[272][271]
The U.S. Department of State, Office of Asylum Affairsoffers the following information on the status of repatriates. It is theDepartment's understanding, based on reports from the U.S. Interests Section(USINT) in Havana, that the majority of returnees have not suffered reprisals.According to USINT, there have been instances of harassment by local officialsand some previously-employed persons have had employment problems upon return.However, USINT reported that many of the returnees who are unemployed upontheir return were already unemployed before their attempt to leave Cuba, andare indistinguishable in this respect from other unemployed Cubans. Accordingto USINT, some returnees who complained of unemployment had not applied for thejobs from which they complained that they were excluded. USINT also reportedthat repatriates who were formally employed when they attempted to leave thecountry generally have been returned to their jobs. Some professionals andother persons previously employed in areas deemed sensitive, however, have notbeen given back their original jobs, although some of these were offeredalternative employment.^[273][272]
USINT monitors the treatment of migrants returned under theterms of the 1995 U.S.-Cuba migration accord to ensure that they are notharassed for their illegal exit. Only USINT consular officers are permitted bythe Cuban government to participate in monitoring visits, augmented by consularofficers from other U.S. posts who are occasionally detailed to Havana forshort periods for this purposes. As in all travel outside Havana, based uponU.S. - Cuban reciprocity, restrictions imposed on U.S. officials require that atravel itinerary be provided to Cuban authorities three days prior to eachmonitoring visit. Each returnee, with the exception of those who live in theHavana province, is visited at least twice during the first year followingrepatriation and once during the second year. Those who live in the Havanaprovince are not visited in their homes, but are free to visit USINT asnecessary. USINT monitors are able to carry out their monitoring functionswithout interference from the Government of Cuba. In calendar year 1997, USINTofficers made 12 monitoring trips, during which they made a total of 675visits. Of these, 184 were first-time visits, and 491 were follow-up visits toreturnees who had been previously visited. Visits are made to the homes ofreturned migrants by a pair of monitors. According to USINT, most returneesappear comfortable discussing their situations with the monitors in thatenvironment. However, in addition, all returnees have passes to enable them tovisit USINT at any time, so that if they do not feel comfortable discussingtheir situations in their own homes, they may visit USINT to do so. In additionto the returnees who live in the Havana province, on average ten returnees amonth from outside the Havana province visit USINT to discuss their situationsand migratory options.^[274][273]
According to Maria Dominguez, based on sources in Cuba, someCuban citizens have encountered the following problems when attempting to makevisits to USINT:
•Onseveral occasions, Cuban citizens have been blocked by Cuban authorities fromreaching the USINT-"most common when the citizen is trying to ask forinformation related to refugee processing or attempts to report human rightsviolations."
•Manypeople complained that it was "impossible" to apply in person for refugeestatus at the USINT, and, when told by U.S. officials to apply by mail,expressed fear that the Cuban postal system "does not protect the right toprivacy necessary to prevent government reprisals."^[275][274]
It should be emphasized that the Cuban government pledgedonly not to take action against a repatriate for the particular act of fleeingthat resulted in being returned. Moreover, attemptingto leave the countrywithout official authorization is still illegal. As described in Chapter IV ofthis report, under Penal Code Articles 216 and 217, those caught trying toleave the country without the permission of the government can be imprisonedfor up to three years if they have not used violence and up to eight years ifforce or intimidation is used. Although recently there appears to be a trendtoward lighter penalties -- e.g., fines and/or house arrest -- particularly incases of first-time offenders, Articles 216 and 217 are still used to punishpeople for trying to leave the country without permission.
Under the bilateral agreements between Cuba and othercountries, a repatriate can be prosecuted for any prior or later attempts toleave the country without authorization, or for any other activity deemed to beillegal by the Cuban government. As Cuban National Assembly president RicardoAlarcón, one of Cuba's principal negotiators of the accord, took care to pointout, the agreement "does not preclude the obligation of the Cuban authoritiesto act against [repatriates] for reasons or crimes committed before or afterthe attempt [to leave the country]."^[276][275]Inthis regard it should be kept in mind that the Cuban government frequently usesless overtly political offenses to target persons for political reasons, asdescribed in Section IV.
In one documented case, the BPIC reported that on September25, 1997, Juan Carlos Herrera Acosta, a member of theMovimiento Cubano de Jóvenes por la Democracia, was detained forinterrogation by State Security in Guantánamo Province. He was warned that ifhe did not get a job, he would be arrested on a charge of "dangerousness." BPICreported that Herrera Acosta had attempted to flee Cuba and had beenrepatriated by U.S. Immigration officials in 1995. Upon his return he had beenfired from his job in a food-processing center. As in the case of Dr. Quesada,it was not reported whether Herrera Acosta had made known to U.S. AsylumOfficers his affiliation with the dissident youth organization.^[277][276]
Another noteworthy case is that of 27-year-old RobertoGonzález Tibanear, who was returned to Cuba in March 1996 by the Swedishgovernment after it had rejected his claim of political asylum. Prior to hisdeparture to Sweden in July 1994 on a tourist visa, Cuban authorities hadprohibited him from continuing in his job at the Spanish Embassy in Havana,reportedly because his views were not in accordance with those of the Cubangovernment. González Tibanear reported that as a result of his holdingdiscussions with Cuban dissidents, he was placed under surveillance by StateSecurity whom he feared were intending to arrest him. On November 26, 1996,eight months after Sweden returned González Tibanear to Cuba, he was arrestedin Havana on charges ofdesacato,"disrespect," anddesorden público,"public disorder," after making anti-government statements to foreignjournalists. Amnesty International declared him a "prisoner of conscience."^[278][277]González Tibanear was not tried until August 27, 1997, when he was convicted ofdesacato, "disrespect," and sentencedto nine months in prison. As he had already been imprisoned for nine months, hewas released on August 28, 1997.^[279][278]
As of July 1997, about 200 Cuban migrants remained inSweden. According to the Swedish Foreign Ministry, approximately 1,500 Cubansarrived in Sweden in 1994 seeking political asylum and Swedish authoritiesruled that most of them did not qualify. Many arrived on tourist visas from theformer Soviet Union where they had been living and working. Hundreds, includingRoberto González Tibanear, were repatriated to Cuba by early 1996. Since then,however, Cuba has refused to accept the return of Cubans from Sweden
In April 1997, an independent Cuban press report exposed aparticular form of intimidation against repatriates; one that some Cuban humanrights activists believe is linked to the Cuban government's desire to portrayrepatriates as economic migrants rather than refugees. Olance Nogueras, theformer and now-exiled BPIC correspondent in Cienfuegos province, reported thatState Security there was requiring repatriates to answer a 12-point, writtenquestionnaire, in which they were specifically asked, among other things,whether they had left for economic or political reasons. According to Nogueras,repatriates were being given the questionnaires personally by State Securityagents and were informed they had 24 hours to complete them. Representatives ofhuman rights organization in Cienfuegos said repatriates were afraid to answerthe questions truthfully for fear of reprisals. Angel Eduardo Hernández Bernalof thePartido Pro Derechos Humanos,Party for Human Rights, in Cienfuegos, said, "all the questions are traps."Benigno Aznares López of theMovimientoMaceísta por la Dignidad, Maceísta Movement for Dignity, said, "Thequestionnaire is a blunt form of manipulation…[The government] wants to make itlook like Cuban immigration is economic."^[280][279]

D.ReligiousInstitutions and Worshipers

Religious institutions in Cuba include the Roman CatholicChurch, a number of Protestant denominations, an array of Pentecostal andevangelical congregations, andSantería,a syncretic system which combines African and Catholic belief. Historically,the Castro government has been highly antagonistic toward the Catholic Church,Pentecostals, and evangelicals. Cuba's main Protestant churches-Baptist,Presbyterian and Methodist-have in part been coopted by the state and their leadersrarely, if ever, criticize the nature of the regime. Two Protestants actuallyhold seats in the PCC-controlled National Assembly.^[281][280]The practice ofSanteríais toleratedto a significant degree, and many importantSanteríapriests also have been coopted by the government.
After seizing power in 1959, the Castro government decreedCuba to be an atheist state. Catholic Church property was nationalized andCatholic schools closed. A great number of foreign priests were expelled. In1959 there were over 700 priests in Cuba, whereas in 1988 there were less than225. Churches were forbidden to use broadcast communication media. Christianswere not allowed to join the Cuban Communist Party (PCC) or hold public posts,and were discriminated against when seeking work from the state, Cuba's soleemployer.^[282][281]
The Cuban government began to ease the restrictions on theCatholic Church as the economic crisis deepened following the collapse of theEastern Bloc and the Soviet Union in 1989-1991. Faced with mounting discontent,the government evidently believed that greater freedom to worship would providea non-political outlet for the expression of people's discontent. At the fourthPCC congress in 1991, the Constitution was amended to allow religious adherentsto be members of the PCC, and the state, previously atheist, was declared"secular."^[283][282]Since then, most ordinary Cubans have been able to practice the Catholic faithwithout facing punishment, as long as the government senses no politicalovertones.
The Church hierarchy welcomed the measures and decided totest the limits of the regime's tolerance in 1993 when the Cuban BishopsConference issued a pastoral letter highly critical of the political system.The letter called for, among other things, an end to single-party rule and thestate security system. The government responded with blistering attacks in theofficial media which called the Church "counterrevolutionary." For some timethis cooled considerably the relationship between the Church and thegovernment, but appeared to enhance the credibility of the Church withdisaffected Cubans as more and more worshipers began attending mass.^[284][283]
The next confrontation occurred when the Cuban bishopsissued in March 1996 a public statement entitled "A Call to Reconciliation andPeace." In the statement, the bishops criticized the government's refusal toallow theConcilio Cubanoto hold itsplanned meeting in February 1996 and the downing by Cuban fighter jets of twosmall civil aircraft flown by members ofHermanosal Rescate, Brothers to the Rescue, that same month.^[285][284]Brothers to the Rescue is a Florida-based organization of anti-Castro Cubanexiles which seeks to assist Cubanbalseros,rafters, who have fled Cuba. In at least one instance prior to the shootdown,in which all four people aboard the aircraft were killed, the organization haddropped leaflets over Havana. The International Civil Aviation Organizationsubsequently concluded that the shootdown took place outside Cuban territorialairspace, and the UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights in Cuba regarded it as"a premeditated act" and stated that it "constituted a violation of the rightto life of the four people."^[286][285]
In a response to the Cuban bishops' statement, the PCCdelivered a letter to the Church that accused the bishops of "coinciding withthe enemies of Cuba" in their criticism of the downing of the airplanes, andrejected reconciliation with "those who plot terrorist acts against theirnative country."^[287][286]Still, the response was more low-key than the government's reaction to thepastoral letter three years before. Since 1993, the government has tried toimprove relations with the Catholic Church as part of its tactical effort toproject a more tolerant image abroad, as described in Chapter XII, and becausethe Vatican opposes the U.S. economic embargo. The Church, in turn, has soughtto take advantage of the government's maneuvering to leverage for itself awider sphere of influence in Cuban society. Both sets of interests coincidedwhen Fidel Castro met Pope John Paul II in the Vatican in November 1996 toarrange a papal visit to Cuba, currently scheduled for January 21-25, 1998. Asof October 1997, the Pope was expected to visit Havana and the provincialcities of Santa Clara, Camagüey and Santiago de Cuba.^[288][287]Caridad Diego, chief of the PCC's Office of Religious Affairs, stated inOctober 1997, that the Pope's visit is "a way to show that the pope does notapprove of the policies of isolating us."^[289][288]
As the Cuban Catholic Church began preparing for the Pope'svisit, it was given greater freedom by the government to conduct its mission.During the summer, Jaime Cardinal Ortega, the Archbishop of Havana, held twoopen-air masses, the first outdoor religious services permitted in more thanthree decades. In another concession, Cuban state television broadcast briefextracts from the first open-air mass, which was held in Havana on July 29,1997. Earlier in the year, the Cuban government agreed to allowCaritas Cubana, a Catholic humanitarianagency, to monitor sales of U.S. medical equipment and medicines to Cuba.^[290][289]
Nevertheless, the government's tolerance of the CatholicChurch has strict limits and the Church still faces many restrictions. Itcannot have its own schools, press, or access to newsprint and new priests needspecial permits to enter Cuba. There are still only about 260 priests for apopulation of about 11 million.^[291][290]
On May 13, 1997, representatives from all religiousdenominations were summoned to PCC headquarters in Havana, where they wereaccused of abusing international travel and import permits. Caridad Diego, PCCchief of religious affairs, alleged that visas granted to religiousinstitutions were being used to allow agents of the CIA and other foreignintelligence agencies into Cuba. Church representatives were also reminded thatsince December 1995, the sale of computers and photocopiers to churches wasprohibited because they were needed in "priority institutions," and becausethey use excessive amounts of electrical power.^[292][291]Thegovernment seemed to be signaling that it would not tolerate anything like thePolish scenario, in which the Polish Catholic Church, backed by the Pope,supported the dissident Solidarity movement against communist rule. Thatmessage has been reinforced by the harsh crackdown against Cuban dissidents, asdescribed in Chapters XI, XII and XV, even as the government was seeking thevisit from Pope John Paul II.
So, even as the Cuban government allows the Catholic Churchto act as a channel through which disaffected Cubans can vent theirfrustrations, it is doubly determined to ensure that Cubans do not takeadvantage of greater religious freedom for political purposes. That was evidentin a recent incident reported by the independent Cuba press. During a massgiven by Jaime Cardinal Ortega on September 8, 1997, in the seaside communityof Regla, Lázaro Fernández Valdés and Rodolfo Valdés Pérez, president andvice-president of thePartidoFederalista, Federalist Party, shouted"Viva el Cardenal!" When the service ended, they were arrested by StateSecurity and as of September 12, their whereabouts were still unknown.^[293][292]Other examples include the detentions in 1996 of two individuals who werewarned by police not to organize religious commemorations on July 13, theanniversary of the sinking of the13 deMarzotugboat in 1994 in which some 40 people died. Aída Rosa Jiménez oftheMovimiento de Madres Cubanas por laSolidaridad, Cuban Mothers' Solidarity Movement, was threatened withimprisonment if she went to church on July 13, and Isabel del Pino Sotolongo,president ofSeguidores de Cristo Rey,Followers of Christ the King, was threatened with several charges after beingdetained for displaying photographs of the victims of the tugboat sinking anddistributing leaflets containing quotes from the Bible.^[294][293]
Government surveillance of the Church has always beenpervasive. In 1995, José Félix, secretary general of the Cuban BishopsConference, stated, "[t]here is always someone at Mass who comes especially tosee what we say and inform the authorities about it."^[295][294]Now, however, having given a certain amount of latitude to the Church fortactical reasons, the government seems even more invasive. In March 1997, theVatican news agency,Fides, reportedthat Cuban police and State Security "have increased the deployment of spiesand collaborators inside Catholic groups."^[296][295]
As the Cuban government and the Catholic Church continuedtheir charged minuet with the approach of the papal visit, the limits of theregime's tolerance were being tested in Pinar del Río province, where aCatholic publication,Vitral, hasopened its limited number of pages to articles with an increasingly politicaledge by young, non-Catholic writers.Vitralis published by theCentro Católico deFormación Cívica Religiosa(CFCR), Catholic Center of Religious CivicFormation. The center has no press, so copies are limited to a thousand or sophotocopies. ButVitralhas gained inpopularity and copies are passed from one person to the next. In May 1997,Vitraleditor Dagoberto Valdés waswarned by Isidro Gómez, the number two official of the PCC office of religiousaffairs, about the content of the publication and was told that "the languageused is unacceptable." Gómez said, "Be careful. This is not the first time inour country that the Catholic Church has been used for political purposes."Referring to the young, non-Catholic writersVitraloften publishes, Gómez said, "[b]ehind some of these peopletheir could be a fifth column with other intentions far from the aims of theChurch."^[297][296]
The Cuban government and the Catholic Church both wanted thePope to visit Cuba, but they had competing objectives. The question was how farthe Church would try to go to achieve its aims, and more importantly, how farthe government would allow it to go before deciding the tactical benefits itwas reaping outweighed the risks? In the past, the general pattern has beenthat the government would at times allow a certain easing of repressiondomestically to achieve international aims. However, whenever the governmenthas perceived its complete control of the country threatened by such limitedopenings, a crackdown has ensued with little regard for international opinion.One example, described in Chapter VIII, was the jailing of 22 dissident leaderswithin a year after they had been interviewed by a delegation from the UnitedNations Human Rights Commission allowed into Cuba September 1988. Anotherexample, described in Chapter XI, is the crackdown against theConcilio Cubanoin 1996.
As part of the agreement regarding the Pope's visit, theCuban government granted the Catholic Church's request to conduct 13 outdoormasses around the country during the fall of 1997. However, friction betweenthe Church and government soon developed over public displays of faith. OnSunday, October 12, 1997, government officials blocked Cardinal Ortega fromholding one of those outdoor services, and also blocked a planned publicprocession, in Bejucal, near Havana. The mass had to be held indoors.^[298][297]
Another source of tension was the set of regulations decreedby the government on August 4 that sharply restricted the ability of religiousorganizations to buy a range of scarce goods, including basic products likesoap, toilet paper, cooking utensils and personal hygiene articles that areessential to programs conducted byCaritas,the Catholic Church's charitable assistance organization. The purchase ofcomputers, fax machines, video cameras, photocopiers and other electronic goodswas banned outright. In addition,Fides,the Vatican news agency, reported on October 7, 1997, that since March 1997,Cuban "supervisors in factories, hospitals, schools and institutes havethreatened that whoever dares to participate in a papal Mass will be fired."The report said some believers remained absent from their jobs for weeks at atime and "have suffered interrogation and threats." It described the Cubangovernment as taking "a double attitude on religion-permits on one side,pressure on the other…The pressure is being applied especially against partymembers who sympathize with or are close to the church." The report also saidthat police were videotaping all of the open-air masses and using spies andundercover agents to infiltrate Roman Catholic groups.^[299][298]
The friendly relations between most Protestant churches andthe Castro government facilitated the creation of theConsejo de Iglesias Cubanas, Cuban Council of Churches, which haspermission to transmit religious services over radio and television.^[300][299]The Baptist church does not belong to the council, and in the past some of itslay activists have been critical of the government and been punished. Forexample, on December 20, 1994, Miguel Angel León García, a lay pastor of theBaptist Church in San Fernando de Camarones in Camagüey province, and JorgeLuis Brito Rodríguez, a member of that church, were convicted of "enemypropaganda" and given six-year sentences.^[301][300]
The Cuban government requires churches and other religiousgroups to register with the provincial registry of associations to obtainofficial recognition. The government prohibits, with some exceptions, theconstruction of new churches, forcing many growing congregations to violate thelaw and meet in private homes. Government harassment of private houses ofworship is constant, with evangelical Christian denominations reportingevictions from, and bulldozing of, houses used for these purposes which thegovernment callscasas cultos.^[302][301]On May 25, 1995, Pastor Orson Vila Santoyo, a Pentecostal minister in Camagüeyprovince was arrested for refusing to cease holding religious services in hishome. He was convicted of "illicit association" and sentenced to 18 months inprison.^[303][302]The mass closures of private houses of worship and the imprisonment of PastorVila indicates the Cuban government is increasingly anxious about the growingpopularity of evangelical Christianity. In 1996, the government warnedreligious leaders in Havana that they would impose fines from $550 to $2,800,imprison leaders and withdraw official recognition from the religious denominationitself unless private houses of worship were closed.^[304][303]In mid-1996, there were reports that an evangelical pastor and a Protestantminister had been "banished" to their home provinces.^[305][304]
Jehovah's Witnesses and Seventh-Day Adventists have sufferedgreatly under the Castro government for their religious beliefs. The PaxChristi Netherlands delegation, following its visit in July-August 1995,reported that, "[t]he government continues using the Penal Code to persecuteJehovah's Witnesses and Adventists," for their refusal on religious grounds toaccept obligatory military service or participate in state organizations. Thedelegation reported that the government regards them as "active religiousenemies of the revolution," and that they are kept under watch and seriouslyharassed by the CDRs and other mass organizations.^[306][305]The U.S. Department of State reported that in 1996 the government relaxedrestrictions on members of the Jehovah's Witnesses, authorizing smallassemblies and the publishing of theirWatchtowermagazine.^[307][306]
An independent Cuban press dispatch reported the arrest inHavana on July 25, 1997, of two brothers, Fidel and José Castriles Rodríguez,who belonged to an organization calledFraternidadCristiana, Christian Fraternity. State Security agents searched their home,saying they were looking for "enemy propaganda." As of July 30, 1997, they werestill in detention. The dispatch did not say which Christian denominationChristian Fraternity was affiliated with, but reported that it had links withan organization called the International Fraternity of Businessmen of theComplete Gospel.^[308][307]

Freedom in the World 2020

Overview

Cuba is a one-party communist state that outlaws political pluralism, bans independent media, suppresses dissent, and severely restricts basic civil liberties. The government continues to dominate the economy despite recent reforms that permit some private-sector activity. The regime’s undemocratic character has not changed despite a generational transition in political leadership between 2018 and 2019 that included the introduction of a new constitution.

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 In Cuba, There Isn’t a Movement for Black Thought, or Black Pride. It Doesn’t Exist.

February 19, 2018 | Pulitzer Center

By

Esohe Osabuohien

Black Lives Matter poster from a rally in Ontario, Canada, is displayed among some of documentary-filmmaker Gloria Rolando's possessions in Havana. Image by Esohe Osabuohien. Cuba, 2018.

In Cuba, to acknowledge one’s racial origin and history is considered taboo, and, in many cases censored—an after-effect of former President Fidel Castro declaring post-Revolution Cuba free of racism. However, for some artists and activists, living in this post-race society has served as the ultimate form of censorship.
“To me, Cuba is very, very racist, one of the most racist countries in the world,” said Luis Manuel Otero Alcántara, 30, a contemporary artist and activist, referring to the lack of freedom of expression given to Cuban citizens in denouncing the de facto racism that still exists in the country.
Alcántara, a prominent member of Cuba’s growing artist-activist community, creates visual and performance art with the help of art curator, Yanelys Núñez Leyva, 28. Their art addresses social issues in Cuba such as racism, homophobia, the right to free speech, and gender violence.
For them, art functions as a form of conversation between the people and the politics that affect them, often transcending historical lines to address past topics and policy changes made throughout Castro’s regime. One policy change that is often discussed in present day is Castro’s condemnation of racism and subsequent efforts to eradicate it on the island.
On March 23, 1959, in a speech at the Havana Labor Rally, Castro condemned racial discrimination, and vowed equality for all in the workforce. A vow that he upheld by creating anti-discrimination laws for both the workplace and schools, launching a yearlong literacy program (Campaña de Alfabetización) that reduced illiteracy rates among all Cubans from 20 percent to 3.9 percent.
From 1979 to 2003, Castro also worked to increase the amount of Afro-Cubans in government positions from 12.9 percent to 25.8 percent. In 1979, there were only 4 Afro-Cuban members on El Consejo de Estado (the State Council), and by 2003 Afro-Cuban membership on the Council consisted of 8 individuals. Nevertheless, this number has remained relatively stagnant in comparison to the approximately 70 percent white civil and public leadership, according to a 2007 report by economist Dr. Esteban Morales Dominguez. Currently, 5 Afro-Cuban members sit on the 31-member Council.
“Blackness is expressed artistically, but not politically in Cuba,” said Elias (who asked that his last name not be used), overseer of Callejón de Hamel, one of the first spaces in Havana, Cuba, dedicated to Afro-descendants and Afro-religion.
The Yoruba-based religion, Santería, is embraced wholeheartedly throughout the island, with Callejón de Hamel hosting a festival dedicated to rumba and the orishas (the gods and goddesses of Santeria) every Sunday. This event brings in both tourist and citizens alike to learn about Santería’s origin and partake in rumba, a dance with African roots. Casa de África (Africa House), a small and independent museum located in the heart of Old Havana, showcases art from the continent of Africa as well as hosts weekly workshops on Cuba´s African heritage and culture.
“Many Cubans know the importance of the Afro-Cuban tradition because part of the religion that exists in Cuba in this moment is the Afro-Cuban religion [Santería],” said Ernesto Moricette Pichardo, 22, a Cuban of Haitian descent. In fact, visitors to the island can easily find artifacts paying homage to the gods and goddesses in restaurants, stores, and in the homes of some Cubans.
Throughout Cuba there are monuments dedicated to prominent civil rights figures and Cubans of color, such as Antonio Maceo, Dr. Martin Luther King Jr., and Malcolm X. In Vedado, the Fernando Ortiz Foundation is dedicated to providing citizens and visitors with information about Cuban ethnology and racial discourse.
Despite the celebrations honoring Cuba’s ties to Africa, Afro-Cuban religion, monuments dedicated to prominent civil rights figures in both Cuba and America, and the election of their first Black parliamentarian president, Esteban Lazo Hernández, in 2013, Cubans of color still feel that they are misrepresented and do not have a space to either organize or express themselves.
Two years into Fidel Castro’s regime, he announced at the Meeting of Confederation of Cuban Workers that the Revolution had effectively eliminated racism from Cuba—thus, making any mention of racism, or discrimination, in the country counterrevolutionary, and punishable by law. “When you have 300, 400 years of racism in Cuba, a system of racial discrimination… in two years, it is very difficult to say there isn’t any [racism]. I believe that there was an advance [toward] something better in 5 to 10 years, but when you make it a fact that you can’t talk about racism in Cuba the problem remains for 60 years like an atomic bomb,” Alcántara explained.
Art is one of the ways that Cubans have begun to express their concerns about racism and discrimination in the country, despite, in recent years, a more intense government crackdown on artists and activists.
In November 2017, both Alcántara and Leyva were detained by Cuban officials for having construction materials and were questioned about their upcoming involvement with #00Bienal de La Habana, an alternative artistic and cultural event to Cuba’s official Bienal XIII, which was postponed to 2019 due to budget constraints from the effects of Hurricane Irma.
Also in November 2017, a music video by rapper El Individuo, Rafael Bon Lemus, titled, “Mi Raza”, was censored by Cuban television for addressing racial themes and promoting awareness amongst Afro-descendants.
For many Black and mixed-race (mulatto or mestizo) Cubans, racism is still prevalent in their lives through the economic constraints of the country’s two currency system. Those receiving remittances, usually white or lighter-skinned Cubans, coming from outside of the country, and Cubans who are able to work in the tourist industry benefit the most from this system. A 2004 study spearheaded by economist Angela Ferriol reported that Black and mulatto Cubans made up almost half of the lowest income bracket, while also representing approximately 94 percent of the state sector. The study also found that only 8 percent of this community received remittances, and none of them reported receiving hard-currency tips or salary.
The lack of Black or mulatto Cubans whose income derives from tips in the tourism sector appears to stem from racially-based hiring practices, as reported in a 2001 study by Harvard Professor Alejandro de la Fuente. He stated that it was possible businesses tended not to hire darker-skinned Cubans, instead seeking out those with a “pleasant aspect"—or lighter skin.
These hiring practices have been internalized by some Afro-Cubans. Independent studies conducted in 2017 by the Comité Ciudadanos por la Integración Racial (CIR), a civil rights organization in Cuba, show that when surveyed on their opinions of who would be better suited for certain jobs, a group of 70 Black and mestizo women believed that hard labor and janitorial roles were better suited for Black women. The results from the survey further stated that white  and lighter-skinned Afro-Cuban women belong in roles geared towards hospitality and tourism.
“In Cuba, there isn’t a movement for Black thought. It doesn’t exist,” Alcántara said. He, along with other Cubans of color, acknowledge that the lack of Black pride in Cuba is related to Cuba’s cultural structure of associating Blackness with something that is ugly and undesirable. There is some desire in Cuba, as well as in other parts of Latin America and the Caribbean, to “adelantar la raza” or whiten the race.
He added: “When I can say that I am Black, publicly, in an official newspaper… that is the first step of change.” 

https://pulitzercenter.org 

 APPENDIX I
CONCILIO CUBANO MEMBERSHIP
NOVEMBER 1995

At the end of November 1995, the Miami-basedGrupo de Apoyo a Concilio Cubano(GACC),Concilio CubanoSupport Group, issuedthe following list of 101 groups belonging to theConcilio Cubano, and the name of the principal representative ofeachgroup at that time. It should be emphasized that this is not a definitivemembership list, as at least 30 more groups joined theConcilio Cubanobetween November 1995 and the crackdown by theCuban government that began in February 1996. The next membership list did notappear until August 1996, after the crackdown had taken a significant toll onthe organization (See Appendix III). The list as it appears here isalphabetized according to the name of each group. Originally, this list wasalphabetized according to the name of each group's representative. The list asit first appeared can be found on the Free Cuba Foundation web site at:
http://www.fiu.edu/~fcf/conciliocubano.html.
When searching for a particular group, it should beremembered that some parts of a group's name may be dropped in common parlanceor in media accounts. For example, theMovimientoCubano de Jóvenes Por la Democracia, Cuban Movement of Youth for Democracy,is often referred to simply asJóvenesPor la Democracia. Also, spellings of people's names are not necessarilyexact, due in large part to the difficulties Cuban dissidents and independentjournalists experience in transmitting information between themselves and withthe world outside Cuba.
Alerta Verde GrupoEcológico- Raúl Pimental.
Alianza DemocráticaPopular- Mercedes Paradas Antúnez.
Alianza LiberalDemocrática Cubana- Pedro Brito Hernández.
Asociación CívicaDemocrática- Aida Rosa Jiménez Rodríguez.
Asociación Cubana deIngenieros- Orfilio García Quesada.
Asociación de JóvenesDemócratas- Ernesto Ibar Alonso.
Asociación de LuchaFrente a la Injusticia Nacional- Reinaldo Alfaro García.
Asociación deTrabajadores Independientes de la Salud- Dianelis García González.
Asociación deTrabajadores Por Cuenta Propia- Ismael Salazar Aguero.
Asociación HumanitariaSeguidores de Cristo Rey- Isabel del Pino Sotolongo.
Asociación MartianaLibertad, Igualdad y Fraternidad- Alfonso Cabrera La Rosa.
Asociación Pro ArteLibre y Concertación Democrática Cubana- Gladys González Noy.
Asociación ProDemocracia Constitucional- Félix Fleyta Posada.
Atención a PresosPolíticos- Roberto Hernández Morales.
Bloque DemocráticoJosé Martí- Eugenio Rodríguez Chaple.
Buró de PrensaIndependiente de Cuba- Yndamiro Restano Díaz.
Centro de DerechosHumanos de Santiago de Cuba- Nicolás M. Rosario Rosabal.
Centro NoGubernamental José de la Luz y Caballero Para los Derechos Humanos y la Culturade Paz- Lorenzo Páez Núñez.
Coalición DemocráticaCubana- Reinaldo E. Cosano Alén.
Colegio MédicoIndependiente- Hilda Molina Morejón.
Comisión Cubana deDerechos Humanos y Reconciliación Nacional- Elizardo Sánchez Santacruz.
Comisión de DerechosHumanos José Martí- Amador Hernández Blanco.
Comisión Humanitariade Ayuda a Prisioneros Políticos- Agustín Jesús Acosta Moya.
Comité Cubano deOpositores Pacíficos Independientes- Victoria "Vicki" Ruíz Labrit.
Comité Cubano Pro DerechosHumanos- Gustavo Arcos Bergnes.
Comité de AyudaHumanitaria a Presos Políticos de Santiago de Cuba- Jorge H. AlfonsoAguilar.
Comité Julio SanguilFrente Unido Democrático Camagüey-Ciego de Avila- Reinaldo Rivero Milián.
Comité Martiano Porlos Derechos del Hombre- Clara Ortíz González.
Comité por Paz,Progreso y Libertad- Alberto Perera Martínez.
Confederación deTrabajadores Democráticos de Cuba- Juan G. Martínez Guillén.
Consejo Médico CubanoIndependiente- Jesús Ramón Marante Pozo.
Consejo Nacional deDerechos Civiles- Jorge Omar Lorenzo Pimienta.
Consejo Unitario deTrabajadores Cubanos- Pedro Pablo Alvarez.
CoordinadoraCamagüeyana- Francis Campanería Peña.
Corriente Agramontista- René Gómez Manzano.
Corriente CívicaCubana- Félix A. Bonne Carcacés.
Corriente LiberalCubana- Juan José López Díaz.
Corriente SocialistaDemocrática- Vladimiro Roca.
CubaPress- RaúlRivero.
El Derecho Cubano- Belkis R. Hidalgo Hernández.
Foro Feminista-Deysi (or Daisy) Carcasés Valle.
Frente Cívico deMujeres Martianas, Villa Clara- Mérida Pérez Fuente.
Frente de UnidadNacional- José Antonio Fornaris Ramos.
Frente DemocráticoCalixto García- Pedro Hechevarría Alarcón.
Frente DemocráticoOriental- María A. Escobedo Yaser.
Frente FemeninoHumanitario- Gladys Linares Blanco.
Frente Pro DerechosHumanos Máximo Gómez- José Angel Chente Herrera.
Frente SindicalistaOriental Independiente- Raúl Morel Castillo.
Fundación CívicaCubana- Orlando Pérez Pineda.
Grupo IndependienteMinas, Sierra de Cubitas- Manuel E. Valido Gutiérrez.
Grupo No. 5 Camagüey- Félix Santana Rodríguez.
Instituto Cubano deEconomistas Independientes- Beatriz Marta Roque.
Instituto de laOpinión Pública- Jorge Bacallao Pérez.
Liga Cívica Martiana- Miguel Angel Aldana Ruíz.
Movimiento AgendaNacionalista- Irene Almira Ramírez.
Movimiento AmorCristiano- Félix Perera González.
Movimiento Armonía- Rogelio Fabio Hurtado.
Movimiento CristianoLiberación- Oswaldo Payá Sardiñas.
Movimiento de DerechosHumanos de Camagüey- Jabib Jabib Jalil.
Movimiento de JóvenesPor la Democracia- Néstor Rodríguez Lovaina.
Movimiento de MadresCubanas Por la Solidaridad- Mercedes Parada Antuñez.
Movimiento Democraciay Paz Oriente- Jorge L. Rodríguez González.
Movimiento DemocráticoCientífico- Juan Rafael Fernández.
Movimiento DemocráticoJosé Martí- A. Yonasky Hechevarría.
Movimiento Ecologistay Pacifista Naturpaz- Leonel Morejón Almagro.
Movimiento IgnacioAgramonte, Camagüey- José García Reyes.
Movimiento LiberalDemocrático- Héctor Fernando Maceda Gutiérrez.
Movimiento Libertad yDemocracia- Miguel Eumelio Sánchez Valiente.
Movimiento MaceístaPor la Dignidad- Isidro Herrera Castillo.
MovimientoNacionalista Democrático Máximo Gómez- Cancio Chan Aguilé.
Movimiento OpositorPacífico Panchito Gómez Toro- Secundino Costa Valdés.
Movimiento Pacifista 5de Agosto- Orlando Morejón Bitón.
Movimiento PacifistaPor la Democracia- Nancy Gutiérrez Pérez.
Movimiento PacifistaPor la Liberación- Tony Azoy.
Movimiento Pacifista,Solidaridad y Paz- Miguel A. Palenque Loveiro.
Movimiento Patria,Independencia y Libertad- Ramón Palma Rosell.
Movimiento Reflexión- Librado Linares García.
Movimiento VicenteGarcía, Las Tunas- Roberto Socorro Salgado.
Oficina de Informaciónde Derechos Humanos- Aida Valdés Santana.
Organización JuvenilMartiana- Luis Felipe Lorens Nodal.
Organización Opositora"20 de Mayo"- Celso Ledesma Cordero.
Partido Cubano ProDerechos Humanos- Ricardo Cruz González.
Partido DemócrataCristiano- María Valdés Rosado.
Partido DemócrataMartiano- Juan Francisco Monzón Oviedo.
Partido Democrático 30de Noviembre Frank País- Osmel Lugo Gutiérrez.
Partido Pro DerechosHumanos de Cuba- Odilia Collazo Valdés.
Partido Pro DerechosHumanos Independiente- Lázaro González Valdés.
Partido RenovaciónDemocrática- Jorge Adrián Ayala Corzo.
Partido SocialCristiano, Camagüey- Aurelio Sánchez Salazar.
Partido SolidaridadDemocrático- Héctor Palacio Ruíz.
Proyecto Cristiano Porlos Derechos Humanos y Sindicales, Santa Clara- Juan Antonio ValdésFundora.
Sociedad EcologistaCuba Verde- José Antonio Ramos Guerra.
Sociedad Política deLa Habana- Carlos M. Ríos.
Unión Cívica Nacional- Omar del Pozo Marrero.
Unión de Ex-PresosPolíticos Ignacio Agramonte- Reiler Ramírez Muñíz.
Unión de Ex-PresosPolíticos, Camagüey- Marcelino Soto Caballero.
Unión de Sindicatos deTrabajadores Cubanos- Ibrahín Carillo Fernández.
Unión DemocráticaMartiana- Ernesto Pablo Ramón Domínguez.
Unión Nacional Cubana- Carlos Prades.
Unión Patriótica CristianaIndependiente- Evaristo Pérez Rodríguez.
Unión SindicalCaballeros del Trabajo- Javier Troncoso Aguilar.

APPENDIX II
CONCILIO CUBANO STRUCTURE:
FEBRUARY 1996^[309][308]

Secretariado Nacional/National Secretariat:
DelegadoNacional/National Delegate: Leonel Morejón Almagro
Vice-Delegados/DeputyNational Delegates:
Reinaldo Cosano Alén
Lázaro González Valdés
Héctor Palacio Ruiz
Mercedes Paradas Antuñuz
Miembros honorario/HonoraryMembers:
Gustavo Arcos Bergnes
Oswaldo Payá Sardiñas
Elizardo Sánchez Santa Cruz
Consejo CoordinadorNacional(CNN)/National Coordinating Council:
Made up of 26 members, two each elected by each of the13 commissions established in different regions of the country.
Grupo de Apoyo/SupportGroup (also known as theGrupo de losSiete/Group of Seven):
Gustavo Arcos Bergnes
Félix Bonne Carcacés
René Gómez Manzano
Vladimiro Roca Antúnez
Marta Beatriz Roque
Elizardo Sánchez Santa Cruz
Jesús Yañez Pelletier

APPENDIX III
CONCILIO CUBANO MEMBERSHIP:
AUGUST 1996

In August 1996, theConcilioCubanoissued a second, somewhat reduced list of its member groups,following the crackdown by the Cuban government that began in February 1996.The list was distributed abroad by the Miami-basedGrupo de Apoyo a Concilio Cubano(GACC),Concilio CubanoSupport Group, and the groups were listed in noparticular order. It has been alphabetized here according to the name of eachmember group. The list as it originally appeared can be found on the GACC website at:
http://www.ccsi.com/~ams/concilio/org&repe.html.
When searching for a particular group, it should beremembered that some parts of a group's name may be dropped in common parlanceor in media accounts. For example, theMovimientoCubano de Jóvenes Por la Democracia, Cuban Movement of Youth for Democracy,is often referred to simply asJóvenesPor la Democracia. Also, spellings of people's name are not necessarilyexact, due in large part to the difficulties Cuban dissidents and independentjournalists experience in transmitting information between themselves and withthe world outside Cuba.
Agencia de PrensaIndependiente de Cuba- Manuel David Orrio.
Alianza deTrabajadores Demócrata Cristianos de Cuba- María Elena Argote González.
Alianza DemocráticaPopular- Zoíris Aguilar Calleja.
Alianza LiberalDemocrática- Pedro J. Brito Hernández.
Alianza PatrióticaCubana- Horacio Casanova.
Asociación Cívica"Félix Varela"- José M. Acosta Miyes.
Asociación CívicaDemocrática- Antonio Durán Urgeyéz and Aida Rosa Jiménez Rodríguez.
Asociación de JóvenesDemócratas- Ernesto Ival Alonso.
Asociación de LuchaFrente a la Injusticia Nacional- Reynaldo Faro García.
Asociación Defensorade los Derechos Políticos- Zoíris Aguilar Calleja.
Asociación Humanitariade Seguidores de Cristo Rey- Isabel del Pino Sotolongo.
AsociaciónIndependiente de Ayuda Humanitaria- Nancy de Varona Díaz.
Asociación Pro ArteLibre Independiente- Fernando Sánchez López.
Asociación ProDemocracia Constitucional- Ingeniero José Martínez Puí.
Bloque Democrático"José Martí"- Orlando Morejón Vitón.
Centro de EstudiosAlternativos- Heriberto Leyva Rodríguez.
Centro Independientede Derechos Humanos, Santiago de Cuba- Nicolás Rosario Rosabal.
Centro NoGubernamental de Derechos Humanos y Cultura de Paz "José de la Luz y Caballero"- Lorenzo Páez Nuñez.
Coalición DemocráticaCubana- Reynaldo Cosano Alén.
Colegio de Ingenierosy Arquitectos de Cuba- Orfilio García Quesada.
Comisión de DerechosHumanos y Reconciliación Nacional- Elizardo Sánchez Santa Cruz.
Comisión Humanitariade Ayuda al Preso Político- Agustín J. Arcos Amoya.
Comité Cubano deOpositores Pacíficos- Victoria "Vicky" Ruíz Labrit.
Comité de Apoyo a laDemocracia "Abraham Lincoln"- Enrique Aponte Costa.
Comité Martiano porlos Derechos del Hombre- Lara E. Ortíz González.
Comité por Paz,Progreso y Libertad- Alberto Perera Martínez.
Consejo Nacional porlos Derechos Civiles en Cuba- Jorge Omar Lázaro Pimienta.
Consejo Unitario deTrabajadores Cubanos(CUTC) - Pedro Pablo Alvarez Ramos.
Convención Martianapara la Unificación Nacional- Blanca Rosa Toledo Rodríguez.
Convención Martianapara la Unificación Nacional- Lázaro Santana Mezquía.
Coordinadora deDerechos Humanos- Antonio Durán Urgeyéz.
Coordinadora de PresosPolíticos- Aida Valdés Santana.
Corriente Agramontista- Jorge Bacallao Pérez.
Corriente LiberalCubana- Juan José López Díaz.
Corriente SocialistaDemocrática- Manuel Cuesta Morúa.
CubaPress- RaúlRivero Castañeda.
Foro de EstudiosHistóricos- Manuel Fernández Rocha.
Frente de UnidadNacional- José Antonio Fornaris.
Frente FemeninoHumanitario- Gladys Linares Blanco.
Instituto de laOpinión Pública- Jorge Bacallao Pérez.
Liga Cívica Martiana- Miguel Angel Aldana Ruíz.
Movimiento "13 deJulio"- Arnaldo de Varona Díaz.
Movimiento "13 deJulio" Mártires del Remolcador- Magdalena Pérez.
Movimiento "8 deSeptiembre"- Rolando Hernández Martínez.
Movimiento "IgnacioAgramontes"- José García Reyes.
Movimiento 24 deFebrero- Mario Remedios.
Movimiento AmorCristiano- Félix Perera González.
Movimiento Armonía- Rómulo Michelena Pérez.
Movimiento CristianoAmor y Pax- Sara Franco Leemook.
Movimiento Cubano deJóvenes por la Democracia- Heriberto Leyva Rodríguez.
Movimiento CubanoReflexión, Camajuaní- Librado Linares García.
Movimiento de MadresCubanas por la Solidaridad- Aida Rosa Jiménez Rodríguez.
Movimiento DemócrataCientífico- Juan Rafael Fernández Pellegrín.
Movimiento DemócrataCristiano- María Valdés Rosado.
Movimiento Humanitario"Mariana Grajales"- Gema Romero Yparraguirre.
MovimientoIndependiente de Estudios Martianos- Roberto Larramendi Estrada.
Movimiento LiberalDemocrático- Héctor S. Maceda Gutiérrez.
Movimiento Maceístapor la Dignidad Nacional- Isidro Herrera Carrillo and Pedro AlbertoRodríguez.
Movimiento Pacifistapor la Democracia- Nancy Gutiérrez Pérez.
Movimiento Pacifista,Solidaridad y Paz- Miguel Andrés Palenque Lobeiro.
Oficina de Informaciónde Derechos Humanos- Aida Valdés Santana.
Opositor Pacífico"Panchito Gómez Toro"- Secundino Costa Valdés.
Organización JuvenilMartiana- Luis Felipe Lorens Nodal.
Organización Opositora"20 de Mayo"- Celso Ledezma Cordero.
Partido AcciónNacionalista- Aguileo Cancio Chong.
Partido DemócrataCristiano- María Valdés Rosado.
Partido Democrático"30 de Noviembre" Frank País- Maritza Lugo Fernández.
Partido LiberalDemocrático- Rafael Santiago Montes.
Partido por laLibertad- Antonio R. Afoy Quintana.
Partido Pro DerechosHumanos de Cuba- Odilia Collazo Valdés.
Partido RenovaciónDemocrática Cubana- Jorge Adrián Ayala Corzo.
Partido SocialCristiano, Camagüey- Aurelio Sánchez Salazar.
Partido SocialDemócrata Cubana- Vladimiro Roca.
Sociedad deEcologistas "Cuba Verde"- Armando Javier Alonso Romero.
Sociedad Política deLa Habana "Cambio 2000"- Carlos M. Rivas.
Unión Cívica Nacional- Estévan Pérez Castillo.
Unión de Activistasdel Comité Pro Derechos Humanos, Golfo de Guancanayabo- Mirtha AleidaLópez Chávez.
Unión de JóvenesDemocráticos de Cuba- Raúl Rojas Pérez.
Unión Nacional Cubana-Carlos Enrique Prades Herrera.
Unión PatrióticaDemocrática Sindicalista Independiente- Ibraín Carrillo Fernández.
Unión SindicalIndependiente de Cuba- Lázaro Cuesta Collazo.

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Remarks by President Trump to the 74th Session of the United Nations General Assembly

Issued on: September 25, 2019

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United Nations Headquarters
New York, New York
September 24, 2019

10:12 A.M. EDT

PRESIDENT TRUMP:  Thank you very much.  Mr. President, Mr. Secretary-General, distinguished delegates, ambassadors, and world leaders:
Seven decades of history have passed through this hall, in all of their richness and drama.  Where I stand, the world has heard from presidents and premiers at the height of the Cold War.  We have seen the foundation of nations.  We have seen the ringleaders of revolution.  We have beheld saints who inspired us with hope, rebels who stirred us with passion, and heroes who emboldened us with courage — all here to share plans, proposals, visions, and ideas on the world’s biggest stage.
Like those who met us before, our time is one of great contests, high stakes, and clear choices.  The essential divide that runs all around the world and throughout history is once again thrown into stark relief.  It is the divide between those whose thirst for control deludes them into thinking they are destined to rule over others and those people and nations who want only to rule themselves.
I have the immense privilege of addressing you today as the elected leader of a nation that prizes liberty, independence, and self-government above all.  The United States, after having spent over two and a half trillion dollars since my election to completely rebuild our great military, is also, by far, the world’s most powerful nation.  Hopefully, it will never have to use this power.
Americans know that in a world where others seek conquest and domination, our nation must be strong in wealth, in might, and in spirit.  That is why the United States vigorously defends the traditions and customs that have made us who we are.
Like my beloved country, each nation represented in this hall has a cherished history, culture, and heritage that is worth defending and celebrating, and which gives us our singular potential and strength.
The free world must embrace its national foundations.  It must not attempt to erase them or replace them.
Looking around and all over this large, magnificent planet, the truth is plain to see: If you want freedom, take pride in your country.  If you want democracy, hold on to your sovereignty.  And if you want peace, love your nation.  Wise leaders always put the good of their own people and their own country first.
The future does not belong to globalists.  The future belongs to patriots.  The future belongs to sovereign and independent nations who protect their citizens, respect their neighbors, and honor the differences that make each country special and unique.
It is why we in the United States have embarked on an exciting program of national renewal.  In everything we do, we are focused on empowering the dreams and aspirations of our citizens.
Thanks to our pro-growth economic policies, our domestic unemployment rate reached its lowest level in over half a century.  Fueled by massive tax cuts and regulations cuts, jobs are being produced at a historic rate.  Six million Americans have been added to the employment rolls in under three years.
Last month, African American, Hispanic American, and Asian American unemployment reached their lowest rates ever recorded. We are marshaling our nation’s vast energy abundance, and the United States is now the number one producer of oil and natural gas anywhere in the world.  Wages are rising, incomes are soaring, and 2.5 million Americans have been lifted out of poverty in less than three years.
As we rebuild the unrivaled might of the American military, we are also revitalizing our alliances by making it very clear that all of our partners are expected to pay their fair share of the tremendous defense burden, which the United States has borne in the past.
At the center of our vision for national renewal is an ambitious campaign to reform international trade.  For decades, the international trading system has been easily exploited by nations acting in very bad faith.  As jobs were outsourced, a small handful grew wealthy at the expense of the middle class.
In America, the result was 4.2 million lost manufacturing jobs and $15 trillion in trade deficits over the last quarter century.  The United States is now taking that decisive action to end this grave economic injustice.  Our goal is simple: We want balanced trade that is both fair and reciprocal.
We have worked closely with our partners in Mexico and Canada to replace NAFTA with the brand new and hopefully bipartisan U.S.-Mexico-Canada Agreement.
Tomorrow, I will join Prime Minister Abe of Japan to continue our progress in finalizing a terrific new trade deal.
As the United Kingdom makes preparations to exit the European Union, I have made clear that we stand ready to complete an exceptional new trade agreement with the UK that will bring tremendous benefits to both of our countries.  We are working closely with Prime Minister Boris Johnson on a magnificent new trade deal.
The most important difference in America’s new approach on trade concerns our relationship with China.  In 2001, China was admitted to the World Trade Organization.  Our leaders then argued that this decision would compel China to liberalize its economy and strengthen protections to provide things that were unacceptable to us, and for private property and for the rule of law.  Two decades later, this theory has been tested and proven completely wrong.
Not only has China declined to adopt promised reforms, it has embraced an economic model dependent on massive market barriers, heavy state subsidies, currency manipulation, product dumping, forced technology transfers, and the theft of intellectual property and also trade secrets on a grand scale.
As just one example, I recently met the CEO of a terrific American company, Micron Technology, at the White House.  Micron produces memory chips used in countless electronics.  To advance the Chinese government’s five-year economic plan, a company owned by the Chinese state allegedly stole Micron’s designs, valued at up to $8.7 billion.  Soon, the Chinese company obtains patents for nearly an identical product, and Micron was banned from selling its own goods in China.  But we are seeking justice.
The United States lost 60,000 factories after China entered the WTO.  This is happening to other countries all over the globe.
The World Trade Organization needs drastic change.  The second-largest economy in the world should not be permitted to declare itself a “developing country” in order to game the system at others’ expense.
For years, these abuses were tolerated, ignored, or even encouraged.  Globalism exerted a religious pull over past leaders, causing them to ignore their own national interests.
But as far as America is concerned, those days are over.  To confront these unfair practices, I placed massive tariffs on more than $500 billion worth of Chinese-made goods.  Already, as a result of these tariffs, supply chains are relocating back to America and to other nations, and billions of dollars are being paid to our Treasury.
The American people are absolutely committed to restoring balance to our relationship with China.  Hopefully, we can reach an agreement that would be beneficial for both countries.  But as I have made very clear, I will not accept a bad deal for the American people.
As we endeavor to stabilize our relationship, we’re also carefully monitoring the situation in Hong Kong.  The world fully expects that the Chinese government will honor its binding treaty, made with the British and registered with the United Nations, in which China commits to protect Hong Kong’s freedom, legal system, and democratic ways of life.  How China chooses to handle the situation will say a great deal about its role in the world in the future.  We are all counting on President Xi as a great leader.
The United States does not seek conflict with any other nation.  We desire peace, cooperation, and mutual gain with all.  But I will never fail to defend America’s interests.
One of the greatest security threats facing peace-loving nations today is the repressive regime in Iran.  The regime’s record of death and destruction is well known to us all.  Not only is Iran the world’s number one state sponsor of terrorism, but Iran’s leaders are fueling the tragic wars in both Syria and Yemen.
At the same time, the regime is squandering the nation’s wealth and future in a fanatical quest for nuclear weapons and the means to deliver them.  We must never allow this to happen.
To stop Iran’s path to nuclear weapons and missiles, I withdrew the United States from the terrible Iran nuclear deal, which has very little time remaining, did not allow inspection of important sites, and did not cover ballistic missiles.
Following our withdrawal, we have implemented severe economic sanctions on the country.  Hoping to free itself from sanctions, the regime has escalated its violent and unprovoked aggression.  In response to Iran’s recent attack on Saudi Arabian oil facilities, we just imposed the highest level of sanctions on Iran’s central bank and sovereign wealth fund.
All nations have a duty to act.  No responsible government should subsidize Iran’s bloodlust.  As long as Iran’s menacing behavior continues, sanctions will not be lifted; they will be tightened.  Iran’s leaders will have turned a proud nation into just another cautionary tale of what happens when a ruling class abandons its people and embarks on a crusade for personal power and riches.
For 40 years, the world has listened to Iran’s rulers as they lash out at everyone else for the problems they alone have created.  They conduct ritual chants of “Death to America” and traffic in monstrous anti-Semitism.  Last year the country’s Supreme Leader stated, “Israel is a malignant cancerous tumor…that has to be removed and eradicated: it is possible and it will happen.”  America will never tolerate such anti-Semitic hate.
Fanatics have long used hatred of Israel to distract from their own failures.  Thankfully, there is a growing recognition in the wider Middle East that the countries of the region share common interests in battling extremism and unleashing economic opportunity.  That is why it is so important to have full, normalized relations between Israel and its neighbors.  Only a relationship built on common interests, mutual respect, and religious tolerance can forge a better future.
Iran’s citizens deserve a government that cares about reducing poverty, ending corruption, and increasing jobs — not stealing their money to fund a massacre abroad and at home.
After four decades of failure, it is time for Iran’s leaders to step forward and to stop threatening other countries, and focus on building up their own country.  It is time for Iran’s leaders to finally put the Iranian people first.
America is ready to embrace friendship with all who genuinely seek peace and respect.
Many of America’s closest friends today were once our gravest foes.  The United States has never believed in permanent enemies.  We want partners, not adversaries.  America knows that while anyone can make war, only the most courageous can choose peace.
For this same reason, we have pursued bold diplomacy on the Korean Peninsula. I have told Kim Jong Un what I truly believe: that, like Iran, his country is full of tremendous untapped potential, but that to realize that promise, North Korea must denuclearize.
Around the world, our message is clear: America’s goal is lasting, America’s goal is harmony, and America’s goal is not to go with these endless wars — wars that never end.
With that goal in mind, my administration is also pursuing the hope of a brighter future in Afghanistan.  Unfortunately, the Taliban has chosen to continue their savage attacks.  And we will continue to work with our coalition of Afghan partners to stamp out terrorism, and we will never stop working to make peace a reality.
Here in the Western Hemisphere, we are joining with our partners to ensure stability and opportunity all across the region.  In that mission, one of our most critical challenges is illegal immigration, which undermines prosperity, rips apart societies, and empowers ruthless criminal cartels.
Mass illegal migration is unfair, unsafe, and unsustainable for everyone involved: the sending countries and the depleted countries.  And they become depleted very fast, but their youth is not taken care of and human capital goes to waste.
The receiving countries are overburdened with more migrants than they can responsibly accept.  And the migrants themselves are exploited, assaulted, and abused by vicious coyotes.  Nearly one third of women who make the journey north to our border are sexually assaulted along the way.  Yet, here in the United States and around the world, there is a growing cottage industry of radical activists and non-governmental organizations that promote human smuggling.  These groups encourage illegal migration and demand erasure of national borders.
Today, I have a message for those open border activists who cloak themselves in the rhetoric of social justice: Your policies are not just.  Your policies are cruel and evil.  You are empowering criminal organizations that prey on innocent men, women, and children.  You put your own false sense of virtue before the lives, wellbeing, and [of] countless innocent people.  When you undermine border security, you are undermining human rights and human dignity.
Many of the countries here today are coping with the challenges of uncontrolled migration.  Each of you has the absolute right to protect your borders, and so, of course, does our country.  Today, we must resolve to work together to end human smuggling, end human trafficking, and put these criminal networks out of business for good.
To our country, I can tell you sincerely: We are working closely with our friends in the region — including Mexico, Canada, Guatemala, Honduras, El Salvador, and Panama — to uphold the integrity of borders and ensure safety and prosperity for our people.  I would like to thank President López Obrador of Mexico for the great cooperation we are receiving and for right now putting 27,000 troops on our southern border.  Mexico is showing us great respect, and I respect them in return.
The U.S., we have taken very unprecedented action to stop the flow of illegal immigration.  To anyone considering crossings of our border illegally, please hear these words: Do not pay the smugglers.  Do not pay the coyotes.  Do not put yourself in danger.  Do not put your children in danger.  Because if you make it here, you will not be allowed in; you will be promptly returned home.  You will not be released into our country.  As long as I am President of the United States, we will enforce our laws and protect our borders.
For all of the countries of the Western Hemisphere, our goal is to help people invest in the bright futures of their own nation.  Our region is full of such incredible promise: dreams waiting to be built and national destinies for all.  And they are waiting also to be pursued.
Throughout the hemisphere, there are millions of hardworking, patriotic young people eager to build, innovate, and achieve.  But these nations cannot reach their potential if a generation of youth abandon their homes in search of a life elsewhere.  We want every nation in our region to flourish and its people to thrive in freedom and peace.
In that mission, we are also committed to supporting those people in the Western Hemisphere who live under brutal oppression, such as those in Cuba, Nicaragua, and Venezuela.
According to a recent report from the U.N. Human Rights Council, women in Venezuela stand in line for 10 hours a day waiting for food.  Over 15,000 people have been detained as political prisoners.  Modern-day death squads are carrying out thousands of extrajudicial killings.
The dictator Maduro is a Cuban puppet, protected by Cuban bodyguards, hiding from his own people while Cuba plunders Venezuela’s oil wealth to sustain its own corrupt communist rule.
Since I last spoke in this hall, the United States and our partners have built a historic coalition of 55 countries that recognize the legitimate government of Venezuela.
To the Venezuelans trapped in this nightmare: Please know that all of America is united behind you.  The United States has vast quantities of humanitarian aid ready and waiting to be delivered.  We are watching the Venezuela situation very closely.  We await the day when democracy will be restored, when Venezuela will be free, and when liberty will prevail throughout this hemisphere.
One of the most serious challenges our countries face is the specter of socialism.  It’s the wrecker of nations and destroyer of societies.
Events in Venezuela remind us all that socialism and communism are not about justice, they are not about equality, they are not about lifting up the poor, and they are certainly not about the good of the nation.  Socialism and communism are about one thing only: power for the ruling class.
Today, I repeat a message for the world that I have delivered at home: America will never be a socialist country.
In the last century, socialism and communism killed 100 million people.  Sadly, as we see in Venezuela, the death toll continues in this country.  These totalitarian ideologies, combined with modern technology, have the power to excise [exercise] new and disturbing forms of suppression and domination.
For this reason, the United States is taking steps to better screen foreign technology and investments and to protect our data and our security.  We urge every nation present to do the same.
Freedom and democracy must be constantly guarded and protected, both abroad and from within.  We must always be skeptical of those who want conformity and control.  Even in free nations, we see alarming signs and new challenges to liberty.
A small number of social media platforms are acquiring immense power over what we can see and over what we are allowed to say.  A permanent political class is openly disdainful, dismissive, and defiant of the will of the people.  A faceless bureaucracy operates in secret and weakens democratic rule.  Media and academic institutions push flat-out assaults on our histories, traditions, and values.
In the United States, my administration has made clear to social media companies that we will uphold the right of free speech.  A free society cannot allow social media giants to silence the voices of the people, and a free people must never, ever be enlisted in the cause of silencing, coercing, canceling, or blacklisting their own neighbors.
As we defend American values, we affirm the right of all people to live in dignity.  For this reason, my administration is working with other nations to stop criminalizing of homosexuality, and we stand in solidarity with LGBTQ people who live in countries that punish, jail, or execute individuals based upon sexual orientation.
We are also championing the role of women in our societies.  Nations that empower women are much wealthier, safer, and much more politically stable.  It is therefore vital not only to a nation’s prosperity, but also is vital to its national security, to pursue women’s economic development.
Guided by these principles, my administration launched the Women’s Global Development and Prosperity Initiatives.  The W-GDP is first-ever government-wide approach to women’s economic empowerment, working to ensure that women all over the planet have the legal right to own and inherit property, work in the same industries as men, travel freely, and access credit and institutions.
Yesterday, I was also pleased to host leaders for a discussion about an ironclad American commitment: protecting religious leaders and also protecting religious freedom.  This fundamental right is under growing threat around the world.  Hard to believe, but 80 percent of the world’s population lives in countries where religious liberty is in significant danger or even completely outlawed.  Americans will never fire or tire in our effort to defend and promote freedom of worship and religion.  We want and support religious liberty for all.
Americans will also never tire of defending innocent life.  We are aware that many United Nations projects have attempted to assert a global right to taxpayer-funded abortion on demand, right up until the moment of delivery.  Global bureaucrats have absolutely no business attacking the sovereignty of nations that wish to protect innocent life.  Like many nations here today, we in America believe that every child — born and unborn — is a sacred gift from God.
There is no circumstance under which the United States will allow international entries [entities] to trample on the rights of our citizens, including the right to self-defense.  That is why, this year, I announced that we will never ratify the U.N. Arms Trade Treaty, which would threaten the liberties of law-abiding American citizens.  The United States will always uphold our constitutional right to keep and bear arms.  We will always uphold our Second Amendment.
The core rights and values America defends today were inscribed in America’s founding documents.  Our nation’s Founders understood that there will always be those who believe they are entitled to wield power and control over others. Tyranny advances under many names and many theories, but it always comes down to the desire for domination.  It protects not the interests of many, but the privilege of few.
Our Founders gave us a system designed to restrain this dangerous impulse.  They chose to entrust American power to those most invested in the fate of our nation: a proud and fiercely independent people.
The true good of a nation can only be pursued by those who love it: by citizens who are rooted in its history, who are nourished by its culture, committed to its values, attached to its people, and who know that its future is theirs to build or theirs to lose.  Patriots see a nation and its destiny in ways no one else can.
Liberty is only preserved, sovereignty is only secured, democracy is only sustained, greatness is only realized, by the will and devotion of patriots.  In their spirit is found the strength to resist oppression, the inspiration to forge legacy, the goodwill to seek friendship, and the bravery to reach for peace.  Love of our nations makes the world better for all nations.
So to all the leaders here today, join us in the most fulfilling mission a person could have, the most profound contribution anyone can make: Lift up your nations.  Cherish your culture.  Honor your histories.  Treasure your citizens. Make your countries strong, and prosperous, and righteous.  Honor the dignity of your people, and nothing will be outside of your reach.
When our nations are greater, the future will be brighter, our people will be happier, and our partnerships will be stronger.
With God’s help, together we will cast off the enemies of liberty and overcome the oppressors of dignity.  We will set new standards of living and reach new heights of human achievement. We will rediscover old truths, unravel old mysteries, and make thrilling new breakthroughs.  And we will find more beautiful friendship and more harmony among nations than ever before.
My fellow leaders, the path to peace and progress, and freedom and justice, and a better world for all humanity, begins at home.
Thank you.  God bless you.  God bless the nations of the world.  And God bless America.  Thank you very much.  (Applause.)

END

10:49 A.M. EDT

The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, says that "Congress shall make no law....abridging (limiting) the freedom of speech, or of the press..." Freedom of speech is the liberty to speak openly without fear of government restraint. It is closely linked to freedom of the press because this freedom includes both the right to speak and the right to be heard. In the United States, both the freedom of speech and freedom of press are commonly called freedom of expression.